MA:==
>I think you have misunderstood Gould, Brian. My impression was that
>he was trying to argue for evolution against special creation (but without
>the theological tightness us theists would have liked). Funny
>solutions are proof that God did not SPECIALLY create not that He did
>not create at all.
>
First let me clarify my original question. I meant how would we
answer Gould scientifically rather than theologically. I have been
on somewhat of a crusade lately for adopting methodological naturalism
as defining the limitations of science. With MN we clearly identify
Gould's statement as theological rather than scientific. Then we can
go on to show how bad his theology really is ;--) (and I think you've
done an admirable job of this in the remainder of your post). It is important
to make it clear though that it is Gould who chose to embark along
the theological path. For example, suppose we were actually debating
Gould here and that you gave him the response that you gave below.
He might complain "But this is just theology, blahhh". You can reply
"You started it" ;-).
Now to your statement above. I can understand your interpretation
of what Gould wrote but I really don't think he's limitting this to
special creation. If this is his intention then he should say so
clearly. As it stands he says that evolution is a path that a sensible
God would never tread. Yet TE's believe God did in fact take this path.
I also don't think oddities and funny solutions prove God didn't
specially create especially if you view this as a scientific argument.
God is God, and he can be odd and funny if he so chooses. Also,
if one wants to consider this as an argument for evolution (and
Gould does it seems) then considering only special creation by
the God of the Bible would be an argument from the false (or
missing) alternative. What kind of oddities would Descartes'
demon come up with? I'm not trying to be cute here, my point
is that creationists have a lot of trouble trying to find scientific
arguments for their position, for reasons along the lines we've
been discussing. Turnabout is fair play. If creationists aren't
allowed theological arguments then neither is Gould.
At the risk of going on too long (a bad habit of mine :), I'll further
illustrate my points by looking at vestigial organs, perhaps the
most common subject of arguments from imperfection. I'll do
this by looking at an article published in <Evolutionary Theory>:
"Do 'Vestigial Organs' Provide Evidence for Evolution"
S.R. Scadding, _Evolutionary Theory_ 5:173-176 (May, 1981)
Perhaps a little explanation is in order here lest people get the
wrong idea about Scadding. His answer to the question posed in the
title to his paper is no, for example the last sentence of the abstract
reads:
An analysis of of the difficulties in unambiguously identifying
funtionless structures and an analysis of the nature of the
argument, leads to the conclusion that 'vestigial organs' provide
no evidence for evolutionary theory.
-- Scadding, 1981, p. 173
My, wouldn't this be a nice quote for Creationists :)? But this, by itself,
is very misleading. Scadding's claim is that the vestigial organ argument
does not provide any evidence for evolution *in addition* to that already
provided by the homology argument, i.e. that the vestigial organ argument
is just a special case of the homology argument.
Regarding the difficulties in identifying vestigial organs in
humans Scadding writes:
As our knowledge has increased the list of vestigial structures
has decreased. Wiedersheim could list about one hundred in
humans; recent authors usually list four or five. Even the
current short list of vestigial structures in humans is
questionable.
-- Scadding, 1981, p.175
There seems a potential here for a kind of vestigial organs
of the gaps type of business. At first there seem so many,
but as knowledge increases ... In any event, there is a
potential for being made to look foolish here.
But my main point has to do with the nature of the argument.
As Scadding says:
Haeckel makes clear why this line of argument was of such
importance to early evolutionary biologists. Nineteenth
century creationists had held to the position that the
creation of man and the animals by God was 'perfect' and
hence the observations of organs which had no apparent
function proved something of an embarrassment to them.
Various interpretations were placed on organs whose
functions were unknown including the idea that the creator
had placed them there for the purposes of symmetry, or as
mere decorations. It seemed difficult to explain function-
less structures on the basis of special creation without
imputing some lack of skill in design to the creator.
Obviously, the theory of evolution could provide a much
more satisfactory explanation than that, consequently
rudimentary organs were much played up in arguments of
evolutionists. Functionless organs were clearly a distinct
embarrassment to anyone who wished to talk of the purpose
of nature. Haeckel refers to these rudimentary organs as
a "dysteleological proof of evolution". ... It should be
noted however, that presented this way, the vestigial
organ argument is essentially a theological rather than
a scientific argument, since it is based on the supposed
nature of the Creator.
-- Scadding, 1981, p.174
This is the type thing I've been trying to say but not nearly
so well as Scadding does. Stripped of the theology, "imperfect"
structures provide evidence for evolution only through homology.
Now let's return to Gould. Scadding (and apparently Haeckel)
makes clear the historical context and the nature of the
argument that the argument from imperfection is aimed at.
Gould does not. As an interesting sidelight, Gould was
listed as a reviewer of the Scadding paper. Those familiar
with the reviewing process will understand that this doesn't
mean that Gould agrees with Scadding, but he certainly cannot
plead ignorance to these subtleties.
MA:==
>One cannot go from the existence of imperfection to a denial that
>there is an Omnipotent Creator. Here's why: (This is also my answer to
>Gould). When we say that God is omnipotent we mean that
>there is nothing extrinsically impossible for Him (sensu C.S. Lewis).
>
>There are some things that are impossible for God. God cannot
>justify a person without punishing sin. To do would be to violate
>His character. To demand that God rescue me from sin without the
>Jesus having to die would be like asking for a square of circle.
>
>Perhaps asking for a universe that is sufficiently autonomous to
>generate self -conscious creatures with genuine free-will without a
>process like evolution with its attendant imperfections is like
>asking for a square circle. This argument is not new with me. Arthur
>Peacocke and others have developed the argument. I have put it
>somewhat crudely.
>
I've been thinking along exactly these lines so I look forward to
reading Peacoke. Any book in particular that you might suggest?
>Anyone who wants to challenge the idea that an Omnipotent God would
>create through an evolving universe really has a tall order. He has to design
>a universe with self-conscious creatures having genuine free-will - they
>can't be robots. Good luck to him or her.
>
This is a good answer. Interestingly, it is not too different from
Paul Nelson's answer regarding the blind spot. If you want to
show that this is a bad design then you have to come up with
a design that's better and actually demonstrate that its better
without any handwaving about how God should have done it differently.
This is also a tall order, but not so tall as designing an entire
universe of course ;-).
>I suspect that Brian and I are closer in our thinking then it might
>appear. I happen to believe that this is the best of all possible
>worlds. In this sense it is perfect even though it contains
>imperfections.
>
First of all, let me say that I agree with this statement. But also
I want point out that this answer is not too terribly different from
Richard Owen's view of design. I hope I'm remembering correctly
(perhaps Paul can correct me if I'm wrong), but I believe Owen
actually expected imperfections in individual components of a
complicated structure since he felt optimization of the whole
would necessarily require concessions be made with components.
Gould's criticism provides no answer to Owen except the theological
objection about paths that sensible God's won't follow.
I must say that I feel a little awkward arguing a position (ID) that
I don't agree with. One reason I'm doing this is that it was not
that long ago that I was a progressive creationist and I can
still remember the frustration at not being allowed a theological
argument when my opponents are free to use theology against
me. Fair is fair, and if theology is out in scientific arguments
(as I think it should be) then its out for everyone, no matter
how convincing we might find the theology.
>So, it seems to me that there are two very different forms of the
>Argument from Imperfection. One, which I accept, argues from
>isolated imperfections to the existence of an evolutionary process.
>The other argues that everything could have been much better made by
>an Omnipotent Creator. This is a completely different kettle of
>fish.
>
I can only accept the first once it is admitted that this is a theological
argument. But once one admits this things become sticky. Creationists
often get in trouble when, in the end, they have to say "and so it pleased
the Creator" (I believe these are Darwin's words). This may be a perfectly
legitimate statement of faith, but it's not a scientific argument. My
argument in a nutshell is this: how is "and so it would not please the
Creator" any better?
Brian Harper | "If you don't understand
Associate Professor | something and want to
Applied Mechanics | sound profound, use the
The Ohio State University | word 'entropy'"
| -- Morrowitz
Bastion for the naturalistic |
rulers of science |