>BH>Hello Eddie. I think you have made some interesting observations, however,
>>I suspect most TE's are going to label your scenario as creation.
>
>You're probably right. It's my inherent creationist bent showing through.
>:-) However, I think many PC's and YEC's will instinctively label it as
>theistic evolution. (See Stephen's reply to my original post). Regardless
>of what it is, I don't think I've seen anybody explore the possibility at
>all which is why I posted it. I am not well read in this area, though.
>Perhaps this is just a rehash of what somebody else has written better
>elsewhere? If so, I would like to read what they had to say.
>
Polkinghorne has some interesting things to say about the role of chance
in his book <Science and Creation>.
EO:======
>Good point, although I suspect the randomness element in evolution is going
>to eventually be reincarnated by non-theistic scientists. (see below) I
>think I probably have a different intended audience for these ideas than you
>might expect. My goal is to be able to find ways to explain to my
>non-scientific creationist friends that evolution is not the evil "bogeyman"
>they think it is. :-)
This goal is highly commendable. I decided to do exactly the same thing
about a year and a half ago. I have two interests really in the evolution
creation debate. The first is purely academic, i.e. I find the various
topics immensely interesting. The second is a concern for the impact
that this controversy has on the Church (a) internally and (b) externally,
i.e. in the perceptions of non-believers. One way to diffuse a lot of the
internal tension is to argue that theistic evolution is a viable theological
view. That it can be and actually is for some the preferential theological
view and not a second-choice compromise. I think it is very admirable if
someone is willing to argue this in spite of what their own position happens
to be.
EO:====
>The most repugnant element of Darwinian evolution to
>most conservative theologians and creationists (both PC & YEC) is its
>*randomness*. In most of their minds, evolution is inexorably linked to
>random chance, so I am going to tackle that objection head-on. My objective
>was to show that God's purposeful intervention could exist in "random"
>chance in a way that science could never detect.
Ah, this is a good idea. I would again recommend Polkinghorne's book
above for a positive theological view of randomness ;-). Does anyone
have any other suggestions?
One could also draw on my illustration below to argue that God's purposeful
action may very well appear random [remember this means incompressible,
unfathomable] to us if God is more complex than our brains ;-). This is
an interesting take on algorithmic complexity that I hadn't thought of
before. This doesn't actually require a linkage between God's purposeful
intervention and true randomness. If God's purposeful interventions
result in phenomena whose descriptive lengths (complexities) are larger
than the complexity of our mental faculties, then they will appear to us
as if they are random even though they are in fact orderly and purposeful.
An interesting idea .... :-)
I sometimes enjoy entertaining wild and speculative ideas like those
above :). More important to the task of eliminating the evil "bogeyman"
of evolution is to emphasize that evolution is not a random process.
There is a really good new FAQ in the t.o archives on this called
"Chance and Metaphysics". If you (or anyone else) don't have a web
browser I can send an ascii version by e-mail. I have a few very
minor "complaints" about it, but overall its extremely good.
EO:== (regarding principles of self-organization)
>I will cast my vote with Yockey and say that I don't know if such principles
>exist or not.
Let me elaborate a little further on Yockey's views to make sure there
is no misunderstanding. Yockey is saying something a little more
controversial than "We don't know yet", perhaps I should have said
fundamentally undecidable instead of just undecidable. The reason for
this conclusion comes from algorithmic information theory, more
specifically a theorem of Gregory Chaitin's which I previously
paraphrased as (actually, the paraphrased version is also due to
Chaitin):
"you can't get a 200 lb. baby from a pregnant woman who
weighs 100 lb."
This theorem has some interesting consequences that I don't believe
I discussed previously. Suppose that we have two algorithms, A and B.
Algorithm A is a very efficient compression algorithm capable finding
just about any regularity that exists in a set of data. This algorithm
is trying to find regularities in the output of another algorithm, B.
The meaning of Chaitin's result in this context is that if the
algorithmic complexity of B exceeds that of A by some constant, i.e.
AC(B) > AC(A) + C <the value of C is known roughly>
then algorithm A will not be able to compress the regularities in the
output of algorithm B, ie B will appear algorithmically random to A.
Now, let's assume my reductionistic premises that I outlined previously
and say that the mind is reducible to the brain and that the actions of
the brain are mechanistic, describable by an algorithm. [BTW, if I
understand him correctly, Penrose accepts the first part of this
reduction but not the second]. Let's further suppose that nature is
mechanistic (algorithmic), or more specifically that the origin of
life occurred by a mechanistic process. If the algorithmic complexity
of the mechanistic laws responsible for the origin of life are greater
than the algorithmic complexity of the brain, then these laws are beyond
our ability to discover.
With this in mind, consider the following extract from the epilogue
of Yockey's book.
A great deal of effort has been expended in finding theories
(i.e. algorithms) for the origin of life without success.
When a great deal of work has been applied to a problem without
finding a solution the reason may not be that we are not smart
enough or that we have not worked hard enough. The reason is
sometimes that there is no structure or pattern that can be
put into the terms of an algorithm of finite complexity.
The reader who has solved Socrates' problem (discussed in
Plato's dialogue Meno) of doubling the square will find his
efforts to double the cube futile. This does not mean that
cubes twice the size of any given cube do not exist. It means
that the exact solution to the problem is undecidable; it is
beyond human reasoning. In view of the isomorphisms discussed
in section 2.4.6 and in sections 5.l.l and 5.12 we may apply
knowledge or theorems from one system to another isomorphic
with it. Accordingly, the indeterminacy theorems of Godel (1931),
Turing (1937) and Chaitin (1987b) must apply. Godel (1931)
proved that there are theorems in number theory that are true
but cannot be proved and propositions that are undecidable
from the axioms of number theory. The isomorphism of the genetic
logic system with the axioms of number theory shows that it
is undecidable from the laws of physics and chemistry that
life exists or that it does not exist. Contrary to the opinion
expressed hy Wald (1954), Simpson (1964) and Eigen (1971) it
is not deterministic but undecidable, by the same token, whether
life would almost inevitably arise spontaneously from nonliving
matter on young planets 'sufficiently similar' to Earth
elsewhere in the universe. Of course the term 'sufficiently
similar' is an escape clause since the conditions for the
origin of life are not known. We must conclude that Bohr (1933)
was right and that we must accept the existence of life as an axiom.
The reason that there are principles of biology that cannot be
deduced from the laws of physics and chemistry lies not in
some esoteric philosophy but simply in the mathematical fact
that the genetic information content of the genome for
constructing even the simplest organisms is much larger than
the information content of these laws. Chaitin (1985, 1987a)
has examined the complexity of the laws of physics by actually
programming them. He finds the complexity amazingly small.
-- H.P. Yockey, _Information Theory and Molecular Biology_,
Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 334-335.
Now, what does all this mean? I think you are right in that it would
be inappropriate for the Naturalist to say "these unknown naturalistic
mechanisms MUST exist". Its undecidable whether they exist, a hard
pill for the committed Naturalist to swallow especially in view of the
suggestion from algorithmic information theory that the issue may
be forever undecidable. However ;-), it is *not* inappropriate for
the Naturalist to say "the only mechanisms that science can entertain
are naturalistic mechanisms" (my paraphrase of methodological naturalism).
But its also inappropriate for the creationist to try to take advantage
of this and say that undecidability is somehow evidence of God's
intervention. Undecidability is undecidability :-).
EO:=====
>However, I would like to make two additional observations
>about the "organizational principles" scenario of evolution.
>
>1. This has always sounded like an "Evolution of the Gaps" argument to me.
>If you can't explain it by known naturalistic mechanisms, then postulate
>that unknown naturalistic mechanisms MUST exist in order to save an
>evolutionary explanation of the phenomenon. It's essentially identical to
>Newton suggesting that God (an unknown supernatural mechanism) must
>periodically adjust the orbits of planets so that Newton could save his
>theory of planetary motion. I don't have any problems with evolutionists
>proposing these types of explanations. I will only insist that they be
>consistent--they should shutup and be considerate when creationists propose
>their own "God of the Gaps" scenarios.
This reminded me of something Yockey likes to say to stir up
the "lumpenintelligentsia" (anyone know enough German to translate this?)
==========================================================
As Ludwig Wittgenstein said: " Wovon man nicht reden kann,
darueber muss man schweigen." That of which one cannot speak,
one must remain silent.
Let us have a little more schweigen from the lumpenintelligentsia
on this subject.
If you don't know what you are talking about; shut up! Yogi Berra.
============================================================
The context of this was a discussion on talk.origins regarding the existence
of a primeval soup. In his book, Yockey argues against the various theories
for the origin of life in several different ways. Perhaps the most direct
of these is to point out that there is no evidence whatsoever that the early
Earth went through a period of chemical evolution. In either his book or one
of his articles he likens chemical evolution to the architect at the Grand
Academy of Lagado (Gulliver's Travels) who sought to build houses starting
with the roof and working down to the foundation :).
After having said all this I should probably also add that Yockey's reaction
to a God of the Gaps explanation would be equally derisive. The absence of
evidence for chemical evolution cannot be taken as evidence for creation.
IMHO, the best approach is to point out the mistakes of ones opponents
rather than to commit the same mistakes.
[...]
EO:=============
>2. This newer version of evolution seems to either be admitting intelligent
>design up front or shifting the "random" chance argument to a new venue.
>Why should the universe contain these law-like organizational principles?
>The only sound answers seem to be (i) they exist because they are part of an
>intentional design or (ii) because the universe just randomly happened to
>form in a way that organizational principles arose. (Is there a third
>reasonable answer?)
This brings us to one of my favorite topics, the Anthropic Principle.
If only there *were* just these two possibilities then things would fare
very well indeed for design. Those who want to entertain (ii) are
probably not aware of the level of fine tuning that has been discovered.
Some fine tuning is relatively minor, on the order of 10% or so, but there
are a number of examples exhibiting fine tuning to 1 part in 10^40 and a
few to 1 part in 10^100. I believe Penrose gives an example that requires
tuning to 1 part in 10^(10^120) !
But, alas ;-), there is door number 3, the many Worlds hypothesis.
Here are the three options in the words of Dennis Sciama:
This simple but powerful argument leads us to ask the question:
*how much* can I deduce about the universe from the fact that
I exist? It turns out that various elementary particle, nuclear,
atomic and molecular properties of matter have to be very finely
tuned for conditions in the universe to have permitted my
development--many examples are given by Barrow and Tipler and
elsewhere in this book. These finely tuned properties will
probably also eventually be accounted for by fundamental
theory. But why should fundamental theory _happen_ to lead
to these properties?
There seem to be three possible answers to this question:
(a) It is a complete chance.
(b) God regards me as such a desirable product of the universe
that he has fine-tuned it so as to guarantee my development.
(c) There exist other, disjoint, universes with other laws
and constants of nature.
-- D.W. Sciama, "The Anthropic Principle and the Non-Uniqueness
of the Universe," in _The Anthropic Principle_, Proceedings
of the Second Venice Conference on Cosmology and Philosophy,
F. Bertola and U. Curi, ed., Cambridge University Press,
1993, pp. 107-109.
the argument from design based on fine tuning is John Leslie. I'm in the
process of reading his book <Universes> (Routledge, 1989) and am finding
it to be quite impressive. What he seeks to do first is to give all the
arguments against the argument from design and then show how each of these
arguments works equally well at refuting the many Worlds view. BTW, he
dismisses chance as being so ridiculous that it should not enter in to
any serious discussion. Thus, what he seems to be doing now is to
demonstrate that if one is to dismiss the argument from design then
consistency requires that many Worlds must also be dismissed leaving
one with no options. I'll be interested to see where he goes from here.
If this is all he does then the conclusion would be, it seems, that
design and many Worlds have an equal standing.
Now I'll introduce something a little more controversial ;-). Leslie
is careful to point out that while the argument from design is alive
and well, its not just any old argument from design and in particular
it is definitely not the argument from design that a creationist would
likely be comfortable with, for example:
The argument from design tries to prove God's reality by
examining the universe. In the form given to it today by
those naming themselves "creation scientists" it earns the
fury of genuine scientists. I shall show why most reputable
thinkers consider it long dead and buried. But afterward I
plan to demonstrate that recent developments make it very
much alive, though not in any shape creation science would
welcome.
-- Leslie, J. (1985). "Modern Cosmology and the Creation of
Life," in <Evolution and Creation>, Ed. E. McMullin,
University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 91-120.
OK, now for a controversial question. Is it inconsistent on the
part of someone like Hugh Ross to be amazed at the fine tuning
required for the precipitation of particles and force fields in
the early moments of the Big Bang, the formation of stars and the
evolution of galaxies, the spontaneous formation of carbon within
those stars etc. etc. and then draw a line in the sand when it
comes to chemical and biological evolution? This is what Leslie
is saying, of course. The fine tuning that has been observed is
a fine tuning of natural laws which allow for the evolution of
intelligent observers according to those natural laws.
>If evolutionists admit design, then our Designer must
>be considered a reasonable possibility. If they opt for the latter, they've
>just moved their fudge factor to a different arena where it's more difficult
>to show an "extraordinary coincidence" occured. Presumably one could show
>that a universe with law-like organizational principles is extremely less
>probable than other possible universes without such principles. However,
>it's very difficult to discuss the probability of other "possible universes"
>when our only experience is with the one we live in. :-)
Yes, this is one of the problems of the many worlds view. The disjoint
universes must be more than just "possible universes", they must actually
exist. Further, they must not only exist, they must be *unobservable* by
definition :-). From this we encounter problems with Occam's razor.
The many worlds view requires a vast (but not necessarily infinite) number
of universes, all of which are undetectable, in order to explain the
regularities of just one.
========================
Brian Harper |
Associate Professor | "It is not certain that all is uncertain,
Applied Mechanics | to the glory of skepticism" -- Pascal
Ohio State University |
========================