I thank Steve Matheson for his three replies, which I am just now getting around to. The first two replies concerned procedural matters, i.e., how we might profitably discuss the subjects at hand. As I’m more interested in actually discussing the subjects at hand than in discussing how we might discuss the subjects at hand, I won’t reply specifically to those, other than to say that I found the second reply gracious and inviting, and I thank Mr. Matheson for it. So I move to the third and most recent reply.
I thank Mr. Matheson for offering to discuss the Martian sculpture example, and I’ll certainly try to respond non-evasively to his questions and criticisms. However, I have to disappoint Mr. Matheson in confessing that I have not read the discussions of Del Ratzsch. This is not deliberate; as Mr. Matheson probably knows, literally hundreds of new books and hundreds of new articles per year have been coming out on topics related to evolution, and no one can read them all. I try to keep up as well as I can. Each year I read several meaty, non-lightweight books in their entirety, and I read dozens of articles, of varying degrees of technical difficulty, forwarded to me or posted on the internet. But that only covers a fraction of what’s written. My current reading schedule (not to mention teaching schedule) will not permit me to get to Del Ratzsch for several months, so if Mr. Matheson wants a proper scholarly response to Mr. Ratzsch, he will have to wait that long. !
For now, I propose to answer in terms of the core understanding of Del Ratzsch’s ideas that Mr. Matheson has presented. If this is not adequate, Mr. Matheson will have to offer further explication of Del Ratzsch’s ideas.
We agree on much:
“The point is the same: we recognize design, unambiguously and effortlessly in
those cases, despite complete ignorance (even utter bafflement) regarding the
origins of the artifacts. "Scientific" or not, our reasoning is completely
valid.”
Yes, this is my position, that the reasoning is valid. I am not sure that the reasoning is “scientific”, which is why I posed the question, to find out what makes reasoning scientific or non-scientific in such circumstances. Also, I wanted to ask: Whether or not a form of reasoning is “scientific” in some special modern sense (e.g., Galilean, for example), can it not still be used in scientific contexts, as long as it is valid? The reasoning used in Euclidean geometry is not scientific reasoning, but mathematical or deductive reasoning, yet it is still valid, and scientists make use of it. If they can make use of Euclidean geometry, or mathematics generally, I see no reason why scientists cannot make use of other forms of valid reasoning, such as the reasoning which identifies the Martian sculptures as “designed” rather than “accidental products of unguided natural causes”.
The other point to be expanded upon is that, in the case of the Martian sculpture, we do not seem to need any knowledge of the designer in order to be sure that the object is an artifact and not a product of unguided natural causes. Critics of ID often argue that the entire premise of ID is faulty, because it moves from inferring the design of mechanical or otherwise artificial objects, the designers of which we are familiar with, to inferring the design of living objects, for which we have no comparable knowledge of the designer. But it appears from my example and from Del Ratzsch’s discussion that knowledge of the designer is not necessary to prove design in the case of artificial objects, so it is not clear why the move to living objects should be illegitimate (on those grounds, anyway).
Where we seem to disagree, and where you accuse me of “serious error” (rather prematurely, as we are only beginning the discussion and I have only aired some tentative ideas and questions, not stated anything firmly), is over the proper criteria for design detection. You suggest that “counterflow” is the appropriate criterion, or at least a promising criterion, for the detection of design, and that “complexity” is an inappropriate or bad one. You also seem to say that dragging in “complexity” has misled me, and caused me to assume the very thing I have set out to prove, i.e., that things like the avian lung are designed. Taking the second point first, I certainly did not “assume” design in living things, or make any formal argument that complexity automatically proved design. I was only suggesting that complexity, or at least a certain kind of complexity, might well be an indicator of design. And since “complexity” can have many meanings, and we!
haven’t worked through all of those, I don’t think “complexity” should be prematurely rejected; in one possible meaning, it might be relevant to whether or not “counterflow” is detectable. In any case, let’s set “complexity” aside and just try to flesh out “counterflow”.
You go on to write this:
“In my opinion, a focus on counterflow allows us to see that design can indeed
be detected and that the methods for detection can be reasonably considered
"scientific." As I've said before, on UD and elsewhere, I do not consider such
discussions of design to be in any way unscientific, and I am quite keen on
seeing design ideas continue to mature. On this important point, you and I are
in agreement, don't you think?”
Yes, I think we are in agreement, and I’m glad that you don’t offer the blanket equality, “design = unscientific”, that Ken Miller and Eugenie Scott and the NCSE have constantly pushed. You seem to have thought about methodology in a more refined manner than they have. And “counterflow” sounds promising, but I still need to know more about it.
Your rough definition of the notion is given here:
“Del goes on to identify the ‘marks’ of design, focusing on the notion
of counterflow, which can be paraphrased as evidence of action counter to the
expected action of nature ‘operating freely’.”
I like this notion. However, the trick is how to detect counterflow. In order to be sure that we have “evidence of action counter to the expected action of nature operating freely”, we have to know what nature does, or can do, when it is ‘operating freely’. And here I see a fundamental difficulty which separates Darwin-lovers from Darwin-doubters, which is that Darwin-lovers appear to believe that nature, operating freely (i.e., unconstrained by technology or by special interventions of God), can (and given enough time, is likely to) arrange itself, unguided by intelligence, into ever-more-complex, tightly-integrated biological systems, whereas Darwin-doubters do not grant this. They do not see how atoms, molecules, cells, systems, and organisms, as they have generally been understood by Darwinists like Dawkins, Coyne, etc., show any upward tendency toward complex organization. From the Darwin-doubting point of view, there is no “natural” tendency toward up!
ward complexity and integration, or at least, if there is, the Darwinists have not shown it. So if there is no “natural” tendency toward upward complexity and integration, then how can it be said that there is any flow of “nature, operating freely” in the direction of Darwinian evolution, in the sense of molecules to man, or, if you wish to restrict it to Darwin’s original claim, from simple (probably one-celled) creatures to man?
Now you may reply: “But are you not praising Michael Denton, who does argue for a natural, built-in upward tendency for matter to take on complex, integrated, living forms?” Yes, but note that Denton does not conceive of nature as Dawkins, Coyne, Sagan, etc. conceive of it. He does not see a bunch of atoms sloshing around in a primeval sea, which might or might not become a cell, depending upon a blast of lightning at the right time; he does not see a primitive cell which might or might not (depending on the presence of absence of a lucky “hit” from a cosmic ray which alters its genetic make-up) make the leap to multi-celled association; he does not see a primitive worm in the Cambrian seas as maybe producing thirty new major phyla, or maybe just staying a worm forever, depending on a role of the dice. He sees the laws of nature as set up for complex life, tending toward complex life, from the very beginning, and he sees the possibility of evolutionary progress b!
uilt right into the DNA, locked up in the “unused” portions, waiting to be released under the right conditions. What I am saying is that IF nature is as Dawkins, Mayr, Gaylord Simpson, Gross, Coyne, Myers, etc. conceive it (not as Denton conceives it), then the sort of natural upward tendency that Denton imputes to nature is non-existent; any “upward” motion toward cells, multicellular life, vertebrates or man will be completely fortuitous, a lucky accident, a cosmic freak. IF nature is as most 20th-century proponents of evolution have portrayed it, I do not see any natural “flow” upwards toward higher life forms. IF nature is as most 20th-century proponents of evolution have portrayed it, I see Darwinian evolution as nothing but one long “counterflow”, inexplicable in natural terms, unless Darwinists are willing to fall back on just plain luck.
So the first question I pose to you regarding “flow” and “counterflow” in nature is this: Why is Darwinian evolution itself not a counter-intuitive theory from the outset? Does its explanation of design, as only accidental in origin (and thus as only apparent rather than real design), not depend on an utterly improbable “counterflow” in the natural order? Do we not see, in our observations of nature, a natural “flow” toward either degradation, or at best stasis (cows always begetting cows, etc.)? Do we ever see any marked advance in integrative complexity in living systems, other than that which we introduce in the breeding-yards or in the genetics lab, via human intelligence? Is there not already a presumptive argument against Darwin, from 1859 on, in terms of a common-sense notion something like Ratzsch’s “counterflow”?
Any corrections, clarifications, examples, etc. regarding this notion of counterflow would be gladly accepted. And any statement regarding the status of neo-Darwinian theory in relation to counterflow would be helpful.
From: Steve Matheson <1. smatheso@calvin.edu>
Date: Mon Oct 06 2008 - 23:45:03 EDT
Timaeus--
The issue of design detection and its scientific-ness is interesting and worthy
of discussion. (Thanks, by the way, for the acknowledgement that reasonable
people may disagree on these matters.)
I accept your invitation to discuss your sculpture-on-Mars scenario. Here's
what you wrote:
-------
“You would agree that the stone sculpture on Mt. Rushmore is designed, no? You
would agree with this even if you didn’t know the history of its construction,
wouldn’t you?
“Now, shift the scene to Mars. We travel to Mars, and on one of the mountains
there, we find what looks like a sculpture similar to that on Mt. Rushmore, but showing whole bodies instead of heads. The figures in the sculpture are not
exactly human - they have webbed hands, and little antennae on top of the
heads, but they have obvious eyes, nostrils, mouths, and four limbs, with an
upright posture. Their outlines are clear and precise, not vague.
“Would you agree that the design inference here is a practical certainty? I.e.,
would you agree that wind, sun and water did not accidentally carve out these
figures over three billion years? Would you agree that we can “know” that this
is a stone sculpture carved by intelligent beings? And that we can know this
even if we know nothing about those intelligent beings (who may not be the
beings pictured in the sculpture, but beings of another race altogether)? And
that we can know this even if we can find no other trace of the existence of
any previous civilization on Mars, and therefore have no other proof that
anything ever lived there?
“Now, presuming that you agree, is this “knowledge” of design scientific
knowledge? If not, of what kind of knowledge is it?
“Now take something like the avian lung, or the human circulatory system,
either of which is orders of magnitude more complex than a simple carving of
four aliens on a mountain of Mars. Can we know (without the aid of revelation
or a system of philosophy) that this is the product of design? If not, why not?
And if so, is our knowledge scientific knowledge, or some other kind of
knowledge?
“And if the inference is scientific in the case of alien carvings, but not in
the biological cases, what makes the inference scientific in the one case, but
unscientific in the other? Why do you suggest that we are importing religion or
metaphysics or philosophy in the case of the biological examples, but not
equally in the Martian carving example? Why aren’t both inferences simply
examples of deductive reason based on facts established by science, and
therefore scientific inferences?”
-------
This thought experiment is very similar to one proposed by my friend and
colleague Del Ratzsch, whose writings on this subject you should read at your
first convenience. (If you haven't seen them already.) His example is a
diesel bulldozer on Mars, or sometimes a stainless steel replica of Stonehenge.
The point is the same: we recognize design, unambiguously and effortlessly in
those cases, despite complete ignorance (even utter bafflement) regarding the
origins of the artifacts. "Scientific" or not, our reasoning is completely
valid. Del goes on to identify the "marks" of design, focusing on the notion
of counterflow, which can be paraphrased as evidence of action counter to the
expected action of nature "operating freely."
I like his reasoning a lot. Yours, it seems to me, is different. Your key
move in the scenario is to set up avian lungs etc. as analogous to Martian
sculpture, due to "complexity." (Tellingly, you had not mentioned "complexity"
before that, and for good reason: "complexity" has nothing to do with the
design inference with respect to the sculptures.) This is a serious error. In fact, you are assuming the very thing that you seek to establish -- namely,
that avian lungs etc. exhibit clear evidence of design, in the same way that
Martian sculptures would. I believe that you spoiled your good argument (about
the scientific-ness of design detecti("complexity") into the discussion. I think that was a significant mistake.
In my opinion, a focus on counterflow allows us to see that design can indeed
be detected and that the methods for detection can be reasonably considered
"scientific." As I've said before, on UD and elsewhere, I do not consider such
discussions of design to be in any way unscientific, and I am quite keen on
seeing design ideas continue to mature. On this important point, you and I are
in agreement, don't you think?
On the other hand, I am completely unconvinced that any of the biological
examples presented by you or Denton or anyone else display counterflow. Note
that I didn't say that they *don't* display counterflow. I'm just not
convinced, even a little bit, that they do. And the more arguments from
incredulity that I see (Nature's Destiny is chock full of them), the more I
suspect that there is little prospect of any serious attempt to demonstrate
counterflow in a meaningful way. This could change, and I'm watching
carefully. Behe started down a promising road in EoE, but failed to do any of
the real work that is required. Denton gives us a fine-tuning lesson, but on
biological subjects he fails to show counterflow -- he doesn't even come close.
(I'll discuss Nature's Destiny at length in the next few days, separately.)
No ID thinker, so far, has done the hard work of actually showing that any
biological system of any kind exhibits counterflow. And this, in my opinion,
should be the most important ID project by far.
Steve Matheson
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Received on Wed Oct 8 16:26:18 2008
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