Re: ICR and its slurs

Keith Plummer (keithp@starnetinc.com)
Thu, 05 Jun 1997 17:15:42 -0500

Russell Stewart wrote:
>
> At 07:36 PM 6/4/97 -0500, you wrote:
> >Russell Stewart wrote:
> >
[snip]
>
> If it was an isolated incident, then I would probably conclude that the
> latter were more likely. But I would certainly have some doubts. And if
> something similar happened again, my doubts would grow, and if it continued,
> my doubts would gradually disappear.
>
> Remember, however, that one of the central tenets of science is that we
> do *not* know all there is to know about the universe (and many people,
> including myself, believe that we never can). So just seing something for
> which there is not a naturalistic explanation would not be satisfactory.
> It would have to be something for which there *could not* be a naturalistic
> explanation.

That's exactly my point. Given your materialistic worldview you will
never come to the conlcusion that an event *cannot* be accounted for
naturalistically. Indeed it would be impossible for you to know that
such was the case given what you've said about the limitations of our
knowledge of the universe. If, as you believe, we can never know all
there is to know about the workings of the universe, how apart from
omniscience could one ever be justified in concluding that a given event
*could not* be naturalistically explained? This is what I meant when I
said that your materialism is practically unfalsifiable. Either you
will offer a materialistic explanation for such an event or you will
claim ignorance of a yet unknown materialistic explanation although you
would be certatain that such existed.
>
[snip]
>
> I agree. I think that the existence of God is something that can never
> be proven or disproven logically. So the question remains: how can Jim
> prove that his moral system is truly objective and transcendent?
>
> >The issue is one of competing worldviews which
> >should be evaluated in terms of their internal consistency and their
> >ability to provide the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility
> >of our experience including ethics, science, logic, and epistemology.
> >It is my contention that materialism fails miserably on both counts.
>
> A contention without any rational basis. Not only that, but a contention
> that is strongly contradicted by the facts.

Would you mind telling me what "facts" you have in mind? And remember,
what one considers "factual" is also a product of his/her worldview.
>
> >I'm curious, Russ. Why is it that you regard logic and experimental
> >evidence as superior epistemological sources?
>
> Because they have a very reliable track record.

You seem to be relying upon the inductive principle here. Can you offer
a rational justification for that principle without assuming what you
are seeking to prove?
>
[snip]

> >The question was asked before but I don't believe you addressed it in
> >detail. I take it from your concern for logical consistency and proof,
> >that you think highly of logic. What exactly do you believe the laws of
> >logic to be (I don't want you to enumerate them but rather to tell me
> >what you think their nature is i.e. are they human convention, etc.)
>
> I think that they are certainly human convention, and that they are one of
> the most powerful and useful tools developed by the human mind.

If the laws of logic are in fact creations of the human mind, then it
seems inescapable that they are contingent and not necesary truths. In
other words, they might have been other than they are. They could have
been false. A necessary truth, on the other hand, is one that *must* be
true in all circumstances. Please keep in mind that I'm not referring
to physical but logical necessity here. Laws of nature are not
logically necessary. I can conceive of my letting go of an object and
it hanging supsended in midair without violating any principle of
rationality. On the contrary, I cannot conceive of a case in which the
law of contradiction did not hold true. I can't conceive of being
totally wet and totally dry at the same time. Neither can I think of a
case in which a statement could be both true and false at the same time
and in the same respect.

If in fact the laws of logic are contingent, then it is possible that
they could change, in which case they are not invariable. Russ, do you
believe that the laws of logic are absolute, invariable, and
immaterial? If so, how does such a belief comport with your naturalism
and if not, then why do you refer to logic as if it were absolute and
invariable? Have the laws of logic changed with the evolution of man's
brain? As you said, these are certainly not easy issues but I'd very
much like to hear your thoughts on them.