>how does one stipulate limitations upon what can be explained by natural
>causes without either begging the question or drawing boundaries arbitrarily?
Metaphysical considerations may provide some boundaries. Christianity
posits that the resurrection of Christ was supernatural, for example. If
you believe that the purpose of direct divine action such as the Biblical
miracles is as a part of special revelation, then there is theological
reason to not expect direct divine action in general creation.
To some extent, you can also use the history of scientific discovery as a
clue. Methodological naturalism is doing well so far for explaining the
evolution of living organisms, and alternative options do not seem to do as
well nor to be as accurate in representing what is known, so it seems that
keeping going with methodological naturalism makes sense.
Methodological naturalism is a method with certain assumptions. Thus, it
cannot directly address questions about those assumptions. In particular,
it cannot really address the question of whether something happened
naturally (meaning in accord with natural laws; the question of ultimate
causation being even further from its grasp). I can determine if I have a
satisfactory (to me) natural explanation, but this does not actually
determine whether that is what really happened or if there were tiny direct
actions I have not detected or a concealed large direct action.
Conversely, the lack of a satisfactory natural explanation might mean that
I have not thought of it yet. I can decide how satisfactory an answer must
be to tip my inclination towards accepting a natural or direct cause and
thus use the results of methodological naturalism in my assessment, but the
assessment itself is an outside question.
David C.
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