To Reflectorites on Evolution@Calvin.EDU:
Here is the first installment of my critique of Ernst Mayr's four
levels of teleology, articulated in his book _Toward a New Philosophy of
Biology_ and his article "The Idea of Teleology." If you didn't get a
chance to see the summaries of the article I posted last week (Mayr
Summary I, and Mayr Summary II), please e-mail me and I can forward them
to you privately.
Teleomatic processes:
"All objects of the physical world are endowed with the capacity
to change their state, and these changes strictly obey natural laws.
They are end-directed only in a passive, automatic way, regulated by
external forces or conditions, that is by natural laws. I designated
such processes as *teleomatic* to indicate that they are automatically
achieved." (Mayr, "Idea," 125).
I believe Mayr is incorrect in his use of the term "natural
laws." Natural laws do not regulate or govern anything; they are not
obeyed in the sense that juridical laws are. The natural laws of science
are epistemologically descriptive, not ontologically prescriptive. They
are not ontological givens, they are descriptions of how we as humans
regularly observe phenomena to behave. They are not necessary but
contingent. Mayr unwittingly admits this by his verb choice above: "All
objects of the physical world *are endowed* with the capacity to change
their state" (emphasis mine). "Are endowed by whom or what?" I must
ask. If natural laws prescribe anything, they prescribe our expectations
of patterns in nature, thus enabling us to make predictions. They may
make anomalies unexpected, but they don't make them impossible--else how
would natural laws ever get modified?
Use of this kind of language shows a desire to make nature
self-sufficient and automatic, closed to any hint of divine providence.
But if we are going to use the notion of natural laws "governing"
physical phenomena, we must follow this track all the way to a "Governor"
who enforces the laws, and upon whose will such laws are contingent.
Unwillingness to do this does not render the prescriptive account of
natural laws any less metaphysical in character. A universe governed by
natural laws is no less a metaphysical abstraction than a universe
governed by a divine law-giver. Such laws sound like they constitute the
kind of "unverifiable theological and metaphysical doctrines" Mayr is at
pains to avoid in science.
I do not deny the validity of descriptive generalizations about
phenomena of nature, or even of calling them "laws" as long as such laws
are understood as descriptive of regular and consistent processes, not as
prescribing what "can" or "cannot" happen in the empirical world. If the
laws are descriptive, as I argue here, then we must search for the source
of their efficacy, rather than just assume their ontology to be
materialistically given as Mayr does. If natural laws "govern"
phenomena, then metaphysical teleology is present. If such laws
"govern," then they serve the same metaphysical function that used to be
ascribed to the volition of God. Darwin was willing to consider that
natural laws could be expressive of the will of an original divine
Governor; whereas Mayr's thoroughgoing materialism does not allow that
consideration. The lawlike regularity with which changes occur in
physical phenomena lead the human mind to purport that they are so
"endowed," and that the laws of nature constitute a metaphysical reality
which is "obeyed" by the phenomena. Mayr's use of such verbs shows an
inconsistency. If he would restrict himself to the view that laws of
nature are descriptive generalizations, Mayr could be more consistent.
But he would also have to concede that such laws are contingent, and thus
allow the possibility that they are contingent on the will of a necessary
being with intelligence and purpose. And his distinction between
teleomatic and cosmically teleological processes would lose its force as
an argument for a purely materialistic account of physical phenomena.
I would argue a more open stance regarding natural laws--one that
has the freedom to leave open the question of whether we merely accept
natural laws as "brute givens," or if it is reasonable to go further
and to believe those laws reflect the will of a greater intelligence.
In either case, it is mere philosophical prejudice that asserts that
lawlike regularities must not be interpreted to have no metaphysically
teleological implications.
I value your responses, fellow-reflectorites.
Next post: Teleonomic Processes.
Dennis Durst
Urbana, IL
dldurst@prairienet.org