At 07:51 PM 9/26/96 -0400, Loren wrote:
>
>
>Brian Harper wrote:
>
>> Perhaps its a good idea to define methodological naturalism. I take it
>> as a recognition of the limits of science (but not on the limits of
>> reality, of course). I am in agreement with the above, ID might be
>> right and God may actually have "intervened" (don't like that word:)
>> in biological history. But the real question is whether or not the
>> methods of science could ever detect such supernatural intervention.
>> This is what I mean by recognizing the limits of science.
>> It's one thing to say that supernatural intervention "... will ultimately
>> be detectable". Quite another to actually suggest how it could be detected.
>> Suppose God intervened according to some orderly plan. How then could
>> we possibly distinguish the results of such intervention from natural law?
>> Laws are just descriptions of observed regularities. And if God intervened
>> in ways that we could not identify any pattern, what then? How could we
>> say anything but "well, I really can't see any pattern to these events".
>
>
>I suspect it would happen something like this:
>
>First, empirical science would conclude that some historical development
>simply cannot be explained with known natural mechanisms. That is as
>far as "science" could take the matter; philosophical considerations
>would move to the forefront.
>
>Several alternatives could be offered at this point to explain the
>historical development: unknown natural mechanism, supernatural event,
>super-human event, extremely unlikely natural event. Philosophical
>preferences will play a large role in making that decision for each
>individual; HOWEVER, it is not a *purely* philosophical matter. It
>could have practical consequences for how future research is conducted.
>Each different possibility might point researchers in different
>directions. And the wrong choice could lead to unfruitful research.
>
>"Science" restricted to methodological naturalism is restricted to the
>first option, or possibly the fourth. It cannot consider the second or
>third option, along with their potential consequences.
>
It would seem then that the main reason for rejecting MN is that
it might lead to unfruitful research. This is an interesting argument
in that one usually sees it in reverse, i.e. one reason for adopting
MN is to avoid unfruitful research paths :). I've given some thought
to this and will now outline several objections that I have to your
thesis:
1) There may be some implication from what you said that
methodological naturalists cannot consider all four of the
options that you presented when in fact they can. They
just recognize that some problems are amenable to attack
by the methods of science and some are not. These restrictions
are real and apply to all investigators (even TR's) whether
they are aware of it or not. Thus, an advantage of MN is that
it makes clear the dividing line between science and philosophy/
theology. I believe this is critically important in the public debate.
2) It is important to recognize that this hypothetical situation
where "...empirical science would conclude that some historical
development simply cannot be explained with known natural
mechanisms" is arrived at by MN. The identification of such
a situation must be considered a strength rather than a
weakness. One thing that I like to emphasize as an advantage
of MN is that one has a clear identification of where science
ends and philosophy/theology begins. I realize that what you
wrote parallels this, I just wanted to make it clear that the
ability to identify this point is something achieved by MN.
3) After having said that, I must say that I really don't think
this hypothetical situation is realizable. In other words, I
don't think that empirical science could ever "...conclude that
some historical development simply cannot be explained with
known natural mechanisms". I say this based on what I've
learned about complexity and chaos theory or chaoplexity
as Horgan calls it. We can illustrate with a really
simple mechanical system such as the double pendulum.
This is a fully deterministic system with all natural laws
understood, yet its behavior (history if you wish) is not
predictable. Another way of saying this is that there is,
I believe, a possibility missing from your list of four above.
One could have known natural mechanisms operating in
such a way that the resulting behavior is not predictable
or recognizable as a product of those mechanisms.
This comes as a real surprise to us (or at least to me) and
I think there is a real possibility of unknowingly adopting a
position that is akin to scientism. We come to think that
the methods of science are so powerful that if an event
occurs according to natural mechanisms then science will
be capable of providing an explanation of that event. But it
is entirely possible that there may be natural phenomena
(acting according to known natural mechanisms) that are
so complex that they forever elude us. Chaitin (and also Yockey)
has discussed this type of thing extensively. In a nutshell,
if the complexity of some phenomena exceeds the complexity
of our brains, then that phenomena may appear to us as
random even when it is not. Then again, it may actually be
random. We just don't know. Here I should remind everyone
that random in this context does not mean what it does in
everyday conversation. To state what I just said in english :),
there may be phenomena displaying regularities which would
allow them to be highly compressed (into some law) that will
appear to us to have no regularities. And this "... appear to us
to have no regularities" is really what we're talking about in
our hypothetical situation where empirical science concludes
"... that some historical development simply cannot be explained
with known natural mechanisms." To revert back to Chaitin's
language, such a situation is undecidable.
Now, I would like to return to the quote of Phil which originally
prompted my entry into this:
Phil:
>> Page 14: "The culurally important element in the Darwinian
>>theory is not the claim that there was some process of ancestral
>>descent in biology, nor is it the claim that biological creation was
>>a gradual and lengthy process rather than the single week described
>>literally in Genesis. Such claims have to do only with the method of
>>creaiton, not the nature of the creator. The important claim is the
>>one that substitutes a purposeless material process for the Creator."
Based on my experiences here and on talk.origins I think this is
really the key issue with many people and in fact may be the
motivation for a lot of folks getting interested in the origins debate
in the first place.
It is important to note that Phil is not concerned (at this point anyway)
with the fruit fullness of future scientific research and the average
layman I daresay is also not interested in such things. So, I think
Phil is absolutely right in identifying this as a key element in
the public arena. Another of Phil's common themes is how religious
views get marginalized. What better response to this than to
marginalize the marginalizers? This is what MN can accomplish
with its recognition of the limits of science. Whether a material
process is purposeful or purposeless is not a question that
science can answer.
>Now, if there is no identifiable pattern in these hypothetical
>historical developments, then "supernatural events" might still be the
>correct answer, but it won't help the research very much. If, on the
>other hand, there *is* an identifiable pattern in these historical
>developments, then the "supernatural" and "superhuman" options will
>become highly preferable, and potentially a good deal more fruitful in
>directing research.
>
I'm not sure if I follow this. The identification of patterns usually
leads one to suspect that a physical law is in action, leading one
away from supernatural options. Or am I missing something?
Brian Harper | "If you don't understand
Associate Professor | something and want to
Applied Mechanics | sound profound, use the
The Ohio State University | word 'entropy'"
| -- Morrowitz
Bastion for the naturalistic |
rulers of science |