On Thu, 8 Jun 1995 10:55:35 -0500 you wrote:
>Hi Stephen, you responded to a recent post of mine,
>
>SC>Maybe it's just a matter of semantics, but if residual genetic
>information for the "vitamin C" gene is present in the human genome,
>then there is likely a genetic reason (defect if you will) why it is
>not expressed.
>There may be a genetic explanation, but not necessarily a genetic
>"reason"? (More "semantics"! <g>)
>
>Yup. How about genetic "mechanism"?
OK.
>SC>On point 2, I am uncertain by what "common degeneration" means.
>If you mean that precisely the same 'defect' that prevents the gene
>from being expressed could have arisen independently that is very
>unlikely and would probably be eliminated by sequence analysis of
>the pseudogene.
SJ>Why is this "very unlikely"? Look at the numerous examples of
>parallel evolution. Look at the guinea pig which has the same
>"defect".
SC>There is an important distinction in the way that we use "defect".
>In my use of the word, I do not intend to broadly mean "defective"
>which i understand you to mean. By "defect" I refer to the precise
>mechanism by which the gene is made non-functional. I suspect, from
>my knowledge of genetics (but do not know for certain), that the
>guinea pig would have a different molecular defect than primates in
>the gene in question (indeed different species of primates may have
>different genetic malfunctions).
Agreed.
SC>Your point that parallel evolution
>explains my "unlikely" statement doesn't really alter the point.
>Here we seem to be talking at different levels since "parallel
>evolution" is a very broad concept in relation to molecular genetics.
>Parallel evolution could feasibly occur by affecting completely
>different genes or by affecting the same gene in different ways in
>distinct species which is what my question addresses.
My point was that do we know that with species with similar genotypes
that the same degenerations could occur due to similar conditions.
This is the explanation given for parallel evolution by Darwinists. If
it can work at the genotype level, why not at the phenotype level?
SC>If guinea pigs and primates share identical genetic defects that
>prevent expression of the enzyme required for vit C synthesis, some
>might say that this is evidence for parallel genetic evolution, and
>suggest that this provides evidence that the common genetic defect is
>highly selectable (this of course is a circular argument).
Even without the guinea pig, it could be evidence of parallel genetic
evolution (or rather degeneration).
SC>However, as I stated previously, it
>would be very unlikely that guinea pigs and primates have identical
>molecular defects in the gene. From what we know about genetics and
>regulation of gene expression, a multitude of molecular defects could render
>a gene unexpressable. For this reason, I highly suspect (but do not
>know--but could probably find out) that distinct molecular changes
>inactivate the gene in guinea pigs vs primates. However, if the genetic
>defects were identical, one could conclude that this would indicate that
>there is something in common between guinea pigs and primates. Since common
>descent is not a likely explanation in this case (otherwise other species
>would likely have the same genetic defect--this could feasibly be tested),
>it would be reasonable to consider common evolutionary selection.
>Logically, it would also be very reasonable to consider common design.
Agreed,
>SC>On the other hand, if identical 'defects' in the gene were shared
>by different primate species, here, I should have added, "and not
shared by guinea pigs, it would almost certainly be due to common
inheritance.
SJ>I disagree with the "almost certainly" bit. It could equally be by
>common design. Even if it was by "common inheritance", this does not
>prove that Darwinist mechanisms were the cause. These need to be
>proved in their own right.
SC>By offering a offering common design as an alternative explanation
>to common inheritance, you infer that design and common descent are
>mutually exclusive. Certainly common design could occur separately
>from common inheritance, and I assume that this is the scenario that
>you are considering here. However, it is also possible that common
>design could incorporate common inheritance. From the hypothetical
>data presented above, there is no way to distinguish between these
>explanations.
Agreed.
SC>The genetic data I postulated above would be consistent with the
>proposed mechanism of evolution by common descent, and would provide
>no reason to discard the evolutionary hypothesis (which is the best
>claim that any experiment can legitimately make). You are correct
>that the data would also be compatible with common design, but also
>with martians molding us out of clay, firing us in ovens and
>sprinkling us with magic dust to become animate.... The problem with
>the last two explanations, is that they are only metaphysical and not
>mechanistic.
Agreed. But then so is Darwinism "metaphysical", at least according
to Popper. Also, we have no evidence of "martians" existing. I
presume you believe we have evidence of a Creator-God existing? <g>
SC>Now, before you protest that common design is a mechanistic theory
It never even occurred to me! I had not thought that common design
was a mechanistic theory.
SC>tell me how such a mechanisms would be distinguished from common
>origins.
Common design may not be able to be "distinguished" from "common
origins" (ie. common ancestry) but may be able to answer a wider range
of data, eg. large systematic gaps in the fossil record, sudden
appearance, rapid change (hyena to whale in 15-20 million years), etc.
SC>Keep in mind that above, I admitted that common origins
>does not rule out design.
And I admit that common design does not rule out common ancestry.
Classic creationism has always accepted common ancestry at the
archetypal basic "kinds" level, while believeing that these basic
"kinds" were in some sense the product of direct creation by God.
SC>Since I include design within the
>philosophical framework of common origins, and since you don't like
>common origins, and seem to want to exclude this from design, then
>the onus is on you to explain how you would distinguish the
>difference.
It isn't a question of whether I "don't like" common origins (ie.
common ancestry). This is trivialising the debate. The question is,
what did occur? And since we cannot ever know that (short of time
travel), the next best question is, what explanation (natural or
supernatural) best explains the widest range of facts?
The bottom line is that all primates share a similar phenotypic and
genetic makup. The first has been known since at least Linnaeus, and
the second since the molecular biology revolution of the 1950's. Part
of this similar phenotypic makeup is that all primates cannot
manufacture vitamin C and the genotypic explanation is that the same
genes do not code for it.
The Darwinist assumption is that this is because all primates share a
common ancestor which had this genetic inability to make vitamin C.
But this is no different (or any more conclusive) than the original
Linnaean argument that man is a primate.
>much clipping....
>SJ>Why is not Progressive Creation not also "an interesting and useful
>theory.">
>
SC>It may be. I know very little about the evidence for or against
>it. Until I joined the reflector, I knew very little about the
>argument for design. While well schooled in the theory of evolution,
>evolution was never really central to anything in my science or
>philosophy. I guess you could say that the whole matter is really of
>little interest to me (or to most of my colleagues and students).
OK. Perhaps that's the trouble with evolution. It purports to solve
the problems too easily and puts its believers to sleep? <g>
SC>So why am I talking to you? From the exposure I did have to the
>debate, largely beginning with Phil Johnson's book, I became
>interested in the debate itself. In particular, I am interested in
>the different conceptions of science embraced by the different sides
>of the debate. While I firmly agree that Dawkins, Huxley, et al.,
>claim too much for science and mistake philosophy for fact,
>unfortunately I see the same mistake made by all sides of the
>creation arguement.
The difference is that the creation side admit that their view is
"philosophy" (or rather theology), but the Darwinist camp believe that
their view is "fact".
SC>Parenthetically, my interest in the philosophy
>of science also traces to my experiences in training students and
>post-doctoral fellows in my lab and classes. Over the last few
>years, I have come to the conclusion that we don't train
>philosophers, as the PhD would imply, rather we train technicians.
>This is because most of my colleagues know nothing about the
>philosophy of science themselves--hence the garbage that comes from
>the writings of well respected scientists, and this explains my
>contention that my colleagues have very little interest in the
>evolution debate and in any resulting theistic implications.
Thanks for the background. Unfortunately, Darwinism has persuaded the
majority of scientists that God is unnecessary at best and
non-existent at worst.
SC>In sum, your argument against common descent and for design cannot
>be adressed by science in the way that you present it.
Why not? If science can address "descent" (which is unobservable,
unrepeatable and untestable), why can it not address "design" which
has the same characteristics?
SC>Like Dawkins, you focus on your interpretation as science and fact.
>However, the science is represented by the data collected and that
>alone is factual. The interpretation, regardless whether it is from
>Dawkins or yourself, is metaphysics.
Agreed.
SC>The problem lies in the latter and not with the former. The
>debate would facilitated by recognizing this distinction and focusing
>discussion at the metaphysical level.
I do recognise this distinction. Whatever gave you the idea that I
didn't?
God bless.
Stephen