How can one return to a simply Baconian approach to doing science after the
discoveries and theories of the twentieth century? This is what YEC has
done, to utter failure in its form of science.
I agree that a foundationalist epistemology simply no longer works. I
recommend Wentzel van Huyssteen's work on post-foundationalist theology and
especially his The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Ihnterdisciplinarity in
Theology and Science. I'll be happy to send a Word document of my lengthy
essay review published several years ago in "The Cresset."
Bob Schneider
On 7/16/07, David Opderbeck <dopderbeck@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Ted said: * I also believe it is much more accurate; the term MN itself
> probably arose with Christian philosophical reflection on the limits of
> science and the reality of a "supernatural" God, and our definition
> reflects
> this.
> *
> But what Hunter seems to be saying is that what we now call MN is rooted
> in the epistemology and method of Bacon and Locke. For the Enlightenment
> empiricists, empirical study of the world is an effort to obtain unified
> knowledge about reality-as-it-is. If reality-as-it-is includes the
> empirically observable hand-of-God, then that observation properly falls
> under the umbrella of "science," or, to use an eighteenth century term,
> "natural philosophy." The gist of Hunter's argument -- at least what the
> book review seems to reflect -- is that "science" should return to this
> broader notion of "natural philosophy." The current restrictions of MN
> would reflect an improper, a priori skeptical elision of God from nature, as
> well as an improper turn away from "empirical," observational,
> inductive Baconian science towards more speculative deductive methods ala
> Popper.
>
> But my first question about this is how to return to Bacon and Locke after
> Darwin, Einstein, and Heisenberg -- in other words, do Bacon and Locke work
> after Newton's mechanism has been dethroned? And my second question is how
> to return to Bacon and Locke after the collapse -- or at least undermining
> -- of foundationalist empistemology's naive view of culture, history and
> language.
>
>
> On 7/16/07, Ted Davis <TDavis@messiah.edu> wrote:
> >
> > >>> PvM <pvm.pandas@gmail.com> 7/15/2007 5:01 PM >>>quotes Wikipedia on
> > Methodological naturalism, as follows:
> >
> > <quote>Naturalism does not necessarily claim that phenomena or
> > hypotheses commonly labeled as supernatural do not exist or are wrong,
> > but insists that all phenomena and hypotheses can be studied by the
> > same methods and therefore anything considered supernatural is either
> > nonexistent, unknowable, or not inherently different from natural
> > phenomena or hypotheses.</quote>
> >
> > Then, Pim adds the following comment:
> >
> > If all Hunter is interested in is pointing out that there may have
> > been some who had religious motivations to restrict science, such
> > should again not be confused with a methodological approach. Science
> > neither approves nor disapproves of the supernatural, which for all
> > practical purposes is the logical complement of natural.
> >
> > Here are my comments:
> > First, this is not an adequate definition of MN, IMO. In fact,
> > ironically,
> > it lends support to the incorrect argument from ID advocates, that MN
> > simply
> > collapses into metaphysical or ontological naturalism. Thus, I'm
> > surprised
> > that Pim quoted it. Note the language: " all phenomena and hypotheses
> > can
> > be studied by the
> > same methods and therefore anything considered supernatural is either
> > nonexistent, unknowable, or not inherently different from natural
> > phenomena
> > or hypotheses." Here is my paraphrase, aimed at making my point: If
> > scientific methods (ie, naturalism) can't detect it, it ain't real, it's
> >
> > only a figment of one's imagination. Am I missing something here? If
> > so,
> > please be explicit about what I'm missing. I do think this is the tone
> > and
> > intent of this very poor definition.
> >
> > Second, Pim, the definition you cite from wiki contradicts your own
> > comment, when you wrote: "Science
> > neither approves nor disapproves of the supernatural, which for all
> > practical purposes is the logical complement of natural." If the
> > supernatural is "nonexistent" or "unknowable," (see wiki), then the
> > latter
> > part of Pim's sentences is entirely emptied of content. If the
> > "supernatural ... is not inherently different from natural phenomena or
> > hypotheses," then it collapses into the natural, and I fail to see how
> > it
> > becomes "the logical complement of natural." Please have another look
> > at
> > that wiki definition, Pim, and clarify your own view in light of it.
> >
> > Third, I offer a much better (IMO) definition, taken from the entry on
> > "Scientific naturalism" that I wrote with philosopher Robin Collins for
> > the
> > Garland encyclopedia of science & religion
> > (http://www.amazon.com/History-Science-Religion-Western-Tradition/dp/0815316569
> > ),
> > a shorter version of which (essays unabridged, however) from JHU press
> > ( http://www.press.jhu.edu/books/title_pages/2308.html). Here is our
> > definition of MN: "the belief that science should explain phenomena only
> > in
> > terms of entities and properties that fall within the category of the
> > natural, such as by natural laws acting either through known causes or
> > by
> > chance (methodological naturalism)."
> >
> > Why do I believe this definition is much superior? First, it spells out
> > that MN is a belief; one might even call it a belief about beliefs, in
> > terms
> > of its implications. Our definition leaves ample ground (as it should)
> > for
> > one to make reality claims about a God who really is bigger than
> > "nature,"
> > and who actually interacts with "nature," which is better called "the
> > creation." It simply affirms, properly, that inferences about God go
> > beyond
> > what science itself can claim. It in no way rules out the legitimacy of
> > such inferences. Second, when read in context (our definition of part
> > of a
> > much longer definition of four types of naturalism), it is clear to
> > people
> > that MN does not equate to or collapse into overreaching forms of
> > naturalism. Thus, e.g., we define "scientific naturalism" (our term for
> > the
> > most wide reaching kind of naturalism) as follows: "the claim that
> > nature is
> > all that there is and hence that there is no supernatural order above
> > nature, along with the claim that all objects, processes, truths, and
> > facts
> > about nature fall within the scope of the scientific method." Our
> > definition of MN is designed, properly, to leave this type of
> > speculation
> > aside entirely. Whereas the wiki definition, IMO, strongly suggests or
> > implies precisely that nature is all there is--at least, all that is
> > genuinely meaningful to discuss, which is the spirit of the logical
> > positivism that still underlies efforts to ridicule belief in God and
> > keep
> > it out of the academy.
> >
> > The definition Robin and I give, in what is frankly a far more reliable
> > and
> > academically serious publication that wikipedia, is (I believe and I
> > hope
> > others agree) a definition that is much more appropriate to consider on
> > the
> > ASA list. I also believe it is much more accurate; the term MN itself
> > probably arose with Christian philosophical reflection on the limits of
> > science and the reality of a "supernatural" God, and our definition
> > reflects
> > this.
> >
> > Ted (ASA member, and glad of it)
> >
> >
> >
> > To unsubscribe, send a message to majordomo@calvin.edu with
> > "unsubscribe asa" (no quotes) as the body of the message.
> >
>
>
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Received on Mon Jul 16 13:21:07 2007
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