Sorry for the long delay in responding to this message. I've been busy
attempting to get ready for GSA and getting my Creation/Evolution
Reference Database downloadable (see http://www.baz.com/litm/cedata.html).
I like to think my question stirred some good conversation, although it
remains unanswered, which was the real point anyway.
To Del's response...
On Tue, 17 Sep 1996, Del Ratzsch wrote:
>
> Tom Moore wrote:
>
>
> > The question is, "what good is it [ID theory]?"
>
>
> Well, if *truth* is the issue, then should ID turn out to be true one
> would think that it would have some value.
>
If it's not distinquishable, it has no value. "ID" is useful in very
specific cases, but not supernatural ones (I quoted ID because so-called
design isn't always "intelligent"). I kept asking for criteria for ID,
but I could never get any that could not be fully natural. So, what good
is it beyond a theological premise?
[I'm not going to delete anything from Del's comments because of the delay]
> Further, it offers at least potential explanatory resources not
> available to theories which proscribe any reference to intelligent
> design (at least, supernatural design).
In other words, you're filling the "I don't knows" with ID. This is an
extremely dangerous move. That's like saying "I don't know how cancer
forms, it must be ID." The simple fact is if you don't know the answer,
you can theologically fill it in, but it doesn't contribute anything and
worse it might deter research from going in the _right_ direction.
>
> But let me pursue an analogy. Suppose that there were three feuding
> groups of 'scientists' - one group which prohibited reference to both
> supernatural and alien design and activity, one group which prohibited
> reference only to supernatural design but allowed reference to alien
> design, and one group which permitted reference to both. The anti-alien
> group could advance the following sort of arguments for their position:
>
Of course, your premise is faulty from the beginning. Science does not
preclude supernaturalism on a whim. It precludes it because invoking
supernaturalism contributes nothing: no real predictions, no possibility
of testing supernatural influence, etc. If you can provide real
objective criteria for testing supernaturalism, science would be a bit more
willing. (but again, this is from a science view, which is the whole
discussion - philosophical/religious views are, of course, another matter)
> 1. The historical track record of alien-reference explanations is
> utterly abysmal - an unbroken record of failure. Roswell, Nazca lines,
> crop circles, etc - there has never been a single confirmed case where
> alien references were useful, much less confirmed. Surely that total
> failaure signals a degenerative program if ever there was one.
>
Of course, the real problem here is that there is significant contrary
evidence to most if not all of these cases. Nazca lines are quite easily
made by humans and actually have a greater amount of evidence showing
that they are a night-time calendar. Crop circles have no evidence of
anything that humans could not do. Indeed, people claim to have made
them all the time. There was even a contest (in england) to see who
could make the best designs while in the dark and quiet. Roswell is a
little odd, but I really don't know the facts. In all of these cases,
there is nothing that actually suggests aliens, except peoples desire to
see them.
> 2. Alien explanations have no empirical content. Suppose that
> something was found which some claimed to be an alien artifact. Would
> one do anything different to it analyzing it in a lab than if it was
> thought to have fallen off a Russian space craft? Would one use
> different solvents, etc? Obviously not, so of what scientific _use_ is
> the alien-origin theory?
>
None, at that point at least. The methodologies are the same, which
should be the case. The problem comes when you invoke an alien source
without any evidence. Is there evidence of a manufacturing technique
presently unknown? Is there evidence of alloys that can made only in
very unusual circumstances - such as zero-gravity alloys. etc etc. And
finally, do you have any real evidence that such aliens exist(ed)? Alien
explanations could certainly be tested, but it takes a significant amount
of evidence to support it.
> 3. The general alienotropic mindset does not admit of falsification.
> After all, given that the aliens are aliens, who knows what undreamed of
> powers and technology they might have? Thus, one can always attribute
> nearly anything to them (alien-of-the-gaps science), can always explain
> away failures in terms of alien shyness, secretiveness, etc.
>
And this attitude is clearly unproductive since there is no real evidence
of them existing at all. On the other hand, if you got a body the
argument might carry a bit more weight in terms of why there is no other
evidence of their existance (remember that some of the great apes in
africa were thought to be a myth for this exact reason - because they
were shy and secretive).
> But if one were to find a single clear case of an alien artifact - say,
> a spacesuit on Io that was obviously not of human manufacture, let alone
> of human shape, etc., the anti-alien party would have some unattractive
> options. It could be claimed (similar to parallel claims of some
> anti-creationists) that the existence of the aliens and the alienness of
> the artifact "might be true, but it isn't science." At that point, the
> proper response might be to demand a recount concerning what counts as
> science or to suggest that the qualification has singularly little
> importance. Or the anti-alien party could insist that the object wasn't
> evidence of aliens at all. Or the non-alien definition of science could
> simply be admitted to be mistaken. Or (again) it could be claimed that
> alien-theory made no difference in the lab - so what good was it?
>
> But really, find one clear case of an alien artifact, and the anti-alien
> party loses. Similarly, find one clear case of supernatural design, and
> the anti-design definitions, prohibitions, etc. would also lose - even
> if it didn't make any difference to what one did with particles, E.
> coli, or whatever in the lab.
>
> That, of course, raises the question: _are_ there any clear cases?
I have yet to see any. Science, contrary to popular opinion, could
investigate the supernatural if it were possible to do so. However,
since we can only investigate the natural world, at least as of now.
That leaves a problem for those who want ID. There is no way to
recognize supernatural ID, that has been proven to me by the responses to
my question. Just saying things "look designed" is not enough. Saying
things are irreducibly complex is not enough either (there was a great
post recently on talk.origins point out that the eye is, in fact,
reducible). To me, that's exactly the same kind of argument the crop
circle people are using.
> That is a matter than cannot be settled by appealing to a dictionary,
> stipulating a definition, pointing to any failed history of alleged
> design or anything of the sort (any more than fake crop circles
> attributed to aliens implies that a spacesuit for a creature with eleven
> legs and four vreeks made of an unknown alloy and containing an ammonia
> internal environment must not be alien either).
Of course, the proble isn't that they must not be alien, the problem is
why _must_ they be alien? If natural systems seem to do something, why
must it be something else? If humans can make the crop circles, and even
cclaim to do so, why must they be made by aliens? The simple fact here
is that it takes a significant amount of evidence to actually make an
alien be the answer.
As Stephen is fond of pointing to SETI, let's mention that for a minute.
If we got a regular ordered signal from space, would the people at SETI
automattically assume that it's alien? They might hope so, and they
might want it to be. Yet, they must demonstrate it was alien. After
all, if SETI got on the news tonight and said "we have a alien signal!"
would you automattically buy into it, or would you demand evidence?
Regular signals from space have been recieved before, and even for a
while believed to be from aliens. These all turn out to be natural
signals - no aliens at all.
< That question has to be
> settled _in part_ in the relevant empirical trenches in specific cases.
> Some - e.g., Behe - think that there are clear cases of the relevant
> sort. What is it about such _cases_ that you take to be mistaken? I
I haven't read Behe's book, but if all his arguments are "gee, isn't that
complicated," he hasn't shown any evidence of supernatural activity.
Indeed, why must something that appears to be a natural system be
supernatural? You need better evidence than just that.
> mean here to be asking a question parallel to that which we could
> address to one of the anti-alien party: what about the specific _case_
> of the alleged alien spacesuit would render it not convincing? That is
> where at least part of the dispute has to be settled.
Simple, an example would be evidence of human manufacture or the
possibility of human manufacture. Finding an alien spacesuit by itself is
not convincing. After all, the claim of an "alien spacesuit" is an
interpretation of the evidence in the first place.
>
> One question. Explanatory resources, presuppositions, concepts, etc.,
> can make a difference at a variety of different levels, etc., in
> science. As you see it, Tom, where and how would ID have to make a
> difference in science for it to be properly legitimate?
Find a way supernatural activity can be detected, apart from other natural
forces, and then detect it and/or prove that such supernatural beings even
exist.
Anything else is purely a philsophical/religious view. There is nothing
wrong with that, but it is not science, which is again the basis of my
question.
Remember, all other forms of design meet these criterea. For example, we
have evidence humans exist. We have evidence on the type of construction
methods used by humans today as well as all the requirements humans need
to live. All of this information helps demonstrate human or, in Glenn's
case, human-like activity in the past. What about in the rest of
biology/paleontology? Structures found in trees in the petrified forest
in arizona have structures that look much like bee nests. From that,
it's simple to say that these structures might be bee nests - note the
_might be_. The next piece of evidence to call these bee nests have not
been found, that is bee body parts. Are they bee nests? You appear to
want me to according to your "spacesuit" example. Are they?
It takes a great deal of evidence to demonstrate intentional design.
Then it takes a great deal of evidence to demonstrate the particular
designer. I have yet to see any evidence of either by ID'ers.
So, the question I asked, is it useful? If, and only if, there is any
chance of determining if it is design and who designed it in an objective
fashion. The alien hypothesis, at least, has the potential to meet these
criteria. ID, in the supernatural sense, does not.
Tom