dfsiemensjr@juno.com wrote:
> On Mon, 03 Jul 2000 15:08:06 -0500 "Bryan R. Cross" <crossbr@SLU.EDU>
> writes:
> > >
> > > >Either nature indicates a designer or it doesn't. One cannot
> > claim that an
> > > >underlying teleology is necessary to explain why things work and
> > then disparage
> > > >the design argument. One must either deny that an underlying
> > teleology is
> > > >necessary or accept some form of the design argument.
> > >
> > > What exactly do you mean by the design argument?
> >
> > Roughly, an argument claiming that nature indicates a designer, that
> > a designer is
> > needed to explain some feature of nature.
> >
> Dave (Siemens?): This is a minimal description. In practice, such ID
> adherents at Behe and
> Dembski assume that the input is non-natural.
Whether they do or not is irrelevant to my point. If it is relevant, I don't
see how.
> > First, concerning your claim that the statement 'methodological
> > naturalism implies metaphysical naturalism' denies the doctrine of
> providence. How does
> > that follow? Apparently you think that methodological naturalism is
> compatible
> > with the doctrine of divine providence. Well, lets spell it out. The
> methodological
> > naturalist *always* seeks for, insists upon and presumes the existence of
> (even
> > without any supporting evidence) a natural cause. The methodological
> naturalist
> > does not make exceptions, for then he (or she) is not a methodological
> naturalist.
> > Therefore, there is no room for divine causation of any sort, not even
> > providential. Creation, revelation, etc., the methodological naturalist
> will pursue natural
> > causes for them all. The result is that God and providence are eventually
> shaved
> > right out of the picture, or, more accurately, natural causes are posited
> to explain
> > why we ever believed in them in the first place. This sort of
> naturalistic
> > deconstruction has already been done with ethics, free will, afterlife,
> religion,
> > consciousness, altruism, etc. Methodological naturalism is a universal
> acid; you
> > can't contain it behind barriers of any sort. Once you let it in, it eats
> up
> > everything.
> Dave (Siemens): This is pure BS. It is the slippery slope carried to
> ridiculous extremes.
> All that is required for methodological naturalism (for any but the
> doctrinaire) is the recognition that some problems are not amenable to
> scientific explanation.
But methodological naturalism by definition cannot recognize that. That is
exactly Phil's point. Methodological naturalism is a way of being a
naturalist without explicitly affirming metaphysical naturalism or explicitly
denying theism. No matter what kind of gap methodological naturalism comes up
against, it will always presume that there is a natural explanation. If
someone practices methodological naturalism in one discipline, but does not
consistently apply practice this method in all the other areas of their life,
that doesn't mean that methodological naturalism isn't as I described it; it
only means that many (if not most) people are inconsistent in their
conformity to and application of this method. I attended the Nature of Nature
conference at Baylor this past April, and I heard one scientist say
(paraphrase) that he is prepared to wait 100 or more years to find a natural
explanation for the origin of certain biological phenomena. In practice, the
100 years is indefinite. (This particular scientist just made up the number
off the top of his head, to make his point about how [indefinitely] long he
is willing to wait.) The methodological naturalist never reaches the end of
his stipulated '100 years'. This is not a slippery slope, it is simply
cashing out the concept. A method which permits natural explanations to be
insufficient and inadequate (i.e. is willing to acknowledge the possibility
of real gaps with respect to natural causes), is not methodological
naturalism.
David Campbell writes:
>This purported methodological naturalist is a metaphysical naturalist.
>Methodological naturalism is a method. It is also a bad name, as theistic
>assumptions can also generate the assumption that MthN is a good way to
>look at nature. The assumption that methodological naturalism must be able
>to explain everything is metaphysical naturalism. It is this assumption
>that leads to the consequences above. However, methodological naturalism
>is a very effective way of analyzing nature. God usually runs nature
>naturally. This is an observation from history (including the Biblical
>accounts), scientific experiment and observation, and everyday experience.
>It is also to be expected from the fact that the Creator is rational and
>created us to be stewards over it. If creation does not act in regular,
>predictable ways, we cannot figure out enough to rule over it.
>I would also see MthN more as describing a limitation of science rather
>that prescriptive. I can try to replicate natural processes and form
>predictions and descriptions. I cannot make God do something for me to
>investigate in the lab. Thus, MthN can easily run into things it cannot
>handle.
We're using two different definitions of the term "methodological
naturalism". Given your definition, I agree with what you say.
> > Second, regarding your claim that ID defines design as direct divine
> > action, that is
> > simply not true. Del Ratzch, for example, has the classic John
> > 3:16-on-the-back-of-the-Moon example. Even if we were able to trace
> > the causes of
> > the formation of the letters spelling out John 3:16 on the back of
> > the Moon all the
> > way back to the Big Bang, we would still be justified, rational, and
> > right in
> > concluding that that verse was the product of intelligent design.
> > That is just one
> > counterexample. Here is another. ID is compatible with design by ETs
> > a la Crick and
> > panspermia. But that wouldn't be the case if ID defined design as
> > "direct divine
> > action". Therefore, ID does not define design as "direct divine
> > action". Of course,
> > many ID proponents believe that the designer is God and that some of
> > these designs
> > were accomplished directly. But that involves further inferences
> > from the mere
> > existence of design in nature.
> >
> > - Bryan
> >
> Dave (Siemens): So one person inserts an impossibility. This is nothing but
> special
> pleading.
A counterexample is not special pleading. Name one ID proponent who defines
'design' as "direct divine action". I'll lay money on this one ($20). Every
design proponent that I have ever known would instantly acknowledge that
humans can make designs (and of course they would each deny that humans are
divine). If you want to stand by this claim that the ID movement defines
'design' as "direct divine action", then you will have to find a quotation
(not taken out of context) from some notable ID person who claims that all
design is divine design, and that there is no such thing as human design.
Happy hunting.
David Campbell writes:
>I would consider whatever initial intelligent action set up all the causes
>before the Big Bang to be direct action.
Yes, I think many proponents of the Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA) would say that
initial conditions have to be done by direct divine action. But, my reason
for bringing up Del's example was to show that ID proponents do not define
'design' as "direct divine action". Del's example allows that the verse on
the Moon was formed by natural causes obeying natural laws, and not by
*direct* (i.e. non-mediated) divine action. Del's point was that even if we
could trace the chain of natural causes following natural laws all the way
back to the Big Bang, we would still be right to posit the action of an
intelligence at the beginning end of that chain. I used Del's account simply
as a counterexample to the claim that ID proponents define design as "direct
divine action". Del (and ID proponents) wouldn't just say that in this
example, only God's immediate (direct) initial fine tuning was designed; they
would all (unanimously I believe) say that the verse on the Moon was
designed.
David Campbell writes:
>It is true that action by aliens
>rather than supernatural action could be intelligent design. However, I do
>not find the invoking of aliens as possible designers very convincing.
I know of no main ID proponent who has invoked ET to explain terrestrial ID,
but many of the ID proponents have acknowledged that the basic ID thesis
(that design is detectable and present in nature) does not close off the
possibility that ET explains terrestrial signs of ID. It is a logical point,
not an empirical argument, hence not intended to be "very convincing".
>If
>ID advocates really think it is just an observable scientific phenomenon,
>they do not belong in apologetic settings.
Maybe from a pragmatic point of view you are right. (I have concerns here
myself.) But in principle, there is nothing contradictory about wearing two
hats. At the metaphysical edge of science, it would be surprising if
scientists didn't use the results of their work in science to support some
sort of metaphysical claims (cf. the metaphysics in the area of
neurology/philosophy of mind/consciousness!).
Joel Cannon wrote:
>> Because I agree with Augustine that being an intellectually fulfilled
atheist is a
>>contradiction in terms. Therefore, nothing, not even Darwinism, can make it
possible.
>My followup question: Why worry about challenging Dawkins-like
>thinking by arguing about whether Darwinism requires intelligent
>direction?
>I know you didn't quite argue that, but you posed it in a way and
>defended ID in a way that did not reveal that bedrock belief and it
>makes me think that you would like to challenge Dawkins-like thinking
>on the premise rather than on the fact that the statement could not
>possibly be true.
In my view, they are two different and legitimate ways of challenging
Dawkins's statement. One is theological/philosophical (i.e. is it possible to
be an intellectually-fulfilled atheist?). The other is scientific/empirical
(Is it possible to explain the origin of all life forms via the operation of
mutation and natural selection alone?). I don't see that the existence of one
question makes the other question moot. If (notice "IF") it turns out that
there are intractable gaps in the macroevolutionary account, then there will
be two ways to challenge Dawkins's claim. Even if Dawkins were some day to
acknowledge that it is impossible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist,
and therefore that his famous statement was false, the scientific question
would still be worth pursuing for its own sake.
- Bryan
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