Re: [asa] Worthy of response?

Twinning occurs before implantation. Dizygotic twins occur when two eggs are fertilized by 2 sperm, so they are separate entities from conception.

Monozygotic twins separate at the morula stage, or the blastocyst stage, which can be as early as 3 days post conception, and before implantation.

I don't understand Burgy's statement: "It would seem, based on various medical findings, that ensoulment does
not take place at conception and, indeed, does not take place until after
implantation has taken place." If he is talking about twinning as the medical evidence, it is clear that this occurs before implantation, and very early after conception, so implantation seems to be an arbitrary definition of when personhood, (via 'ensoulment') begins.

Having said that, I disagree with David O when he says : ""Personhood" ultimately is an ethical value judgment based on both present and potentential aspects of the entity. " What does an argument for personhood based on potentiality look like without having to resort to religious, and especially biblical values? This IS exactly where religion and science clash on this matter.

  ----- Original Message -----
  From: David Opderbeck
  To: Carol or John Burgeson
  Cc: asa@calvin.edu
  Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2007 2:32 PM
  Subject: Re: [asa] Worthy of response?

  Burgy said: I cannot agree. The Nazis made an ethical judgement that Jews were not persons. That did not make them not persons. A person is a person regardless of any ethical judgements made by others.

  I respond: right, but the question "what consitutes 'personhood'" ultimately is a metaphysical / ethical question, not a scientific question. I agree that empirical data from the natural sciences, such as data about what can physically happen to a zygote pre-implantation, bears on this question. However, I don't think such observations can answer the question.

  And, the fact that the Nazis made wrong and evil ethical judgments doesn't mean there is no basis on which we could reach a different, objectively better conclusion, without reducing the question to a merely "scientific" one. In other words, when I say something is primarily an "ethical" rather than a "scientific" issue, I don't think that relegates the question to the realm of merely subjective emotion, concerning which the Nazi view is just as valid as any other view.

  In response to my musings on the pre-implantation zygote and ensoulement, Burgy said: The problem with this explanation is that is (I think) entirely ad hoc. Or perhaps there is supporting evidence for it?

  I respond: I think you are improperly shifting the burden of proof here. You asserted that the indeterminacy of the zygote before implantation -- the fact that it can split into two and then re-fuse or not re-fuse -- defeats any notion of ensoulement before implantation. In making that assertion, you took on the burden of proving it.

  I offered a few scenarios under which your assertion might not hold. In doing that, I've at least provisionally defeated your defeater concerning ensoulement -- you haven't carried your burden of proof. I don't need to offer any more evidence, because I'm not claiming any specific concept of ensoulement is necessarily correct. I'm only suggesting that there are any number of plausible ways in which pre-implantation ensoulement could possibly remain viable despite your proposed defeater. In order to carry your burden of proof, you now need to show why my possible scenarios fail.

  I could go a bit further, though, and say that if a zygote can split in two before implantation, and if that results in two distinctly individual fetuses being brought to term and growing into distinct individuals, that in itself is evidence against your claim. But at the end of the day, neither of us has enough data to know what is or isn't possible concerning ensoulement, or even whether ensoulement is a useful concept.

  On 9/4/07, Carol or John Burgeson <burgytwo@juno.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> "I had said: The medical data that indicates fairly clearly that an entity prior to
> implantation is not a person is as follows:
>
>
>
> David O posted:
>
> "I think that is too strong a statement."
>
> We must disagree, then, on that claim.
>
> "The data you cite certainly suggest that the concept of "personhood" is difficult to apply prior to implantation."
>
> I understand your use of a milder term. Perhaps it would help if I agreed that the data, while "clear," is not a rock solid 100% proof. It is, as are so many concepts in this area, always provisional.
>
> "However, the notion of "personhood," IMHO, ultimately is not something that can be conclusively determined one way or the other by these sorts of empirical observations."
>
> We can, on that basis, never have conclusive proof of such things. But none the less we have to (sometimes) bet on what looks the most likely. That is all I am doing.
>
> "Personhood" ultimately is an ethical value judgment based on both present and potentential aspects of the entity."
>
> I cannot agree. The Nazis made an ethical judgement that Jews were not persons. That did not make them not persons. A person is a person regardless of any ethical judgements made by others.
>
> "I would argue that the potentiality of a not-yet-implanted human zygote gives it a kind of dignity that requires us (a) not to discard it without very good reason; and (b) not to create it without the intention to bring it to term if possible."
>
> I have not argued otherwise.
>
> "As to "ensoulment," the fact that a zygote that has the potential to split into two entities before implantation, it seems to me, does not decide the question one way or the other. If the "soul" is an entirely immaterial substance that God implants in the womb, and if God knows beforehand whether a given zygote will split into two entities before implantation, then it seems entirely possible that God gives that zygote two souls before it splits, with one going each way as it were. And if the two entities subsequently fuse, it would seem that God is capable of accounting for that in advance as well when he does the ensoulement."
>
> The problem with this explanation is that is (I think) entirely ad hoc. Or perhaps there is supporting evidence for it?
>
> "But I'd also suggest that the notion of "ensoulement" perhaps isn't very helpful. It analogizes the soul to a material substance that would be injected, so to speak, into the zygote / fetus / baby at a fixed time in its development. That makes what is essentially a spiritual property too much like something material."
>
> Good point.
>
> " Rather than searching for a specific time of "ensoulment," I'd suggest that we advocate respect for human life from its very start to its very end -- which means, at least, not taking active measures to terminate human potentiality."
>
> As in most discussions of this nature, the devil is in the details. Above you said "without very good reasons" and we might debate endlessly about what those reasons might be. AT the end, we would have to agree to disagree.
>
> Thanks for the dialing.
>
> Burgy
>

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Received on Wed Sep 5 06:25:21 2007