Tom Pearson wrote:
> This question has been chewed over by philosophers (and others) for a very
> long time now, in one way or another, going back to the ancient Greeks. I
> think the debate over consciousness -- particularly in its contemporary
> incarnation -- needs to be unpacked a little more. For one thing, I think
> that discussions of consciousness need to be related to current
> investigations in brain science -- modularity, neural networks, and the
> like -- rather than to the traditional conundrum of mind-body dualism.
> Some folks, like the non-atheist John Searle, have been arguing for a
> generation that neither dualistic nor monistic approaches to understanding
> the mind-body problem work very well when applied to the problem of
> consciousness, and that new insights from neurobiology is the place to
> begin our inquiry into the nature of consciousness. In other words,
> consciousness is not a new version of the mind-body problem.
>
> I suppose I would find myself at the opposite end of the spectrum from
> Burgy on this matter. I don't know enough chemistry to answer the first
> question with any confidence. But with regard to the second question --
> "Is consciousness biology writ large?" -- my answer would be, "In all
> likelihood, yes." It seems to me that there is more contemporary evidence
> suggesting a neurobiological basis for consciousness than there is evidence
> supporting some other mode of explanation. As the evidence changes, so too
> would my answer to this question.
>
Interestingly, I find it curious that you are able to
agree that consciousness is biology writ large, yet don't
feel confident about saying that chemistry is physics writ
large. As a scientist working on protein/RNA interactions
at a molecular level, chemistry stands in the gap for me.
My whole science education seems to have been one of starting
on the journey somewhere around philosophy, gradually
gravitating toward physics via chemistry, and then gradually
climbing back up through the ranks into biology. I expect
that the "journey" has not ended, but biology is where I am
right now.
Chemistry has given me enormous appreciation for the
interactions of biopolymers that I don't think I could
have gained from a physics education alone, yet at the
same time without the physics education, I don't think
I would have appreciated the chemistry as much.
I hesitate to insist on some ultra-reductionist view, but
I will say that there is a *tendency* for a strong hierarchy
of physics -> chemistry -> biology. However, like a mosaic,
if you only look at a tiny fragment of a tile, you cannot
recognize that it is a tile, and if you don't stand far
away from the tiles, you never realize that you are looking
at a breathtaking picture.
I don't have any strong objections to Searle's view on
consciousness as such, but I keep wrestling with how
he seems to sidestep the issue. He makes it clear that
ultra-reductionists force consciousness into a third-person
frame that ultimately eliminates consciousness altogether.
That I agree with. Indeed, since a Turing machine based
brain is almost surely an unworkable model for the human
brain --- see Penrose and others --- we are _probably_ wise
to dispense with such incredibly simple-minded (and rather
sectarian) views of the mind.
However, in its place, Searle argues for an "irreducibility
of consciousness". That naturally begs the question from a
scientist like myself, "*why* is it irreducible?". Penrose
tries to answer this with his idea of quantum mechanics and
microtubules. I am not currently convinced about the
microtubules. However, his idea of quantum mechanics is
interesting and maybe it has a place somewhere in this.
As a potential artificial mind, I will go the stretch to say
that it *might* be possible.
Presently, I would say we have three options for addressing
Searle's position: chaos, some unforeseen QM backdoor such
as quantum chaos, or some completely unforeseen reality of
matter. I will not rule out the third possibility but it
doesn't make any progress in this discussion. Chaos does
potentially allow a system of local interactions to take
on a global character. However, at the heart of it, chaos
is deterministic and therefore we are forced back into the
ultra-reductionist camp where we must accept a nonexistence
of consciousness. That leaves us with quantum chaos (which
may yet be a promising avenue and is NOT!!! deterministic),
however, it is rather unclear how we can model quantum chaos
in with all the other chaotic interactions that happen in a
"living system" like the brain. At any rate, the "wet"
chemistry of the brain makes digital ones and zeros a rather
questionable proposition.
So the upshot of that is I would say "probably yes" to both
questions with the added proviso that the complexity of these
system make narrow-minded reductionism a barbaric abuse of
both science and philosophy.
by Grace we proceed,
Wayne
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Nov 14 2001 - 22:29:06 EST