On Fri, 12 Dec 1997, Greg Billock wrote:
> Have you read _One Long Argument_ by Mayr? He gives 5 aspects of
> evolutionary theory as set forth by Darwin. In my experience, the
> biggest confusions in popular usage are between four very different
> theories.
No, I haven't read it. Thanks for the recommendation, and I'll do my best
to get to it soon.
(snip)
> Third, there is the theory of common descent, which is a part
> of the body of evolutionary theory, but is often what anti-
> evolutionists object to..."I don't believe people came from
> monkeys!" This is an assumption for most modern work on the
> subject.
I was aware that this is so, but I couldn't figure out how to put it into
my discussion of the 8 points. Notice that I said "At least 8 ..." I agree
with you that it's quite important, but it didn't seem necessary to the
point(s) I was trying to make. Perhaps I was wrong about that.
> Fourth, there is the group of theories about how common descent
> (and current evolution) took place--which forces drove it, what
> their relative importance is, what limiting factors are there,
>
>
> > 5. 3 + 4 together (i.e., mutation + natural selection, in
> > whatever way these may be understood) are the cause of *some*
> > (but not all) changes in biological organisms.
>
> This is the neo-Darwinist position.
I don't think so -- it seems to me that the neo-Darwinist
position claims more than my # 5, that, in fact, the neo-
Darwinist position is my #6 below. Or, as I'll show in a minute,
at least Dawkins seems to conclude that both my #6 and
#7 are true.
> > Group-B:
> > 6. 3 + 4 together (i.e., mutation + natural selection) can
> > account for *all* changes in biological organisms (i.e., can
> > account for all speciation and the coming into being of all
> > biological differences and biological structures, after the
> > first living cell appears).
>
> No evolutionists believe this.
Wrong. Dawkins holds this view.
Richard Dawkins, *The Blind Watchmaker* (Norton, 1986):
"EVOLUTION basically consists of endless repetition of
REPRODUCTION. In every generation, REPRODUCTION takes the genes
that are supplied to it by the previous generation, and hands
them on to the next generation but with minor random errors --
mutations. [p.56] ... Mutation is random with respect to adaptive
advantage, although it is non-random in all sorts of other
respects. It is selection, and only selection, that direct
evolution in directions that are non-random with respect to
advantage. [p. 312] ... The theory of evolution by cumulative
natural selection is the only theory we know of that is in
principle *capable* of explaining the existence of organized
complexity. [p. 316]" (Emphasis in Dawkins's text.)
Darwin also believed it [minus a full understanding of mutation,
which hadn't yet been incorporated into the view in his time]:
"If it could be demonstrated that any complex [biological] organ
existed which could not possibly have been formed by numerous,
successive, slight modifications, my theory would absolutely
break down." (*The Origin of Species* 1859)
> > 7. 3 + 4 together (i.e., mutation + natural selection) are the
> > only possible (or intellectually credible) account for all
> > changes in biological organisms.
>
> Or this.
Wrong again. Dawkins believes it:
"The theory of evolution by cumulative natural selection is the
*only* [my emphasis] theory we know of that is in principle
*capable* [Dawkins's emphasis] of explaining the existence of
organized complexity. ... *Cumulative selection* [Dawkins's
emphasis], by slow and gradual degrees, is *the* [my emphasis]
explanation, the only workable explanation that has ever been
proposed, for the existence of life's complex design." [p. 317]
> > 8. Metaphysical naturalism must be accepted as the only (possible
> > or intellectually credible) stance. (As opposed to
> > metaphysical supernaturalism or theism.)
>
> Some believe this, however. This is a philosophical argument,
> though, not one particularly identified with biological evolution--
> why evolutionary theory instead of gravitational theory is
> singled out by Johnson and others for objection in this regard
> seems a bit mysterious.
I can't speak for Johnson, but I suspect that the reason is that
metaphysical naturalism in physics, plumbing, car repair, or
computer science does not impinge on religious views about human
origins and value, whereas metaphysical naturalism in biology
does.
> > 5 are true. *If evolution is defined as claiming that any or all
> > of the statements 1 through 5 are true, but only that,* then we
> > can say that evolution is conclusively shown to be true. Thus, if
> > the claim "evolution is true" means *only* that one or more of
> > the statements 1 through 5 is asserted to be true, then that
> > claim "evolution is true" is warranted or true.
>
> > Here, however, is the most important point: The truth of any
> > of the statements 1 through 5 -- or of all the statements 1
> > through 5 taken together -- does *not* yield the truth of *any*
> > of the statements 6 through 8.
>
> However true that may be, it is hard to see how that impacts the
> debate, since no evolutionists maintain either 6 or 7,
I've already shown that your claim here is false -- some leading
evolutionists [and, I suspect, nearly all of them, more or less]
*do* maintain both 6 and 7.
> and 8 is
> a much broader base which everyone doing science, medicine, business,
> interior decorating, plumbing, watch repairing, and political
> campaign junketing takes as a working hypothesis.
Yes and no. *Many* -- if not most -- of the most successful
people working in medicine, business, and political campaigning
adopt extra-naturalistic accounts and explanations (i.e.,
spiritualistic ones) of phenomena and happenings in their fields.
I suspect that the same is true of interior decorating. In the
case of science, although metaphysical naturalism is adopted in
*testing* hypotheses, some form of spiritualistic insight is
responsible for at least some important hypothesis proposals.
The American philosopher C.S. Peirce [the founder of pragmatism,
and the greatest American philosopher ever], for example,
discussed what he called "abductive inference." Abduction is the
process by which we reason: `Such and such phenomena "p" are
observed. If theory "T" were true, it would explain p. Thus we
accept T (tentatively) as the explanation of p.' In explaining
this process of abduction Peirce said that it works by "Divine
inspiration."
> > The error in much evolutionist thinking and argumentation comes
> > about, I think, because of this confusion: 1 through 5 are known
> > to be true. Moreover the truth of 1 through 5 offers some
> > evidence toward the truth of one or more of the statements 6
> > through 8. On that basis, many evolutionists go on to assert that
> > one or more of the statements 6 through 8 is true.
>
> I think we'll need more evidence than this that any evolutionists
> believe that 6 or 7 is true.
Wrong. I think I've given what amounts to a Q.E.D. proof that at
least some prominent evolutionists believe that both 6 and 7 are
true.
> There was a time, BTW, when practically
> no evolutionists believed Darwin's selection theory accounted for
> much of any of biology. The neo-Darwinian group of theories has
> placed selection back in a prominent role, but certainly not as
> the only operator. Neutralist theory, genetic drift, horizontal
> transfer, and (I can hardly believe you're missing this one ;-))
> sex are all key components of the modern synthesis.
Yes, you're right. But notice that all these are just further
specifications and descriptions of natural selection theory. So
your point here doesn't go anywhere to denying that selection
theory is the cornerstone of evolutionism.
> Current
> arguments rage over their relative importance, and about how best
> to understand the units of selection, and about the details of
> the dynamics of the processes.
>
> > I need to consider for my purposes here.) On the basis of the
> > truth of 1 through 5, Dawkins then goes on to assert the truth of
> > 6 and then 7 *without giving anywhere near sufficient evidence
> > for their truth* -- instead he gives a lot of hand-waving and "it
> > must have been's" and "we can only suppose's" and so on -- what
>
> To the contrary, Dawkins *does* think mechanisms other than selection
> are responsible for evolutionary history, he just doesn't regard them
> as interesting. This is a topic of much heated debate on talk.origins;
> I suggest you take a look there under 'High Table' 'Dawkins' 'selectionism'
> and see what you find.
Fair enough. I'll look.
> > scientific investigation. As you can tell from my tone here,
> > Dawkins irritates and offends me immensely; I regard *The Blind
> > Watchmaker* as being not just factually or logically wrong, but
> > evil.
>
> My suggestion is that in combatting evil, you make sure to get
> the facts straight yourself, or you'll give the appearance of
> a rush to judgment.
Yes. You're completely right here.
> > First, what is usually called modern science -- that is the
> > empirical science of today that goes back at least to Copernicus
> > -- has been successful because it has adopted statement 8 (the
> > stance of metaphysical naturalism) as its methodological stance.
>
> Science isn't the only human pursuit that takes naturalism as
> a methodology. In fact pretty much every human pursuit takes
> naturalism as an assumption. Plumbers assume there is some
> naturalistic reason why the pipes are blocked--they don't consult
> horoscopes and read your palm, they use Roto-Rooter.
I responded to this point above.
Maybe plumbers don't do this (although I suspect some do), but
many highly-successful businessmen, medical practitioners,
conductors of political campaigns, etc. are attuned to extra-
naturalistic (i.e. spiritual) phenomena (prayer, etc.), and use
them in their work. It's wrong to diminish such phenomena by
trivializing them with words such as "consult horoscopes and read
your palm."
> > in naturalistic terms -- i.e., it has held that there must be a
> > naturalistic explanation (as opposed to a supernatural one) for
> > everything. We have methods for testing naturalistic hypotheses,
> > but we do not really have methods for testing extra-naturalistic
> > or supernaturalistic ones. Another way of making this point is to
>
> How would you suggest we proceed, then, if we abandon naturalism?
> Many scientific projects (even naturalistic ones) proceed on the
> basis of 'let's see how far we can get with this line of approach.'
> This is usually because it is just too hard to crunch out the
> more complete theory, so an approximation is used to try to make
> progress. The same is true for whole research programs--they try
> to make sense of some mystery given the current theories afloat,
> and see how far they get. Solar neutrino research is a good
> example. If you are suggesting we incorporate supernaturalism
> into our theories, you need to provide at least two methodologies.
> First, we need a method to determine when to pull in the
> supernatural. Is it after the first attempt fails? "Well, epicycles
> just can't explain the bright dots around Jupiter, so the whole
> of astronomy must be supernatural, let's go do something else."
> Is it when the best, most up-to-date attempt fails? Is it after
> 40 years of failure? Second, we need methods to adjudicate between
> competing supernaturalistic explanations. While judging between
> naturalistic theories is seldom as clean as "do the experiment and
> see," I'm not sure there is any acceptable precedent for adjudicating
> supernaturalistic theories.
Yes, you're quite right in the points you make here. I thought
that I was making the same -- or similar -- points in what I
wrote in this section of my paper. Maybe I was not sufficiently
clear in doing so.
> > not have come about. Moreover, although there may be ways of
> > testing extra-naturalistic hypotheses, we have not, in fact,
> > possessed them in any way that we could really call scientific.
> > The question of whether extra-naturalistic hypotheses and
> > explanations can be tested in any adequate way thus remains open
> > and unanswered, I think. Another way of saying this is that we do
> > not at this time have available any good or adequate model or
> > paradigm for a non-naturalistic science.
>
> That may be, but before castigating people for not using these
> undefined methods, it might be more appropriate to first define
> them, show how beneficial they are, and then offer them for use.
>
> [paradigm shifts]
>
> Paradigm shifts in science have typically come from a new research
> program gaining much more momentum than its competitors, and
> simply sweeping them off the field.
Yes, this is correct. I do not see this as my role, however. I'm
not a working scientist, but a philosopher of science. As such, I
take a critical stance toward what is offered to see whether it
passes logical and methodological muster. (That sounds arrogant,
as if philosophers set themselves up as arbiters of what's OK and
what's not. I do not wish to be arrogant, but I do think that
philosophy has a vital role here, and I think that philosophers -
- some of them anyway -- have particular training that enables
them to have special acuity and be of special service in this
role.)
> One key ingredient in this
> process (what many scientists wish was the only ingredient) is how
> well the research program is doing in solving interesting problems
> in a field. You can't build momentum in science on rhetoric alone--
> you need a replacement method or theory which does better than
> the competitors and, hopefully, explains where and why they were
> wrong.
Yes. Here I completely agree with you.
> The supernaturalistic research program seems to be stalled
> in the rhetoric stage--it has produced no interesting and useful
> results, no contributions to any area deemed important and interesting
> by other scientific programs.
Yes, I agree here too. There may exist, somewhere, a research
program that can be properly called supernaturalistic that has
interesting and useful results that could be deemed to be
scientific, but I'm not aware of any such.
There *is* a problem here, however. There's an ongoing tendency
to define science as "that which deals with the metaphysically
naturalistic." So long as we accept such a definition, either
consciously or unconsciously, we won't be able to proceed on this
front.
> When it progresses beyond the pouting
> and foot-stamping stage, it will, perhaps, be worth listening to.
> (And don't think for a second that naturalistic research programs
> don't go through this stage! :-)) It is the responsibility of
> folks like yourself to push the program forward.
>
> -Greg
Thanks for your response. I think that such exchanges do push
forward the program of having fruitful discussions about the
evolution question.
Lloyd Eby