Sorry about the double post. Something was wrong with my
e-mail last night, and I thought the first one had been
lost.
I appreciate George's answer (and I wish I could have heard
his defense of MthN based on Christ's cross and resurrection.)
He wants to draw the boundary for MthN at the point where
it posits unobservable entities. I take it by 'unobservable'
you mean 'unobservable in principle', not due to present
technological limits. But even so, 'unobservable' is far too
ambiguous. If we can observe its effects, is it unobservable?
Is there anything we observe by observing something other
than its effects? Therefore, by MthN, if we see effects
that need to be explained, we infer the existence of a
natural cause.
Once there are no more effects that need to be explained,
we stop postulating natural causes. At that point, there
is no room in our universe for God, for we have now
posited natural causes for all the effects we used to
think were caused by Him (in our antiquated days).
So it seems to me that "unobservable" is a cardboard
barrier that MthN plows right over.
Someone else suggested metaphysical barriers. Christianity
says God created the world. Therefore, at this point MthN
must stop. But, if this isn't a "theistic natural science"
that Doug considers an oxymoron, then why can't atheists
adopt it? The Christian cosmologist (unlike the Christian
mechanic), will refuse to posit a natural cause for the
formation of the universe. At this point, Christianity
is a 'science-stopper'. So, on this view, there is nothing
wrong in principle with Christianity being a science-
stopper. (The debate simply concerns *where* the lines are
to be drawn, i.e. where science is to be stopped.) If
MthN should determine what is taught in public schools,
then multiverse theory should be taught in our high
schools, because it posits natural causes to explain
observed effects.
Moreover, scientific theories which employ or posit
only natural causes to explain the origin of all
religions and religious beliefs, they too should be
taught in public schools. But in my view, MthN
can't be the determiner of what should be taught
in public school science classes, for where one
draws the boundary for MthN depends upon one's
metaphysics. (Occasionalists have no room at all
for MthN; metaphysical naturalists have room for
nothing but natural causes.)
MthN is prevented from swallowing up metaphysics only
if one either adopts a presuppositionalism that stipulates
a metaphysics (such as Christianity) as an epistemological
foundation or abandons MthN.
The problem is that MthN is not just a search for
natural causes; my proposed method does that. MthN is
a belief, a commitment to the existence of undiscovered
natural causes. As a methodology it carries with it
the implicit assumption that natural causes lie behind
whatever phenomenon to which it is turned. To prevent
MthN from swallowing up metaphysics, one must
refuse to aim one's MthN guns at events one believes
(and doesn't want to stop believing) are the result
of non-natural causes. For MthN has the power to
provide natural explanations for (or eliminations of)
every phenomenon.
Naturalists aim MthN everywhere; TEs aim MthN everywhere
except creation, providence, some events in redemptive
history, and special revelation; ID-proponents reject
MthN, in favor of a scientific method open to the
possibility of non-natural causes. One might say that
ID-proponents reject a division of disciplines
effectively based on allowable causes, and pursue
instead a division of disciplines based on the object
of study (not on the allowable causes). Whereas the
former method entails contradictions between the
disciplines (because different causes are posited
to account for the same entities/events) unless
one stipulates [seemingly arbitrary] boundaries
around the scientific discipline so as to avoid
just those contradictions, the latter method does
not entail contradictions between the disciplines.
Personally, I find any methodology that entails
perpetual contradictions between disciplines to
be aesthetically unpleasing. I believe that our
methodology should allow for, and bring us toward,
unity across the disciplines.
best,
- Bryan
>Bryan R. Cross wrote:
> ...........................
>> George Murphy wrote:
>>
>> >> For example, if we take Doug's answer about the
>> >> trilobite eye, and apply it to the fine-tuning of the universe, science
should
>> >> forever go on looking for an explanation by IDNC.
>>
>> > There is an obvious difference here. Everybody (except maybe solipsistic
>> >trilobites) recognizes that trilobites are embedded in a universe which
was "here" long
>> >before they were & is much larger than they are. Thus it is not unreasonable
to seek
>> >the cause of features of the trilobite eye in processes of that universe.
But it is not
>> >generally admitted that the universe itself has such a "larger" environment.
We can
>> >speculate about parallel universes in various ways but that is speculation
and no more
>> >logically compelling than belief in a creator who transcends the universe.
>>
>> Multiverse theory has been around for at least the past twenty five
>> years, and especially big the last ten years. And multiverse theory is
>> the baby of MthN, even a MthN that is limited to the domain of natural
>> science. You claim that multiverse theory is no more logically
>> compelling than theism, but the degree to which MthN's conclusions are
>> compelling is not relevant to my point. My point is that the discipline
>> of science when employing MthN will be in perpetual conflict with other
>> disciplines not employing MthN. MthN doesn't stay behind stipulated
>> boundaries. It will posit natural causes (an infinite number of
>> universes if need be) in order to explain any phenomenon. And in that
>> case, it will always be opposed to areas where, say, Christianity,
>> claims that non-natural causes are involved (e.g. redemptive history,
>> religious experiences, etc.) Of course one can simply choose to ignore
>> the deliverances of science in these cases, or subordinate them to
>> higher sources of authority. But a method that entails perpetual
>> disagreement between the disciplines just cannot be correct, especially
>> if we affirm Augustine's principle of the unity of truth. ...................................
> Actually "multiverse" theories have been around for more like 45 years &,
more
>important than the length of time, did not originate with an attempt to explain
the
>properties of the universe. Their genesis (in science rather than science
fiction)
>was Everett's many worlds interpretation of QM, which was intended to explain
the
>measurement process without requiring any collapse of the wave packet.
> Metaphysical (N.B.) naturalism is a hard and fast dogma which refuses ever
to
>consider God as an explanation for anything. At some point, even after hypothesizing
>the most extravagant multiverse imaginable, it still say why there is something
rather
>than nothing.
> I do not consider _methodological naturalism_ to be that rigid. There would,
in
>fact, be no point in making the distinction between the two if methodological
naturalism
>were not at least open to the possibility of theistic answers to questions
at some
>level. Just what that level is may be open to debate, but when the quest for
"natural"
>explanations gets to the point of postulating unobservable entities then it
seems that
>that point has been reached. This is all the more so for Christians who are
not only
>"open to the possibility of theistic answers to questions at some level" but
are
>explicitly committed to them.
> Speaking for myself, a commitment to methodological naturalism is not just
a
>concession to the successes of science. It is a consequence of an understanding
of what
>kind of God God is, based on God's revelation in the cross & resurrection of
Christ. I
>won't go into that in more detail here - many of those on this list have heard
me
>expound on the theme. But I do think that in the whole ID-MN &c debate not
enough
>attention has been given to the possibility that there are good _theological_
arguments
>for methodological naturalism & against at least the popular understanding
of ID. Van
>Till's arguments about the functional integrity of creation are steps in the
right
>direction & ID proponents have been unwilling to take them with sufficient
seriousness.
> Shalom,
> George
>
>
>
>George L. Murphy
>gmurphy@raex.com
>http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
>
>
>
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