>>What is the nature of the limit on science placed by methodological
naturalism? Are we saying "science doesn't really work to address
such topics" or are we arbitrarily excluding them? If arbitrary, are
we merely drawing lines as to what falls under "science" versus some
other heading, or are we also making claims that the category
"science" is better than other categories, as creation science or ID
advocates do when they insist that their claims are scientific?>>
Let me try an answer. MN was drilled into me as a physics undergrad at
Carnegie Tech over a half century ago -- it is necessarily part and
parcel of how I view science.
First of all -- I can only speak about physics. To the extent the social
sciences treat MN, they must struggle to find their own answers.
Second: You ask: "What is the nature of the limit on science placed by
methodological naturalism?" That is simple. One does not involve or
suggest the supernatural to explain the results of an experiment or to
play a part in an explanation. That is a limitation on science, nothing
more, nothing less. Science searches for regularities, and unexplained
events (such as the resurrection) are outside its scope of inquiry.
Third: You ask: "Are we saying "science doesn't really work to address
such topics" or are we arbitrarily excluding them?" I'm not clear on what
you mean by "such topics," but I suggest the answer is "yes" and "yes."
Fourth: You ask "are we also making claims that the category "science" is
better than other categories." Some do, such as Dawkins. But I would not
agree.. I suspect few on this list would agree.
Burgy
www.burgy.50megs.com/one.htm
(Review of ONE WORLD, The Interaction of Science and Theology, by John C.
Polkinghorne)
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Received on Wed Jul 18 14:03:01 2007
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