But with this idea I dissent:
<< Not only has it first to be established that the person
in question has a legitimate claim on one's allegiance, but even when
that has been established, it still doesn't necessarily follow that what
he commands is right.>>
Ayer reasons that the moral standard we use to say that God is good is
independent of our belief in God, and therefore self-referential only. But if
the moral sense is itself from God, then this is not true. One can, of course,
question whether God's moral sense is, in fact, good. But this seems to me to
be in the realm of nonsense questions, like asking if light is actually
illuminating.
That is the sort of questioning in which Ayer is engaged.
Tim writes:
<<If the universe
requires God to give it a purpose or meaning, from where did God's
purpose or meaning derive (From a higher God? --- infinite regression
is not impossible, BTW)>>
Another nonsense inquiry. As Charles Coppens writes in "Moral Philosophy":
"God is the absolute end of all things. Such an end we have defined to be an
object which, by its very nature, requires that all action be subordinated to
it, and that in it all desires shall rest. Now God alone can be the object.
For all things except God are contingent or unnecessary, i.e., they have not
in themselves the principle of their own existence, but they exist only
because and in so far as God gives them being, and preserves them by his own
power." [p. 13]
BTW, infinite regression IS impossible. The syllogism is as follows (courtesy
William Lane Craig):
1. The series of events in time is a collection formed by adding one member
after another.
2. A collection formed by adding one member after another cannot be actually
infinite.
3. Therefore, the series of events in time cannot be actually infinite.
Mackie, of course, objected to #2, but I think Craig argues compellingly that
his objection is irrelevant.
Further comments:
<<I was suggesting that religious morality was malleable as well. Not
in theory of course, but certainly in practice.>>
But the envelope is much tighter, always a good thing in moral philosophy.
<<Given that moral absolutes defy proof, one can only exercise "moral force"
if someone believes what you say. This is the crux of the issue.>>
Moral absolutes do not defy proof. If this is the crux of the issue, then it
has already been favorably disposed of over the centuries. The crux of the
issue, in my mind, is the irrationality of naturalistic ethics.
<<Hammas suicide bombers are religious. They believe in God, they believe
that the morals standards they use come straight from God, and thus they
are convinced that they are doing the right thing. How can your moral
force counter theirs?>>
It's interesting that these suicide bombers are usually exploited and troubled
individuals, who are not told what their mission will be until the leadership
has manipulated them into the correct mental condition. But it is easy to
demonstrate they are wrong. "Thou shalt not murder" is clear.
But what if they don't accept that precept, or believe otherwise? Well,
sometimes people do not respond to reason. That doesn't give them equal moral
force, however.
I asked for some moral causes championed by atheists/agnostics, and Tim wrote:
<<I will try to pull up one or two with regard to women's rights or
the abolition of the Jim Crow laws >>
As to the first, there is still a lot of dispute about the morality of these
so-called "rights." The massive split in current feminism is demonstrative of
this. So using this as an example of a "moral cause" is quite slippery. You'd
first have to establish the initial premise. Besides which, why do you assume
this cause was fueled by atheists/agnostics? Many of the early feminists, such
as Mary Daly, were actually theologians!
As to civil rights, it is clear that Christians were at the front line. What
did Martin Luther King, Jr. do for a living?
<<I also pointed out that one can say "sez who" to religious belief just
as easily.>>
Not so. "God sez" is the end of that argument. Then it shifts to, "Which God?"
Jim