> The question is, "what good is it [ID theory]?"
Well, if *truth* is the issue, then should ID turn out to be true one
would think that it would have some value.
Further, it offers at least potential explanatory resources not
available to theories which proscribe any reference to intelligent
design (at least, supernatural design).
But let me pursue an analogy. Suppose that there were three feuding
groups of 'scientists' - one group which prohibited reference to both
supernatural and alien design and activity, one group which prohibited
reference only to supernatural design but allowed reference to alien
design, and one group which permitted reference to both. The anti-alien
group could advance the following sort of arguments for their position:
1. The historical track record of alien-reference explanations is
utterly abysmal - an unbroken record of failure. Roswell, Nazca lines,
crop circles, etc - there has never been a single confirmed case where
alien references were useful, much less confirmed. Surely that total
failaure signals a degenerative program if ever there was one.
2. Alien explanations have no empirical content. Suppose that
something was found which some claimed to be an alien artifact. Would
one do anything different to it analyzing it in a lab than if it was
thought to have fallen off a Russian space craft? Would one use
different solvents, etc? Obviously not, so of what scientific _use_ is
the alien-origin theory?
3. The general alienotropic mindset does not admit of falsification.
After all, given that the aliens are aliens, who knows what undreamed of
powers and technology they might have? Thus, one can always attribute
nearly anything to them (alien-of-the-gaps science), can always explain
away failures in terms of alien shyness, secretiveness, etc.
But if one were to find a single clear case of an alien artifact - say,
a spacesuit on Io that was obviously not of human manufacture, let alone
of human shape, etc., the anti-alien party would have some unattractive
options. It could be claimed (similar to parallel claims of some
anti-creationists) that the existence of the aliens and the alienness of
the artifact "might be true, but it isn't science." At that point, the
proper response might be to demand a recount concerning what counts as
science or to suggest that the qualification has singularly little
importance. Or the anti-alien party could insist that the object wasn't
evidence of aliens at all. Or the non-alien definition of science could
simply be admitted to be mistaken. Or (again) it could be claimed that
alien-theory made no difference in the lab - so what good was it?
But really, find one clear case of an alien artifact, and the anti-alien
party loses. Similarly, find one clear case of supernatural design, and
the anti-design definitions, prohibitions, etc. would also lose - even
if it didn't make any difference to what one did with particles, E.
coli, or whatever in the lab.
That, of course, raises the question: _are_ there any clear cases?
That is a matter than cannot be settled by appealing to a dictionary,
stipulating a definition, pointing to any failed history of alleged
design or anything of the sort (any more than fake crop circles
attributed to aliens implies that a spacesuit for a creature with eleven
legs and four vreeks made of an unknown alloy and containing an ammonia
internal environment must not be alien either). That question has to be
settled _in part_ in the relevant empirical trenches in specific cases.
Some - e.g., Behe - think that there are clear cases of the relevant
sort. What is it about such _cases_ that you take to be mistaken? I
mean here to be asking a question parallel to that which we could
address to one of the anti-alien party: what about the specific _case_
of the alleged alien spacesuit would render it not convincing? That is
where at least part of the dispute has to be settled.
One question. Explanatory resources, presuppositions, concepts, etc.,
can make a difference at a variety of different levels, etc., in
science. As you see it, Tom, where and how would ID have to make a
difference in science for it to be properly legitimate?
Del