On Mon, 22 Apr 1996 20:33:46 -0500 (EST) you wrote:
LH>Thanks for the extensive feedback, Steve. I'll just respond to
specific
>questions or points germane to version 3.
OK. You should work for the State Dept drafting communiques between
warring parties! :-)
>LH>...Alternatively, scientists with strong religious
>or philosophical reasons for believing that certain events are
>supernatural can marshal scientific arguments to show that those events
>belong in category 3 rather than category 2. This effort might lead them
>to uncover flaws in proposed naturalistic scenarios sooner than scientists
>who don't share their religious beliefs. (*2*)
SJ>Why only "*scientists* with strong religious or philosophical
>reasons for believing that certain events are supernatural"?
LH>Good point. I'll change that in v3.
Thanks.
[...]
>LH>What _can_ science do? It can try to determine, to
>the best of its abilities,
>--what the conditions were before the event,
>--what the conditions were after the event, and
>--what effect known natural mechanisms could have had during the event.
SJ>Agreed. But this is just what ordinary people do according to
>common sense.
LH>I firmly believe that the "scientific method" is little more than a
>special branch of common sense, and that "philosophy of science" gets into
>trouble whenever it forgets this. :-)
I am glad you think that. While I agree that "common sense" gets less
reliable at extremes (eg. atomic and cosmological), at our level it
is generally reliable. Einstein believe that science was just refined
everyday thinking:
"The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday
thinking. It is for this reason that the critical thinking of the
physicist cannot possibly be restricted to the examination of the
concepts of his own specific field. He cannot proceed without
considering critically a much more difficult problem, the problem of
analyzing everyday thinking" (Einstein A., "Physics and Reality," in
"Out of My Later Years", Citadel: Secaucus N.J., 1936, p60, in
Moreland J.P. ed., "The Creation Hypothesis", InterVarsity Press:
Downers Grove Ill., 1994, p242)
SJ>Note that just "accounting for the event" by "sound empirical
>models" does not prove it happened that way. This is the difference
>between historical and empirical science. The latter can repeatedly
>test its causal hypotheses in the present, but the former has only
>unique, unrepeatable events in the past.
LH>This is a good point. I'll add it as (another) footnote.
>
>(I chose my wording carefully. I deliberately said "natural mechanisms
>.... can account for the event" rather than "... caused the event.")
I noted that. I just wanted to clarify it.
SJ>BTW, I am interested that you seem to embrace the "false
>alternative" that Brian accuses me of? If "no known natural
>mechanisms could account for this event", ie. "there are empirically
>sound reasons for ruling out all known natural mechanisms", you seem
>to see this as evidence for a "supernatural" origin?
LH>Yes, if I am pretty sure that "no known natural mechanisms could
>account for [an] event," I see this as evidence for a SUPERnatural
>event (or I MIGHT prefer "unknown natural mechanism," depending
>heavily on the type of "event" and several theological factors --- I
>could give you an historical example of this if you are interested).
Agreed. But the difference is that an "unknown natural mechanism" is
the *only* alternative that a metaphysical naturalist has. *Only* a
theist "can see this as evidence for a SUPERnatural event".
I would be interested in your "historical example".
God bless.
Steve
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