> This is one of those things that confuses me. IMHO, the best way to
> counter this type of thing is with methodological naturalism. The
> methods of science are incapable of determining whether a physical
> process is purposeful or not (or has a purpose-meter been invented
> that I'm not aware of?). What better way to oppose the excesses
> of Dawkinsonianism than to show it lies outside the boundaries of
> science? But yet MN is avoided by Phil (though he apparently
> accepted it at one point) and others like a plague? Why? Is it
> because MN would also exclude ID?
Other people's motives are tricky to guess and easy to get wrong, which
is why I started by focussing on the use of language. But to make
progress in discussion, sometimes you really do have to guess at others'
motivations.
Off hand, I can think of four reasons why any particular ID-advocate
might avoid discussing MN --- one good reason, one mediocre, and two
poor.
Good reason (for an ID-advocate to avoid MN): ID-theory might be right.
God actually might have designed creation without the ability to "self-
assemble" first life or increased biological information. God actually
might have supernaturally intervened in biological history in ways which
will ultimately be detectable. If that is the case (and it's still too
soon to tell from the data), then MN would ultimately run up against a
wall when investigating biological history, and continued reliance upon
MN would be unproductive.
I don't think MN should be advocated as a
pre-condition of "doing science." In any investigation, I think MN
should be provisional and limited in scope. Ideally, a Christian
scientist should be able to offer scientific and theological reasons for
why she believes MN is the best alternative for a particular scientific
question. (And, yes, "It's worked really well so far" is an important
reason, but not necessarily the most important reason).
Mediocre reason (for an ID-advocate to avoid MN): He might think such a
discussion would confuse or side-track his main point.
Poor reason: She might actually have a "punctuated naturalism" view of
biological creation, in which case MN is theologically unacceptable.
The remedy for this, I think, is to read some of those excellent books
relating the _physical_ sciences to Christian theology.
Poor reason: Discussing MN opens the door to admitting that there is
more than just two elements in decision-making (data vs. philosophical
bias), and that there are more than just two monolithic philosophical
approaches (a single theistic view vs. a single atheistic view) to this
question --- an admission damaging to the debater's strategy.
Loren Haarsma