I have placed my responses to a number of posts in this one post so as
to limit excessive numbers of postings.
- Bryan
David Campbell wrote:
> >What does "involved" mean? Caused? If so, in what way did God cause each
> >mutation? Did He cause entities to behave within the limits of their
> >natural properties and thus strictly follow the physical and stochastic
> >laws or not?
>
> From a Calvinist viewpoint, it seems reasonable to suppose that the exact
> events were determined by the initial design of the universe, similar to
> the moon verse example.
That does not seem reasonable at all. Every mutation was determined by,
and falls out of, the initial conditions of the universe? Calvinism does
not imply or entail such a claim, for with respect to determinism
Calvinism entails only that the course of future events be known and
ordained in the mind of God. Nor does it seem even remotely plausible
that mutation events are determined by the initial settings of the
universe. Is there any evidence at all that initial settings of the
universe provide anything but *necessary* (as opposed to sufficient)
conditions for the formation of life? In your view, we are to believe
that if scientists were able to determine precisely the initial
conditions of the universe, and then plugged those factors into a very
fast supercomputer, and then simulated the 12 billion years or so that
has elapsed since then, the exact time and place of every mutation would
pop onto the screen. In fact, apparently this computer simulation would
perfectly match our history until the first direct divine action
occurred around the time of Adam or Noah or Abraham or later. This claim
is so far-fetched that (in my view) it serves as its own reductio ad
absurdum.
> The exact means could involve undiscovered natural
> laws or else divine fiat for the apparently random events (e.g., which
> radioactive nucleotide will decay at what instant to cause the radiation to
> cause a particular mutation). A more Arminian view could have certain
> events indeterminate. The events are also sustained and concurred by God.
Undiscovered natural laws would, I take it, fall out of the initial
conditions of the universe, thus leading to the problem discussed above.
Divine fiat is, I take it, a form of direct divine action. If you are
willing to allow direct divine action into the story of the origin of
mutations, well, then it isn't all written in the initial conditions of
the universe. If you admit the possibility of direct divine action,
then why assume that it is not detectable? It seems to me that the
grounds needed to justify such an assumption cannot be found, even in
theology.
> >If *so*, then unless one simply (and unjustifiably) assumes a continuous,
> >uninterrupted and very steep positive selection slope (i.e. which, being
> >continuous, requires that one assume that there is no irreducible
> >complexity), there very well may not have been enough time between the
> >formation of life and the appearance of such features as the trilobite eye
> >to produce such staggering complexity.
>
> Without suitable criteria to detect irreducible complexity, assuming that
> there is none is not totally unjustifiable. With our present knowledge of
> biochemical evolution, it is very hard to rule out anything.
That is a very good reason *not* to rule out the possibility of gaps,
even chasms, in the slope of Mt. Improbable. I agree that we should not
rule out the possibility that there are *no* gaps. But the fact that we
shouldn't rule out the possibility of no gaps does *not* justify the
assumption of no gaps anymore than the fact that we shouldn't rule out
the possibility of ETs justifies us in assuming that they exist, or
building their existence into our scientific theories. If IC is not a
helpful concept, then just set it aside. It is quite easy to imagine
cases where a biological device of type Y has a selective advantage over
type X, but there is a significant genetic distance between the
respective genotypes, and all the intermediary phenotypes have either
the same or lower fitness as type X. If the fitness of the intermediates
is much lower than that of type X, and if the genetic distance between
type X and type Y is significant, this is a chasm in the slope of Mt.
Improbable. I would be extremely surprised if there were no such chasms
in the evolutionary history of any organism. There is no reason to
suppose that the fitness level of phenotypes tracks directly with every
change at the genotypic level. If such chasms exist, the trio of
[mutation + natural selection + finite time] seems quite inadequate to
surmount them.
Wendee Holtcamp wrote:
>I didn't thoroughly read all the previous back-posts on these issues
>because I'm heavily into some article research, but unless I'm missing
>your point (which is possible) this is exactly why I questioned at the
>very beginning of the thread does theistic evolution necessarily have
>to be opposed to intelligent design. Maybe as defined by some, but not
>as defined by others? Sometimes I feel like its the age-old situation
>of philosophers arguing about how many angels can dance on the head of
>a pin! And it is, truly.
I agree. TE and the basic ID thesis are not necessarily incompatible.
The TE + 'ID is not detectable' combination is incompatible with the
basic ID thesis. But neither [TE by natural causes and direct divine
action] nor even [TE by natural causes alone] are necessarily
incompatible with the basic ID thesis. The IDDA in the former can in
principle be detected Dembski-style against the limitations of IDNC. But
the IDNC in the latter case (i.e. TE by natural cases alone) must be
detected in a different way, for in such cases explanatory filters of
the Dembskian sort will give false negatives. (Dembski, of course,
doesn't mind false negatives; he set up his filter so that false
positives are avoided at all cost.) Del Ratzch uses the term
'mind-correlativity' to describe what we detect in such cases. Perhaps
it is at this cognitive level (i.e. where one detects beauty, purpose,
etc.) that we also 'detect' design, though not in a quantitative or
algorithmic manner.
George Murphy wrote:
>> For example, if we take Doug's answer about the
>> trilobite eye, and apply it to the fine-tuning of the universe, science should
>> forever go on looking for an explanation by IDNC.
> There is an obvious difference here. Everybody (except maybe solipsistic
>trilobites) recognizes that trilobites are embedded in a universe which was "here" long
>before they were & is much larger than they are. Thus it is not unreasonable to seek
>the cause of features of the trilobite eye in processes of that universe. But it is not
>generally admitted that the universe itself has such a "larger" environment. We can
>speculate about parallel universes in various ways but that is speculation and no more
>logically compelling than belief in a creator who transcends the universe.
Multiverse theory has been around for at least the past twenty five
years, and especially big the last ten years. And multiverse theory is
the baby of MthN, even a MthN that is limited to the domain of natural
science. You claim that multiverse theory is no more logically
compelling than theism, but the degree to which MthN's conclusions are
compelling is not relevant to my point. My point is that the discipline
of science when employing MthN will be in perpetual conflict with other
disciplines not employing MthN. MthN doesn't stay behind stipulated
boundaries. It will posit natural causes (an infinite number of
universes if need be) in order to explain any phenomenon. And in that
case, it will always be opposed to areas where, say, Christianity,
claims that non-natural causes are involved (e.g. redemptive history,
religious experiences, etc.) Of course one can simply choose to ignore
the deliverances of science in these cases, or subordinate them to
higher sources of authority. But a method that entails perpetual
disagreement between the disciplines just cannot be correct, especially
if we affirm Augustine's principle of the unity of truth.
David Campbell wrote:
>Metaphysical considerations may provide some boundaries. Christianity
>posits that the resurrection of Christ was supernatural, for example. If
>you believe that the purpose of direct divine action such as the Biblical
>miracles is as a part of special revelation, then there is theological
>reason to not expect direct divine action in general creation.
What is the basis for the claim that direct divine action is always a
part of special revelation? That seems like an important point.
>To some extent, you can also use the history of scientific discovery as a
>clue. Methodological naturalism is doing well so far for explaining the
>evolution of living organisms, and alternative options do not seem to do as
>well nor to be as accurate in representing what is known, so it seems that
>keeping going with methodological naturalism makes sense.
I agree that it has worked well. However, I pointed out in my previous
post principled reasons why (in my view) MthN cannot be the correct
methodology to adopt, even in the sciences. The degree of success had by
adopting MthN does not refute those principles reasons.
>Methodological naturalism is a method with certain assumptions. Thus, it
>cannot directly address questions about those assumptions. In particular,
>it cannot really address the question of whether something happened
>naturally (meaning in accord with natural laws; the question of ultimate
>causation being even further from its grasp). I can determine if I have a
>satisfactory (to me) natural explanation, but this does not actually
>determine whether that is what really happened or if there were tiny direct
>actions I have not detected or a concealed large direct action.
I agree. However, unless one assumes that all IDDA is undetectable, then
the limitations of MthN you describe here seem to be reasons to abandon
or revise it. If there are more than natural causes out there, then a
method that acknowledges that possibility will prevent irremediable
false negatives, but a method that does not acknowledge that possibility
will produce irremediable false negatives.
>Conversely, the lack of a satisfactory natural explanation might mean that
>I have not thought of it yet. I can decide how satisfactory an answer must
>be to tip my inclination towards accepting a natural or direct cause and
>thus use the results of methodological naturalism in my assessment, but the
>assessment itself is an outside question.
Again, I agree. But, as I stated above, a method (MthN) which produces
perpetual contradictions between two or more disciplines cannot be
correct.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Jul 06 2000 - 02:11:19 EDT