Below are replies to Loren, George, Howard, and Doug.
Loren Haarsma wrote:
> Bryan Cross wrote:
>
> > Name one ID proponent who defines 'design' as "direct divine
> > action". I'll lay money on this one ($20). Every
> > design proponent that I have ever known would instantly acknowledge that
> > humans can make designs (and of course they would each deny that humans
> > are divine). If you want to stand by this claim that the ID movement defines
> > 'design' as "direct divine action", then you will have to find a quotation
> > (not taken out of context) from some notable ID person who claims that
> > all design is divine design, and that there is no such thing as human
> > design. Happy hunting.
>
> Of course, advocates of ID believe that there is such a thing as "human
> design."
>
> Advocates of ID do not define "design-in-general" as necessitating "direct
> divine action."
>
> The point is: Johnson, Behe, Dembski et. al. do define
> "design-in-biology" as necessitating "direct divine action."
I think that this statement is inaccurate. I am not exactly sure what it means to
define X as necessitating Y. But we already established that ID proponents do not
define design as direct divine action. So I presume you mean that their definition
of design with respect to biology *entails* direct divine action. But Behe's
comment to the effect "then we couldn't detect it" implies that in their view
direct intelligent action is needed to produce *detectable* design-in-biology.
Nothing you reported suggests that they *define* design such that it entails
direct intelligent action. An intelligent design is the product of intelligent
agency, whether it was produced directly or indirectly. As I mentioned in a recent
post, Dembski recognizes that intelligent agents can mimic chance and regularity.
Therefore, he acknowledges in DI that his filter produces false negatives. For
that reason, when Dembski's filter fails to detect that object O is the product of
an intelligent agent, this does not mean that O is not intelligently designed; it
only means that the filter cannot tell us whether O is intelligently designed. It
is important not to interpret a negative result from Dembski' filter as indicating
that O is *not* intelligently designed. He developed his filter to produce no
false positives, not to avoid false negatives.
> I, and others on this discussion list, have corresponded with Johnson,
> Behe, and Dembski, and asked them their opinion of the following idea:
> God designed the laws of nature so that first life, and subsequent
> increases in biological complexity and novelty, could self-assemble
> and evolve under the continuous operation of those laws, under God's
> ordinary providential oversight, without the _need_ for additional
> miraculous interventions.
>
> And we asked Johnson, Behe, and Dembski the following question:
> If God designed the laws of nature to operate in this way, would
> it not STILL be true that life was "intelligently designed"?
>
> The closest I ever got to a satisfactory answer to that question was when
> Behe said, in effect, that in that case we'd have no way to _detect_ that
> life was intelligently designed.
>
> What is Behe's "irreducible complexity" argument, if not an argument that
> modern life forms could NOT have arisen via natural processes without some
> additional direct divine action (or maybe direct space alien action)?
Arguing that life could not have arisen by chance and regularity alone is not
equivalent to defining design such that it entails *direct* divine action. Of
course they believe that life could not have arisen by natural processes alone.
But they do not define design-in-biology as entailing "direct divine action",
since (as you note) they acknowledge that from the science alone the identity of
the intelligent designer is underdetermined. They bring in theology to make the
inference from "intelligent agent" to "God". But the theology is not embedded into
their definition of design in biology. Therefore, their definition of
design-in-biology does not entail direct divine action.
> What is Dembski's "specified complexity" argument, if not an argument that
> modern life forms could NOT have arisen via natural processes without some
> additional direct divine action. (Dembski even defines "the design
> inference" as the _exclusion_ of explanations based upon chance or
> natural processes!)
You seem to think that detecting design in object O by discovering that natural
process are insufficient to account for O somehow rules out intelligent design
from operating through natural processes. But that simply does not follow.
Dembski's explanatory filter is not a necessary and sufficient condition for
design; it is only a sufficient condition for design.
> Johnson, Dembski, Behe et. al. define "ID" in biology to exclude the
> possibility that modern life forms come about through the operation natural
> laws under God's ordinary providence.
That is simply not true. Just because they believe that life could not have come
about merely by natural processes (under God's providence) it does not thereby
follow that they *define* design-in-biology so as to entail direct divine action.
The mere fact that they acknowledge the theoretical possibility that ETs are
responsible for design-in-biology demonstrates that they do not define
design-in-biology so as to entail direct divine action.
> The necessity for direct divine
> action in biological history is clearly implicit in their arguments for
> ID. Self-assembly, via fine-tuned natural laws, is ruled out from their
> operating definition of "design." (Does this mean that atoms, stars, and
> the earth's ocean, atmosphere, and dry land were not designed?)
No, it means only that the design filter cannot tell us whether atoms, stars, etc.
were intelligently designed or not. Self-assembly via fine-tuned natural laws is
not ruled out from the *definition* of design; such a feature is excluded from the
set of things which the design filter can definitively declare to be designed.
> But you wanted a quotation.
>
> Consider the following, taken from a post by Howard VanTill, which you can
> find archived at http://www.calvin.edu/archive/evolution/199809/0338.html
> (If you wish to see more context for the quote, you'll have to ask VanTill
> where this was originally published.)
>
> =========
> Howard VanTill wrote:
>
> In a published exchange of views regarding the place of divine
> intervention in the course of Creation's formational history, I challenged
> Johnson to articulate his conception of "just what biological history
> would have been like if left to natural phenomena without 'supernatural
> assistance.'" His candid and very telling reply was,
>
> "If God had created a lifeless world, even with oceans rich in amino acids
> and other organic molecules, and thereafter had left matters alone, life
> would not have come into existence. If God had done nothing but create a
> world of bacteria and protozoa, it would still be a world of bacteria and
> protozoa. Whatever may have been the case in the remote past, the chemicals
> we see today have no observable tendency or ability to form complex plants
> and animals. Persons who believe that chemicals unassisted by intelligence
> can combine to create life, or that bacteria can evolve by natural
> processes into complex animals, are making an a priori assumption that
> nature has the resources to do its own creating. I call such persons
> *metaphysical naturalists*."
Interesting quotation. (If he was allowing for providence, then it is unfortunate
that he wrote the last line. It is not clear from the context whether he was
consciously excluding providence or not.) However, neither this quotation nor
anything else in your post shows that ID proponents define design so as to entail
direct divine action.
George Murphy wrote:
>I do not consider _methodological naturalism_ to be that rigid. There would, in
>fact, be no point in making the distinction between the two if methodological
naturalism
>were not at least open to the possibility of theistic answers to questions at
some
>level.
That does not follow, because there is more than one way to be different. For
example, the metaphysical naturalist consciously acknowledges that there is no
God. The methodological naturalist, say, believes in God but practices a method,
which, when followed to its end collapses into metaphysical naturalism.
Distinction requires non-identity in one respect; it does not require non-identity
in every respect.
Howard Van Till wrote:
>My proposal is that Christians ought to lead with a card from their strong
>suit: the historic Christian doctrine of creation. Whatever the universe is
>and is capable of doing must be seen as a "gift of being" from the Creator.
>In the context of seeing the universe as a creation, every one of its
>resources, potentialities, and capabilities can then be experienced as a
>manifestation of the Creator's creativity and generosity. Instead of looking
>for evidence of gifts withheld (that is, looking for things that the
>creation is unable to do) Christians can celebrate every formational
>capability that the sciences uncover. The essence of God's creative action
>is not in occasional form-imposing interventions, but in the giving of being
>to a creation fully capable of accomplishing the Creator's intentions for
>its formational history. Where is there evidence of God's creative activity?
>Everywhere!
I agree that we should praise the Creator for the greatness of creation. You
rightly affirm the importance of the doctrine of creation, and how that ought to
affect our approach to nature. The problem line for me is "fully capable of
accomplishing the Creator's intentions for its formational history." How could one
know this, or be justified in asserting it? It appears to be derived from the
doctrine of creation and the character of God. But it appears to be a rather
tenuous theological abduction. Theologians used to argue that geocentrism
necessarily followed from the Christian doctrines. Skeptics today argue that if a
good God existed, He would not have made a world which contained evil. These show
that reasoning from God's character to the way in which He would do something
involving the exercise of His free will is tenuous at best. Moreover, it seems
clear that God either could not or chose not to create humans in such a way as to
avoid divine interventions in redemptive history. In fact, an even greater
creation would not even require providence; the need for providence is a sign of a
not-fully-gifted creation. The need for fine-tuning could be seen as a deficiency
in creation; a fully gifted multiverse would need not such subsequent and
unsightly tinkering. I'm sure you've heard all these rejoinders before, but I'd
like to hear your reply if you have time. Thanks.
Doug Hayworth wrote:
>My understanding is that Phil Johnson and the anti-naturalism movement does
>not appreciate any distinction between methodological naturalism and
>philosophical/metaphysical naturalism. Implicit, and perhaps also
>explicit, in their objectives is to replace a godless natural science with
>an intentially theistic natural science. This would be a grave
>mistake. It would effectively kill fruitful inquiry in natural science and
>also make Christian theology (also a science, but based on interpretation
>of revelatory data, i.e., scripture, person of Christ, etc.) subservient to
>Creation (when, in fact, our theological understanding of the MEANING and
>purpose of Creation should be subservient to God's Revelation).
Doug, you do draw some lines beyond which you do not let MthN pass (e.g. fully
explaining the origin of God's revelation, the resurrection of Christ, creation,
your own belief in God, etc.). Yours is clearly a theistic natural science, i.e. a
natural science limited by, guided by, and interpreted by theism and Revelation.
And yet you do not consider it a science stopper. However, if you were a
cosmologist, and if you refused to endorse multiverse theory because of your
theological belief in the doctrine of creation, why wouldn't that be a
science-stopper? If you were a forensic scientist, and you refused to propose a
natural explanation of Christ's resurrection because of your theological beliefs,
why wouldn't that be a science stopper? If you were a biblical historian, and you
refused to endorse theories that proposed natural causes for the complete origin
of the Scriptures; if you were a psychologist, and because of your theological
beliefs you refused to endorse psychological theories that explained [away]
religious beliefs in terms of natural causes, why wouldn't these be
science-stoppers? It seems to me that the 'science-stopper' charge is a bit of
fear mongering, because most scientists already draw their own line somewhere in
the sand, and do so without any fear that they are contributing to the demise of
natural science. It seems to be a common phenomenon that anyone who draws their
line further along than one's own is viewed as a science stopper.
- Bryan
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