Re: How to Think About Naturalism

Jim Bell (70672.1241@compuserve.com)
07 Mar 96 18:54:10 EST

Tim Ikeda writes:

<<Is the assumption here that because we can't say the extermination
of Jews is an absolutely "bad" thing, we must let it occur? That
does not follow. I admit that this could happen, but claiming
to have a set of absolute beliefs might not prevent it either.>>

It does if those beliefs included the absolute, "Thou shalt not murder."
Naturalists, by definition, cannot affirm such absolutes. It would be
interesting to hear a naturalist try to make the argument, "Killing Jews is a
bad thing." If you'd like to try, please do. I'd like to see what such an
argument looks like.

<<However, as you mention above,
that does not prevent one from judging according to an agreed standard
of outcome (or an agreed upon set of starting axioms). The theistic
moralist claims that this agreed upon set of standards comes from an
ultimate source. An agnostic would question the source but may agree
with the theist upon a common set of standards.>>

The first problem is that the "agreement" is not based upon anything--it could
come from whim, appetite or a bad day at the office. Therefore, one may
dissent from such "agreements" without any moral counter-argument to stop him.

The second problem, of course, is that agnostic/atheist who does agree is
merely borrowing the moral capital of theism, but without paying any interest.

<< Ultimately, the acceptance of moral standards and
functional criteria are based on personal beliefs, whether one is
a theist or a "moral relativist".>>

This is undisputed. The point is that the theist can sustain "moral standards"
logically. The naturalist cannot. Standards cannot exists. That why it is
called the naturalistic "fallacy." And personal beliefs can be explored for
their logical consistency, or lack thereof.

<<Nor can the "oughts" of one religion (or set of religious beliefs)
logically displace those of another religion.>>

That's not correct. Read, for example, -Truth in Religion- by Mortimer Adler.
It is quite possible to make reasoned arguments about religion and absolute
truth, but the poor naturalist cannot even enter the discussion!

<<I do not quite understand how moral relativism appears as such
a boogey-man to some. Is it the idea that without knowable
moral absolutes, everyone will do exactly as they please with
complete disregard to others? How long could one expect such
actions to be tolerated in any society? >>

Your faith in human society is, I think, a tad naive. I wonder what you think
of the direction of our own society is, morally speaking. Without consensus
what society tolerates can just as easily be, once again, something as
repugnant as genocide. Only the theist can tell us why it IS repugnant.

And with individuals, it is simply a matter of cost-benefit. If I can get away
with some action, currently illegal, why not?

<<Now let me put the shoe on the other foot:
I can only hope that someone's vision of religious absolutism doesn't
lead to hurting other people -- And this hope has been betrayed in
the past.>>

Define "hurt." Define "betrayed." In naturalist syntax, of course. But if you
borrow the moral capital of theism to agree about "hurt," then I would share
your hope.I would also point out that theistic moral arguments have
alleviated great pain and suffering, and still do.

<<The simple fact that there is a God does not imply that there
must be ultimate moral accountability (Heck, it doesn't even mean that
God is moral).>>

Once you admit there is a God, the question becomes "What sort of God?" It is
another inquiry, but one that is consistent with the logic employed in
answering the first. Suffice to say, I think you can get to the moral God
quite easily.

Best,
Jim