I don't know how much light I can shed on the issue of which hominids =
were theological human.
There are very good reasons, I believe, to think that HAL and his ilk =
ARE NOT conscious in the ordinary sense of the term (what I called sense =
(a)). But this doesn't give a direct argument for knowing which beings =
ARE conscious. To put this another way, it's easier to spell out with =
scientific precision some of the things that consciousness -isn't- than =
exactly what it -is-.
How do I know, e.g., that -you- are conscious? Surely I do know that -- =
what could be more obvious? But -how- do I justify such a belief? =
About the best than can be done so far as a logical argument goes is the =
argument from analogy: I'm conscious, and you look and act a lot like =
me (no offense intended!), therefore probably you're conscious. But =
that's not a very compelling argument -- an enormous extrapolation to =
the whole human race from an introspective sample of size one. And not =
many of us think "Bill is my best friend. He's -very probably- =
conscious, too." So it seems that a significant part of our conviction =
that others are conscious is grounded not only in our experience or =
argument, but in ourselves. We have, built into us, something like an a =
priori tendency to believe that other people are as conscious as we are. =
And we've little choice (in this case) but to trust our intuitions =
(which are foundational, though not incorrigibly so, to everything we =
believe).
Unfortunately, so far as determining which hominids are true humans in a =
spiritual sense, this just doesn't buy us much one way or the other, =
because (1) it doesn't really give a compelling argument for thinking =
some set of beings IS conscious (though I think our intuitions would be =
rather strong with respect to protohumans or early humans; hey, aren't =
cats and dogs conscious??), and -much- more importantly (2) =
consciousness is -necessary- but -not sufficient- for theological =
humanity.
All this work, and so little to show for it so far as the question of =
the hour goes, Glenn. :^< (This is important stuff to keep straight for =
many other reasons too, of course.) I haven't followed -utterly- =
closely, because of time, the threads on things like Shaman art, vocal =
abilities, civilization, innovation, and other human characteristics. =
But like you, I think these are going to be more relevant in going =
beyond mere consciousness to determining real humanity.
Maybe this is what you were asking (I insert this after reading a =
subsequent posting of yours I just received): given that the Turing test =
is invalid or even worthless for showing machine consciousness in sense =
(a), is examining early hominids for signs of similarity to modern =
humans similarly invalid or worthless as an argument for their =
theological humanity? If the Turing test is worthless in showing HAL to =
be conscious, is it likewise worthless when used with hominids?
I don't think so, no. Now if one means, would relevant similarities =
PROVE they're as theologically significant as modern humans, the answer =
is no. But that's too high a standard (since, again, I can't PROVE that =
you're conscious from any premises more certain than my belief that you =
are conscious). But they would SUGGEST that for hominids, since there =
is no coercive defeater that completely undercuts them. With HAL 9000, =
the similarities to intelligent human speech would suggest "he" is =
conscious, but then we learn that he is -certainly- -fully- explainable =
without reference to anything like consciousness, because he is a =
reductionistically materialistic machine. With early hominids, we have =
no such defeater. Many scientists would PRESUME that, but a presumption =
is not a truth. And certainly a -methodological- presumption is not an =
-ontological- truth. So the argument that defeats HAL does not, so far =
as I can tell, harm the Turing test of the hominids at all.
One thing I would say is that I suspect this issue of theological =
humanity is going to be extremely difficult to resolve with certainty, =
for both reasons of both theological and empirical incompleteness, =
vagueness, and ambiguity. We may never know this side of eternity, and =
we may need to work with our theories with a significant and ongoing =
level of uncertainty.
--John
----------
From: Glenn Morton[SMTP:grmorton@psyberlink.net]
Sent: Friday, January 31, 1997 10:49 pm
To: John E. Rylander; 'Calvin Evolution Reflector'
Subject: RE: Turing test
At 05:42 PM 1/31/97 -0600, John E. Rylander wrote:
> (If anyone wants me to respond to the argument "Well, but how do you =
know=20
PEOPLE are conscious? By their behavior. So if computers behave the =
same=20
way, we should draw the same conclusions, unless we are (to use =
Hofstader's=20
delightful term) 'meat-based chauvinists'", let me know, but it may be=20
obvious how I'd reply based on my HAL comments.)
In light of the above, how would you go about determining which of the=20
hominids is human in a theological sense?
glenn
Foundation, Fall and Flood
http://www.isource.net/~grmorton/dmd.htm