I suspect that Tim may be right. As a Christian, I am sure that God
revealed moral standards to us. As a scientist who is wary of classical
mind/body dualism, I suspect that God designed the "dust of the earth"
with such amazing properties that new properties can emerge when it is
organized, and when highly organized, it could even be an entity with whom
the Creator can interact personally. As an evolutionary creationist, I
suspect that we'll find "raw materials" for moral capacity within
mammalian & hominid development, and I even suspect that, eventually,
"evolutionary psychology" will provide some useful and verifiable
insights. (Talk about going out on a limb! :-)
Let me sketch (with some seriousness and some humor) one possible
"Naturalist's Justification for Moral Standards for Human Behavior," using
"emergent properties": elementary particles can be organized into
molecules; molecules can be organized into cells; cells can be organized
into organisms; some cells specialize for sensing the environment and
transmitting information to other parts of the organism to induce
behaviors; with greater organization, some processing of the sensory data,
and more complex behaviors, become possible; at still greater
organization, the data processing can include building predictive models
of the world to test hypothetical behavior strategies; and maybe, just
maybe, at higher levels of organization, an organism can learn to build
and test models of _itself_, becoming self-aware and self-conscious.
So the Naturalist examines his mental processes -- these model-building
and behavior-testing processes -- and finds a particular sub-process
which, for the most part, advocates actions which maximize the survival
and happiness of other members of his species (and to a lesser extent
other species). He calls this his "conscience." It is not necessary to
know exactly how the conscience came about, whether it evolved to increase
the overall reproductive success of the human genome, or was a side-effect
of another selection-induced process, or a bit of both. The Naturalist
could decide (self-consistently with Naturalism, IMO) to examine this
"conscience" as a source for moral standards.
Although no two people have identical consciences, there is a large
overlap amongst most people. So we do what scientists do -- throw out the
statistical outlyers (those few people who don't seem to have working
consciences), normalize for detectable systematic effects (genetic or
learned variables), and take the mean (plus or minus standard
deviation ;-) to construct the Canonical Conscience. We've got three more
problems: our conscience doesn't speak to our EVERY behavior choice (only
certain ones); even when it does speak, it sometimes miscalculates the
results of behaviors; other mental sub-processes sometimes defeat our
conscience and we choose behaviors _despite_ our conscience. But we can
employ another strategy: "extrapolate our model to infinity," so to
speak, and imagine a Fully Effective Conscience which speaks to every
behavior, apprehends all available data, and is invariably followed. The
FEC (which takes into account varied genetic and learned factors in most
individuals, but not those of "statistical outlyers") can be used as a
standard for every human behavior (even if not every human agrees to it).
Thus we have one possible absolute standard for moral human behavior, an
"emergent property" of the collective human genome.
Now, I don't wish to argue (though if pushed, I just might) whether this
little scenario is inherently INconsistent with the assumptions of
Naturalism. Instead, I want to argue: What has the Naturalist gained
through all this work?
The Naturalist has chosen one element of the world around (within) him,
idealized it, and made it an object of service and worship. That's one of
the oldest games in the book. The apostle Paul's description of people
who "... worshiped and served created things rather than the Creator,"
(Rom 1:25) is certainly apt in this case.
Everyone makes a leap of faith in their beliefs. But more importantly,
everyone makes a choice as to who or what they will serve, who or what
they make the object of their hope. Popular choices for modern
Naturalists are survival, or happiness, or conscience (or some combination
of those) of self, clan, species, or ecosystem (or some weighted average).
These are commendable goals to be sure, but are they worthy of being the
ultimate object of allegiance? The gods which modern Naturalists chose to
serve have the same problem as the old-fashioned personifications of the
sun, death, or fertility. By worshiping and serving created things rather
than the creator, they are worshiping and serving powerless gods.
"Your god cannot save you" is an old-fashioned taunt. Centuries ago,
armies used it against opposing armies. It is the essence of Elijah's
taunt to the prophets of Baal (I Kings 18). And the Bible records one or
two pagan generals using it against the God of Israel, with disastrous
results.
Thus we return, finally, to the subject of these posts, "How to Think
About Naturalism." I do not think that Naturalism's problem is that
personhood, self-consciousness, free will, values, or morality are
necessarily inconsistent with its assumptions. The problem with
Naturalism (aside from its inherent falsehood ;-) is a very old fashioned
problem: the objects of devotion it offers to its believers are not
worthy of devotion; they are no basis for hope.
Here is the argument I suggest theists take to Naturalists. Ask this
question with the utmost sincerity, concern, and respect: Can your god
save you? When your world is collapsing, and the destroying army is
encamped at the city gate, does the object of your devotion have the power
to secure what you desire? Does it even make any _promises_ to do so?
Pascal's Wager echoes in the mind. If your god cannot save you, isn't it
time to search (in history and in the world today) for one who can?
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"... Another casualty of applied metaphysics." | Loren Haarsma
--Hobbes (_Calvin_and_Hobbes_) | lhaarsma@opal.tufts.edu