Re: [asa] Worthy of response?

Jack said: *And I think that you don't really think they should be
considered the same either.*

Not *exactly* the same -- but not different in such a material way that
destruction for the purpose of medical testing or treatment for the benefit
of others is warranted.

Jack said: * If you are convinced that early embryos deserve the same
consideration that infants do, then why are you not campaigning against IVF,
or praying to God for the 2/3 of conceptuses that never survive beyond a
very early stage?
*
The IVF question is interesting and difficult. Personally, I do believe the
IVF industry is an enormous problem, and I would like to see it much more
tightly regulated. I'll admit that this hasn't been high on my priority
list in terms of lobbying my legislators. As to praying for conceptuses,
well, I did pray for my own once I knew my wife was pregnant, and to the
extent I've know women within my circle of influence who have been pregnant,
I have prayed for safe, full term pregnancies. I don't think anyone can be
expected to pray for every individual pregnancy in the world any more than
every individual baby in the world, except in the general sense of praying
that good, affordable prenatal and infant care will become available to
everyone.

I'll read the PSCF article, but let me also offer a link to an article by
Robert George with a good discussion of the potentiality principle:
http://www.agora.forwomeninscience.com/bioethics/2006/09/the_moral_status_of_the_human.php

On 9/6/07, drsyme@cablespeed.com <drsyme@cablespeed.com> wrote:
>
>
> Your example of the infant is exactly why I think that the potentiality
argument is flawed. I do not think that is the criteria that we should be
making determinations of personhood/humanity, on. I don't think I need to
spell out the different ethical considerations that one should give to an
infant, and to an early embryo. And I think that you don't really think they
should be considered the same either. If you are convinced that early
embryos deserve the same consideration that infants do, then why are you not
campaigning against IVF, or praying to God for the 2/3 of conceptuses that
never survive beyond a very early stage?
>
> I was reading an issue of PCSF from Dec 06 on this topic.
>
> http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2006/PSCF12-06Peterson.pdf
>
> You, should read it. One of the criteria he proposed was that a soul
requires a body. In other words "ensoulment" could not occur in an embryo
that is just a collection of cells, but would require some differentiation,
some development of organs. And even though he did not mention it, I think
that at the point that the neuro-axis is differentiated is probably as good
a point as any to consider the embryo human.
>
>
>
> On Thu Sep 6 11:00 , "David Opderbeck" sent:
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>
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> Jack said: I guess you could take a very conservative stance, but if it
means saving the life of someone with ALS or Parkinsons disease or cancer, I
would suggest that is a compelling reason and But you need to convince me
that embryo's are humanity. The potential to be human is not the same as
being human.
>
> Yes, the possibility of saving a life through destructive tissue
harvesting has to be considered. But (a) it isn't at all clear that
embryonic stem cells will ever save any lives; and (b) it isn't at all clear
whether other sources of stem cells might suffice even if stem cells can be
used to develop viable treatments. So, we have to weigh the potential for
treatments against the potential for fully functional human life inherent in
those embryos. I think you have to convince me that the balance weighs
heavily in favor of the potential treatment -- that there is something like
a public health nuclear bomb about to go off and that embryonic stem cells
will surely defuse it. I think the burden of proof lies with those who
propose that human embryos should be destroyed.
>
> Even then, I'm not sure the answer is clear. For example, even when we
speak of newborn infants, I think, we have to continue speaking about
potentiality. A newborn infant can't speak, reason, or make any meaningful
autonomous decisions. You could easily say -- and some do -- that if such
functionality is integral to being "human," then newborn infants aren't
fully "human" in that sense. We can only say that a newborn infant is
physically of the human species and has the potentiality to become a fully
functional human.
>
> Yet, I think we'd all agree that under almost no circumstances would it be
ethically justifiable to destroy a newborn infant for the purpose of
harvesting tissue to treat another person's medical condition. Even if it
could be shown that, say, the livers of newborn infants can cure all the
cancer in the world, I think most people would agree that we still shouldn't
harvest newborns' livers.
>
> So why does an embryo's human potentiality differ materially from a
newborn infant's human potentiality? At the very early stage, it differs in
the possibility of twinning, and at later stages, it differs only in
the probability of premature mortality. Again, I think the burden of proof
is on you to demonstrate why and exactly how these brute facts change the
ethical calculus. If something like the probability of premature mortality
matters, for example, why shouldn't we be just as comfortable harvesting
organs from newborn infants in impoverished countries where infant mortality
rates approach 10%, particularly if the cure rates for people using the
harvested organs are high? It seems to me that this way of analyizing the
problem leads to an untenable utilitarianism.
>
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Received on Thu Sep 6 12:18:27 2007