Re: What does the creation lack?

From: Howard J. Van Till (hvantill@novagate.com)
Date: Sat Oct 27 2001 - 16:04:57 EDT

  • Next message: Howard J. Van Till: "Re: What does the creation lack?"

    >From: "D. F. Siemens, Jr." <dfsiemensjr@juno.com>

    > As I considered Howard and Peter's views, which look different, I
    > wondered just how different they are in their outworking.

    [skip a bit]

    > Peter argues that the possibilities are so varied that God has to direct
    > matters so that the world as we know it will result. This emphasizes
    > "special occurrences" rather than constant care, but seems pretty close
    > to a twin of Howard's view. It strikes me that what we have is more a
    > matter of emphasis than of actual difference. Both hold that the world is
    > as it is because God so wills it and makes it so.
    >
    > Am I missing something?

    No, but you have found a key point that needs to be emphasized.

    My proposal is that the creation, gifted by God with all of the requisite
    resources, capabilities and potentialities for the actualization in time of
    all creaturely structures/organisms, and enabled by God's blessing (a
    non-coercive but effective action that ensures the fruitfulness of
    creaturely actions), is fully capable of accomplishing what evolutionary
    science envisions without need for occasional supplementary interventions
    (such as bridging capability gaps or jumping over improbability hurdles).
    Part of my proposal is that the creation lacks nothing that it will need to
    accomplish the broad intentions of its Creator. What looks like a creaturely
    action really is a creaturely action.

    Peter's proposal (if I correctly understand it) differs at one key point:
    because of improbability hurdles, God must act decisively (by making
    specific choices) in a multitude of biochemical and genetic events in order
    to ensure the appearance of life in general and Homo sapiens in particular.
    In those instances, what looks like a creaturely action is really the
    outcome of a divine action (the choice of a particular outcome).
    Furthermore, since the values of all relevant probabilities are presumably
    also the product of divine choice, both the ineffectiveness of creaturely
    action and the need for later compensation are there by divine design (as in
    Bob Dehaan's model).

    Howard Van Till



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