Schwarzwald says:
"Davies goes on, I think, to mention that multiverses may 'solve' fine-tuning of our universe at the cost of having to explain fine-tuning of the multiverse-generator. In other words the fine-tuning problem doesn't go away - it shifts up a level."
This is true. There are still yet many things to discover. Max Planck was advised not to go into physics because there was nothing new to discover, but he went on to help discover quantum theory. There's still plenty to unravel. If multiverses are true- yes- there is a 'bubble generator' pumping them out left and right. Only the viable ones survive. Just as we have learned that 'time had a beginning' there may be many other radical learnings coming forward.
The only thing funny- if we can determine this based on math, then it must mean that math is absolute (2+2 always =4), and works the same way in all universes. If different universes have different math, or if the 'universe generator' works on different math, then we will never get it... it will be forever beyond our grasp. It would be like an English speaker trying to understand French without hearing or reading (seeing) French.
...Bernie
________________________________
From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] On Behalf Of Schwarzwald
Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2009 5:50 PM
To: asa@calvin.edu
Subject: Re: [asa] Multiverse math
Paul Davies has something interesting to say about multiverse speculations. From The Goldilocks Enigma:
"If we are prepared to entertain the notion that there exists limitless possible universes that are unobservable from this one, why sould we rule out the existence of limitless simulated, or fake universes, too? No reason at all. In fact, not only have we no reason to rule them out, we have every reason to rule them in."
His argument more or less goes: If there is a superabundance of real universes, then - unless there's something special about human consciousness - there are going to be a superabundance of fake universes as well. Some civilizations (infinite number?) in the universes where life is possible will reach a level of technology capable of simulating a universe, or at least a reality. And what's more, you can have nested simulations - simulations within simulations within simulations, etc. And if for any one universe capable of supporting intelligent life, you thereby have a universe where 1 to n fake universes can be hosted, you're in an interesting dilemma. Namely, it seems we're more likely to be living in a fake universe than a real one. While Davies doesn't point out the following, I will: If we're living a simulated universe, then atheism is false and deism or some variety of theism is true.
Davies goes on, I think, to mention that multiverses may 'solve' fine-tuning of our universe at the cost of having to explain fine-tuning of the multiverse-generator. In other words the fine-tuning problem doesn't go away - it shifts up a level.
On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 7:48 PM, Dehler, Bernie <bernie.dehler@intel.com<mailto:bernie.dehler@intel.com>> wrote:
Gordon said:
"How can you look at a single measurement and determine that the value you get must have been randomly selected? It might be that it was selected for some additional reason besides causing existence to be viable."
As I understand it, there is no compelling reason for the exact values for the constants, other than that they are in the viable range for life to exist. If the multiverse hypothesis were true, then you'd expect these values to fall within a range, but other than that, be random (not special in any other way). (Because any other random number wouldn't generate life so we'd never see it.) The constants do appear to be randomly sitting within the range they need to be. There is no 'exact value' that they need to be!
Bill said:
"I personally don't see why the narrow range for life as we know it to exist is relevant. The "intuition" of the argument is that there appears to be no reason why any value should obtain and not others, whether or not life should arise or not. This is why I have intentionally posed the argument as not anthropic."
I read this book "Many worlds in one" http://www.amazon.com/Many-Worlds-One-Search-Universes/dp/0809067226/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1251848624&sr=8-1 .
I took it that it was very important to confront the anthropic principle, and the multiverse theory does that by explaining the exact constants aren't special in any way other than being in the right narrow range.
Bill said:
"But apparently many others find the compulsion to a multiverse to be akin to a cosmological argument."
...because it (many worlds) answers the anthropic principle argument, which is a very strong case for creationism. If not many worlds, how else to explain creation without God?
...Bernie
-----Original Message-----
From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu<mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu> [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu<mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu>] On Behalf Of gordon brown
Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2009 4:30 PM
To: asa@calvin.edu<mailto:asa@calvin.edu>
Subject: RE: [asa] Multiverse math
On Tue, 1 Sep 2009, Dehler, Bernie wrote:
>
> "3) Since it is possible that these parameters can take on other values,
> they will."
>
>
>
> Maybe a different way to state it is like this:
>
> 3. Since these values fall within a small range, the actual numbers aren't
> special but appear to be randomly selected.
>
>
>
> For example, let's say a certain constant is 1.5667 and it must be between
> 1.5000 and 1.6000 for existence to be viable. Amazing, it is 1.5667! Yes,
> but it could have been 1.5571 or 1.5001, etc. The actual number is in the
> life-giving range, but other than that, it is special in no way. I think
> that makes a compelling argument.
>
How can you look at a single measurement and determine that the value you
get must have been randomly selected? It might be that it was selected for
some additional reason besides causing existence to be viable.
Gordon Brown (ASA member)
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Received on Wed Sep 2 12:41:48 2009
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