Re: [asa] Worthy of response?

Jack said: *I guess you could take a very conservative stance, but if it
means saving the life of someone with ALS or Parkinsons disease or cancer, I
would suggest that is a compelling reason* and *But you need to convince me
that embryo's are humanity. The potential to be human is not the same as
being human.
*
Yes, the possibility of saving a life through destructive tissue harvesting
has to be considered. But (a) it isn't at all clear that embryonic stem
cells will ever save any lives; and (b) it isn't at all clear whether other
sources of stem cells might suffice even if stem cells can be used to
develop viable treatments. So, we have to weigh the potential for
treatments against the potential for fully functional human life inherent in
those embryos. I think *you* have to convince *me* that the balance weighs
heavily in favor of the potential treatment -- that there is something like
a public health nuclear bomb about to go off and that embryonic stem cells
will surely defuse it. I think the burden of proof lies with those who
propose that human embryos should be destroyed.

Even then, I'm not sure the answer is clear. For example, even when we
speak of newborn infants, I think, we have to continue speaking about
potentiality. A newborn infant can't speak, reason, or make any meaningful
autonomous decisions. You could easily say -- and some do -- that if such
functionality is integral to being "human," then newborn infants aren't
fully "human" in that sense. We can only say that a newborn infant is
physically of the human species and has the potentiality to become a fully
functional human.

Yet, I think we'd all agree that under almost no circumstances would it be
ethically justifiable to destroy a newborn infant for the purpose of
harvesting tissue to treat another person's medical condition. Even if it
could be shown that, say, the livers of newborn infants can cure all the
cancer in the world, I think most people would agree that we still shouldn't
harvest newborns' livers.

So why does an embryo's human potentiality differ materially from a newborn
infant's human potentiality? At the very early stage, it differs in the
possibility of twinning, and at later stages, it differs only in
the probability of premature mortality. Again, I think the burden of proof
is on you to demonstrate why and exactly how these brute facts change the
ethical calculus. If something like the probability of premature mortality
matters, for example, why shouldn't we be just as comfortable harvesting
organs from newborn infants in impoverished countries where infant mortality
rates approach 10%, particularly if the cure rates for people using the
harvested organs are high? It seems to me that this way of analyizing the
problem leads to an untenable utilitarianism.

On 9/5/07, drsyme@cablespeed.com <drsyme@cablespeed.com> wrote:
> My responses in italics below.
>
>
>
> On Wed Sep 5 8:56 , 'David Opderbeck' <dopderbeck@gmail.com> sent:
>
>
>
> Jack said: You just keep asserting that human potential is worthy of
protection without actually arguing why.
>
> I just alluded to three arguments -- the precautionary principle, Kantian
deontological duties, and virtue ethics:
>
> 1. The precautionary principle says that, when faced with uncertainty, we
ought not to take action that will cause significant harm if one or more of
the uncertain scenarios turns out to be true. We are uncertain about the
moral status of pre-implantation zygotes. If we are wrong about their moral
status, and we abort them or create them for the purpose of destructive
testing, we will have destroyed human life -- a grave harm. Therefore, at
present, we ought not to take such actions.
>
> I agree that we are uncertain about the status of pre-implantation
zygotes. But who is talking about creating them for the purpose of
destructive testing? They are already being created in the thousands in
fertility clinics. Many of them are created and frozen and never
implanted. I dont think you would disagree that if there is a compelling
reason, it is justifiable to use these embryos even if their status is
uncertain. I guess you could take a very conservative stance, but if it
means saving the life of someone with ALS or Parkinsons disease or cancer, I
would suggest that is a compelling reason.
>
> 2. A Kantian categorical imperative says that we ought to act only
according to maxims that we would wish to become a universal law, and
further that we should always treat humanity as an ends and not a means. It
follows from this that human potential should be encouraged for its own
sake. Thus, we ought not to create potential human life for the purpose of
destructive testing.
>
> But you need to convince me that embryo's are humanity. The potential to
be human is not the same as being human. Again the purpose is not
destructive, it is for reproduction or for medical uses.
>
> 3. An Aristotelian virtue perspective says that a community should adhere
to virtues such as generosity, courage, and fidelity to trust, that are
likely to enhance human flourishing. Possessing the generosity, courage,
and trustworthiness to nurture human potentiality requires us to adopt
certain practices -- such as providing for the care of expectant mothers,
infants and children -- and to eschew others -- such as establishing systems
in which human potentiality is purposefully terminated.
>
> And shouldn't we care for the sick? If stem cells will heal or cure isn't
it not virtuous to look into ways to treat them? You have a very different,
and more negative, understanding of stem cell research than I do, I would
not call it "destructive testing", and the purpose of research is not to
"purposefully terminate" human life or potentiality.
>
>
>

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Received on Thu Sep 6 11:00:56 2007