From: allenroy (allenroy@peoplepc.com)
Date: Sun Sep 14 2003 - 04:03:03 EDT
We've been talking about how YEC interpretation of the Bible causes them
to have bad science--i.e. that they try to force science into
preconceived, religious notions. In light of that, I have here some
edited sections of an article by Del Ratzesch, Professor of Philosophy
at Calvin College, called, "Cradled Science: Examining the Cosmos in the
context of Faith." (Journal of Adventist Education, Summer 2002, pp.
2-12.)
He starts with the concepts of Baconian science and moves on to the
influences of Popper and Kuhn.
[begin selected material]
Baconian science rests ultimately on pure, objective dispassionately
collected observational data.
Scientists then applied special logical procedures to those data in
order to produce scientific theories.
This set of stringent procedures constituted the 'scientific method.'
Bacon's views are generally
referred to as 'inductivism.'
This view of science achieved dominance, becoming practically the
official cultural conception by the
earth 20th century, and still underlies many popular ideas about
science. But however attractive its
promises, Baconian inductivism is in fact irreparably defective,
disintegrating at nearly every point.
Among its many problems are these: (a) There simply is no form of logic
by which theories, laws, and
the like can be inferred from empirical data; and (b) Empirical
procedures cannot confer certainty
upon any scientific theory. The only way to test proposed theories or
hypotheses was to deduce
experimental or other observational predictions from the theory or
hypothesis (hence the term
hypothetico-deductivism), then see whether or not the predictions
matched observed reality, thereby
confirming or contradicting the theory.
Hypothetico-deductivist believed that although theories could not be
proved true, they could at least
be empirically confirmed. Not everyone agreed, A number of people
(claiming to follow Karl
Popper) concluded for technical, logical reasons that theories could not
even be confirmed, much less
proved. But in their view, science could at least prove specific
theories to be false by uncovering
empirical data contrary to predictions of those theories.
Unfortunately, even this modest claim turned
out to be too strong.
Historically, it was almost universally believed that perception was
neutral, in the sense that genuinely
honest and careful observation was unaffected by beliefs,
presupposition, philosophical preferences,
or similar factors. This neutrality guaranteed the objectivity and
utter trustworthiness of empirical
data, which constituted the secure foundation of science. But that
perceived neutrality came under
attack in the mid-20th century. Thomas Khun, for example, argued that
perception itself was an
active--not a passive--process, deeply colored by the broader conceptual
matrices, or paradigms, to
which one had prior allegiances.
Thus, this view not only destroyed the allegedly rigid, logical
structure of science, but also threatened
the pure objectivity of its foundation. Furthermore, paradigms
influenced not only perception, but
also theory evaluation and acceptance, conceptual resources, normative
judgments within science, and
a host of other consequential matters. And, according to Kuhn,
paradigms were partially defined by,
among other things, metaphysical commitments and values. Thus,
non-empirical, human-suffused
perspectives had seeped into the no-longer-inviolable scientific method
at all levels, from empirical
bedrock to theoretical pinnacle.
One consequence of underdetermination was that no amount of (even pure)
empirical data could point
to just one theory among competitors. Thus, if one adopted a realist
stance toward theories, claiming
that come specific scientific theory was actually true, rather than
merely a useful model, the selection
of that specific theory had to involve (at least implicitly) factors
beyond just the empirical. Kuhn's
own list of operative non-empirical principles was relatively
tame--simplicity, fruitfulness,
measurability, accuracy, and the like. But some postmodernists went
much further, claiming, for
instance, that the very heart of science contained political agendas,
social biases, dominance
hierarchies, gender prejudices, and so on.
But what can no longer be denied is that a science with utter
objectivity, absolute logical rigidity, and
purely empirical foundations is not an attainable ideal. Most
contemporary mainline commentators
argue that despite the unavoidable dependence of science upon resources
other than just empirical
data and reason, scientific results can still claim significant rational
justification and epistemic
legitimacy. Rigor, objectivity, and warrant may be less than absolute,
even less than many fervently
hope, but science can still get at theoretical truth. A tempered
realism still seems defensible.
Realist claims are plausible only if we have grounds for confidence in
the human perceptual and
cognitive structures that, inescapably, function within science. Beyond
that, the principle of
underdetermination of theory by data indicates that science requires a
conceptual environment
extended beyond the merely empirical. Historically, that indispensable
confidence and conceptual
richness were drawn from religious principals. Some current historians
argue that without the broader
Christian conceptual matrix, modern science might never have arisen.
Ideally, a worldview should be a unified, integrated whole. But for
much of the 20th century, many
people thought that religion and science were simply irrelevant to each
other. At worst, religion was
seen as fighting a rearguard action against the seemingly inexorable
advance of a science destined to
conceptually engulf everything it touched. Science is now recognized as
(1) at least partially
embedded in a wider conceptual context and (2) unavoidable drawing
resources from that wider
context.
'Science' can thus be locked into place within a number of different
worldviews, with advocates of
each claiming that it confirms their particular view. There are many
who insist on some version of
methodological naturalism--that whatever the ultimate metaphysical
reality, genuine science as
science must (either definitionally or practically be completely
detached from everything other than
the purely natural. But rigid cases for such prohibitions are
increasingly difficult to construct, and
even some secular thinkers now admit that there are no compelling
reasons why Christian thought
cannot contribute to a legitimate conceptual context for science.
[end selected material]
Thus, it seems to me that Emperical data and science is pretty much an
imaginary idea. What we are really dealing with is interpretations of
data and science within philosophical foundations. These can include
Ontological Naturalism, Methodological Naturalism, and even Creationism
(typically YECism). OECism apparently finds its foundation in
Methodological Naturalism. And some on this net seem to function as if
Baconian science is still valid and ignore the enlightenment of Popper
and Kuhn.
Allen
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