on 9/5/01 12:39 PM, George Andrews Jr. at gandrews@as.wm.edu wrote:
> Hi James;
>
> I split this thread since there are two subjects: math and mass.
OK. What follows must be about mass, which is physical. [I think. :-)]
>
>>> James W Stark wrote:
>>>>
>>>> In my worldview reality consists of a physical universe
>>>> (matter), a mental world, (our awareness of the laws of
>>>> mathematics as well as any subject matter.), and the
>>>> spiritual realm (known to us through our consciousness.)
>>>>
>>> Are not our minds an epiphenomenan of our brains and therefore belong to
>>> your first category of physical? i.e. mental activity =
>>> electrical/chemical activity = subsets of physical phenomena.
>>
>> No, I do not see the mind as an epiphenomenona. Such a reductionistic view
>> does not have sufficient explanatory power. The mind and brain are
>> independent worlds connected through human consciousness. The brain is
>> deterministic in structure, but the mind embraces decision agents that can
>> use free will, which is not a program.
>>>
>
> With respect, the brain is physical; the information processed and stored in
> it is by definition epiphenomenal.
True, only if you accept phenomenalism, where everything is derived from our
physical senses. This is a choice. Definitions are not facts. Where does
intuition fit in? Or revelation?
>This is supported by the fact that when we
> forget (information loss) or when we learn (info. gain), the brain's
> electromagnetic patterns are observed to change.
This is pure association between the mental and physical worlds.
Association never establishes correlation of cause and effect. Seeing the
brain as the cause of the experience is a choice that has not been tested.
>Hence, I must insist that
> epiphenomenalism is robust in its explanatory power
It is robust only if you assume the brain to be the cause. I see no
justification. Your robust "model" denies the truth of free will and
non-physical senses.
>and that the compartmental trichodomy of brain, mind and consciousness is in
>fact lacking. >One may view this as reductionism, but I prefer to see it as
>unification.
How is it lacking? It allows concepts that a wholistic physicalism can not
explain, such as free will and consciousness.
>. I am also problem
> by you notion of connected independence; connected entities are by definition
> not independent.
Connectedness is not a yes/no existence unless you choose to limit its
natural nature of varying degrees of connectedness. Independence is not a
yes/no relationship. It depends on how freedom enters the decision process.
An interactive dualism is present, not a yes/no dualism.
>Finally, experiments on the human brain which produce
> emotional/religious response certainly also succumb to an epiphenomenal
> explanation for the human mind.
Succumb is a bit strong, unless you buy into an emergence claim to explain
behavior. Emergent models generally use a deterministic model. The effects
of habits can emerge but the effects of free will choices cannot. Much
behavior is dependent on free will choices. Your position (I think) cannot
adequately explain morality.
>
> The notion of freewill isn't really a problem when striped of its
>absoluteness; we are simply not free to do or think or be anything. Decision
>making can be thought of as algorithmically optimization.... or something like
>that :-).
As you can see all of our discussion depends on how we interpret freedom.
What do you mean by the absoluteness of freedom? You appear to be assuming
that freedom is a fixed program that can be readily handled with concepts
like chance, randomness, spontaneity, serendipity, etc. Obviously, I do
not.
James Stark
>
> Got to go! I'll reply about mass on another thread if you should like to
> continue on that topic.
> Thanks for the discourse.
> George A.
>
>
> --
> George A. Andrews Jr.
> Physics/Applied Science
> College of William & Mary
> P.O. Box 8795
> Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795
>
>
>
>
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