>Tim posted some interesting stuff from Ayer. With the idea that naturalism
>cannot suppy us with our values, only evaluate them "within themselves," I
>agree.
>
>But with this idea I dissent:
>
><< Not only has it first to be established that the person
> in question has a legitimate claim on one's allegiance, but even when
> that has been established, it still doesn't necessarily follow that what
> he commands is right.>>
>
>Ayer reasons that the moral standard we use to say that God is good is
>independent of our belief in God, and therefore self-referential only. But if
>the moral sense is itself from God, then this is not true. One can, of course,
>question whether God's moral sense is, in fact, good. But this seems to me to
>be in the realm of nonsense questions, like asking if light is actually
>illuminating.
The question: "Is God bad?" is nonsense as well? "Illuminating" is
an empirical statement about a property of light. Is "good" an
empirical statement about a property of God or is it assumed?
Like all moral codes, questions about God's morality can only be
evaluated within themselves.
>That is the sort of questioning in which Ayer is engaged.
Ayer notes: "No doubt the premiss that what God wills is right is one
that religious believers take for granted." The only way one can claim
that God's will is good is to identify "good" independently of God and
compare it to God's actions.
Ayer addressed that counter in one of the passages I quoted:
"It is no answer to this argument to say that the possibility of God's
being anything other than good is excluded by his nature. There is,
indeed, no logical objection to building goodness into the definition
of God so long as it is compatible with the other attributes which
go into making up the concept. The drawback is only that it adds
to the difficulty of supposing that the concept is satisfied. But
so far from this proving that God's nature can serve to define goodness,
it proves just the opposite. If one did not know what one understood
by goodness, independently of ascribing it to God, its inclusion in
the definition would not be intelligible."
>Tim writes:
>
><<If the universe
>requires God to give it a purpose or meaning, from where did God's
>purpose or meaning derive (From a higher God? --- infinite regression
>is not impossible, BTW)>>
>
>Another nonsense inquiry. As Charles Coppens writes in "Moral Philosophy":
>
>"God is the absolute end of all things. Such an end we have defined to be
>an object which, by its very nature, requires that all action be
>subordinated to it, and that in it all desires shall rest. Now God alone
>can be the object. For all things except God are contingent or unnecessary,
>i.e., they have not in themselves the principle of their own existence,
>but they exist only because and in so far as God gives them being, and
>preserves them by his own power." [p. 13]
Is this the ontological argument for God?
One could define God in these terms, but I don't see it as having much
application. That God is everything and that everything stems from God
does not provide much detail about God or His will (except that everything
is God). Secondly, it leaves open the problem that if everything happens
only as God wills it, then everything we do is as God desires. As I see
it, this could lead to the elimination of consideration about morality.
By suggesting that God is the source of everything, this ensures that
God' morality can never be subject to external evaluation (like all
moral systems).
Further, this does not address the problem of whether there is a God. That
requires a leap of faith that is not subject to proof. I do not accept
it as a given.
Bertrand Russell asks [typos mine]:
"...if you are quite sure there is a difference between right and wrong,
you are then in this situation: is that difference due to God's fiat
or is it not? If it is due to God's fiat, then for God Himself there
is no difference between right and wrong, and it is no longer a
significant statement to say that God is good. If you are going to say,
as theologians do, that God is good, you must then say that right
and wrong have some meaning which is independent of God's fiat, because
God's fiats are good and not bad independently of the mere fact that he
made them. If you are going to say that, you will then have to
say that it is only through God that right and wrong came into being, but
that they are in their essence, logically anterior to God. You could,
of course, if you liked, say that there was a superior deity who gave
orders to the God who made this world [TPI note: Hume (?) suggests that
at best, you might be able to make statements about the architect of
this world, but not necessarily about God.], or could take up the line
that some gnostics took up -- a line which I often thought was a very
plausible one -- that as a matter of fact this world that we know was
made by the devil at a moment when God was not looking."
[_The basic writings of Bertrand Russell_ RE Enger & LE Denonn, eds.
1961, Simon & Schuster, Inc. p. 590
>BTW, infinite regression IS impossible. The syllogism is as follows (courtesy
>William Lane Craig):
>
>1. The series of events in time is a collection formed by adding one member
>after another.
>
>2. A collection formed by adding one member after another cannot be actually
>infinite.
>
>3. Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be actually infinite.
>
>Mackie, of course, objected to #2, but I think Craig argues compellingly that
>his objection is irrelevant.
This would blow away many branches of mathematics if true. They have
been using infinite series for years [Calculus would never look the same.]
Therefore, I disagree with point #2 as well.
[Side note: Why was "time" included in the discussion of infinite
regression?]
>Further comments:
>
><<I was suggesting that religious morality was malleable as well. Not
>in theory of course, but certainly in practice.>>
>
>But the envelope is much tighter, always a good thing in moral philosophy.
That is an "operative" justification of a morality. While I don't think
it is improper, one must remember that the outcomes of such evaluations
can only be judged within the context of the moral system that is
being tested.
><<Given that moral absolutes defy proof, one can only exercise "moral
>force" if someone believes what you say. This is the crux of the issue.>>
>
>Moral absolutes do not defy proof. If this is the crux of the issue, then it
>has already been favorably disposed of over the centuries. The crux of the
>issue, in my mind, is the irrationality of naturalistic ethics.
I'd like to see how one proves moral absolutes or God. I am pretty
convinced that both require leaps of faith in the process.
><<Hammas suicide bombers are religious. They believe in God, they believe
>that the morals standards they use come straight from God, and thus they
>are convinced that they are doing the right thing. How can your moral
>force counter theirs?>>
>
>It's interesting that these suicide bombers are usually exploited and
>troubled individuals, who are not told what their mission will be until
>the leadership has manipulated them into the correct mental condition.
>But it is easy to demonstrate they are wrong. "Thou shalt not murder"
>is clear.
These people feel they are at war with the state of Israel. They do
not feel that they are murdering people without reason. Their
leaps of faith have lead them to think that killing mobs of people
is morally justified.
>But what if they don't accept that precept, or believe otherwise? Well,
>sometimes people do not respond to reason. That doesn't give them equal
>moral force, however.
People who do not accept one's religious or moral beliefs are not
responding to "reason"? This really doesn't follow and I worry that
this assumption could lead to the marginalization of others' beliefs.
>I asked for some moral causes championed by atheists/agnostics, and Tim
>wrote:
>
><<I will try to pull up one or two with regard to women's rights or
>the abolition of the Jim Crow laws >>
>
>As to the first, there is still a lot of dispute about the morality of
>these so-called "rights." [...]
Racial equality under the law is disputed? Redress perhaps, but not
the abolition of the Jim Crow laws.
[...]
><<I also pointed out that one can say "sez who" to religious belief just
>as easily.>>
>
>Not so. "God sez" is the end of that argument. Then it shifts to, "Which
>God?"
"God sez" is neither the beginning nor the ending of the argument. It
is not a given until it has been demonstrated. One might be able to
argue for belief operationally (ie. what does it buy you if you believe
in God? or Does it give you satisfaction in some way to believe in
God?), but then we must accept that it is a leap of faith, accept
such caveats and go on form there. I certainly do not think that this
is improper or wrong to do: everyone who chooses to live must make leaps
of faith. However, I think it is a error to suppose that everybody will
land on the same place.
Regards, Tim Ikeda (timi@mendel.berkeley.edu)