<<The question: "Is God bad?" is nonsense as well? >>
Of course it is. If God is the standard of good, how do you propose to answer
this question? What criteria will you apply?
Again, it is rather nonsensical to state:
<< That God is everything and that everything stems from God
does not provide much detail about God or His will (except that everything
is God). >>
Details about God's will comes from revelation.
<< Secondly, it leaves open the problem that if everything happens
only as God wills it, then everything we do is as God desires. As I see
it, this could lead to the elimination of consideration about morality.
By suggesting that God is the source of everything, this ensures that
God' morality can never be subject to external evaluation (like all
moral systems).>>>>
You're mixing two thought here. First, God as the source of morality does not
imply determinism. Second, you assume the source must be "evaluated." Source
and system are not the same. All moral systems can be evaluated, but only if
there is a standard. God fills the latter requirement.
<<Further, this does not address the problem of whether there is a God. That
requires a leap of faith that is not subject to proof. I do not accept
it as a given.>>
As I've stated before, the evidence for God's existence is another subject.
The irrationality of naturalism is only one bit of data "in the pan," as it
were, as we balance the scales on the reasonableness of viewpoints. We have
been accepting God as a given only in the context of this discussion.
You quoted a famous passage from Russell's essay "Why I Am Not A Christian."
This was Russell's "counter" to the moral argument for God's existence. The
entire section is composed of two paragraphs. I always thought this was an
embarrassingly bad bit of philosophy by Russell. Here is the crux of his
argument:
"If [right and wrong are] is due to God's fiat, then for God himself there is
no difference between right and wrong, and it is no longer a significant
statement to say that God is good. If you are going to say,as theologians do,
that God is good, you must then say that right and wrong have some meaning
which is independent of God's fiat, because God's fiats are good and not bad
independently of the mere fact that he made them."
What makes this so transparent is the attempt to introduce a false dichotomy
into such an important argument (a sophomore's debating trick). But even the
choices are crude. If I were to create the color scheme, would it make sense
to say there is no difference between green and black?
Russell's second argument was anticipated (and dealt with) by Aquinas. The
moral law flows from the nature of God, but comes THROUGH God's will [fiat].
But God's will is always SUBJECT to his nature. So one can easily say that God
IS good, and that his fiats are subject to that goodness. Bert was not in the
same league, philosophically, as Tom.
<<This would blow away many branches of mathematics if true. They have
been using infinite series for years [Calculus would never look the same.]
Therefore, I disagree with point #2 as well.>>
Conceptually, one can use infinite sets. But the point of the argument, if you
read the syllogism once more, is that an ACTUAL infinite cannot exist as a
series of events in TIME [essential in any argument about actuality]. I don't
believe David Hilbert has been refuted in this.
I wrote:
<<But the envelope is much tighter, always a good thing in moral philosophy.
Tim replied:
<<That is an "operative" justification of a morality. While I don't think
it is improper, one must remember that the outcomes of such evaluations
can only be judged within the context of the moral system that is
being tested.
You're right. Remember, however, the context. You were comparing the two
"systems," and part of your comparison is operational. So I used this same
tool to evaluate naturalism's attempts at moral philosophy.
<<I'd like to see how one proves moral absolutes or God. I am pretty
convinced that both require leaps of faith in the process.>>
Everything ultimately requires a "leap." The naturalist leaps when he
postulates the existence of the natural world, apart from the mere
consciousness of the individual. IOW, the naturalist must have faith in a
perceptual set, preceding knowledge.
So we all "leap." And what proof does is get someone to the point of
"responsible leaping," as it were. If you would like to see the very best of
such arguments, I highly recommend the book "Dear Agnos: Letters to an
Agnostic" by Dr. Arlie Hoover (College Press). It's positively wonderful.
Consider these two consecutive statements made by Tim:
<<These people [Hamas] feel they are at war with the state of Israel. They do
not feel that they are murdering people without reason. Their
leaps of faith have lead them to think that killing mobs of people
is morally justified....People who do not accept one's religious or moral
beliefs are not responding to "reason"? This really doesn't follow and I
worry that this assumption could lead to the marginalization of others'
beliefs.>>
Wow. It doesn't follow that one should accept arguments that are more
reasonable than others? That one should not accept the logical over the
illogical? Then why are we spinning our wheels? Let's just consign philosophy
to the realm of opinion and be done with it!
Once again, I think you are committing the fallacy of asserting that beliefs
cannot be evaluated on the basis of reasonableness. That is false. That's why
we're engaged in this discussion in the first place.
If you really think that it is not valid to argue that the Hamas' belief in
blowing up innocent people is somehow wrong, or that it is not proper to have
such beliefs marginialized in society, then I do think your naturalistic
outlook has come home to roost. That is exactly what the consequences are of
your two statements, above. That is exactly what I've been saying about
naturalistic ethics all along!
<<Racial equality under the law is disputed? Redress perhaps, but not
the abolition of the Jim Crow laws.>>
I never said that about racial equality. Please don't leave people with the
wrong impression. My remarks about equal rights were CLEARLY aimed at your
assertion about women's rights. Here's my full passage:
<<As to the first, there is still a lot of dispute about the morality of these
so-called "rights." The massive split in current feminism is demonstrative of
this.>>
As you can see, this was directed at feminism. Please be more careful about
the quotations!
<<I certainly do not think that this
is improper or wrong to do: everyone who chooses to live must make leaps
of faith. However, I think it is a error to suppose that everybody will
land on the same place.>>
And I think it is perfectly reasonable to demonstrate to people when they are
leaping into a fire, and when they are leaping into a living room.
Jim