SteamDoc@aol.com wrote:
> [...] Phillip Johnson wrote:
> > "My views are explained in by writings, especially Reason in theBalance (
> > the Appendix is particularly important) and The Wedge ofTruth. Among
> > my views are these: (1) God can and does act bywhatever means He chooses,
> > including superintendence of natural processes; and (2) I do not allow
> other
> > persons, especially persons who think in naturalistic categories, to
> > put their own (vague) words in my mouth - e.g., "if evolution" (
> > undefined) "turns out to be true" (as determined by reasoning based upon
> > methodological naturalism?). The question is not what God can do but what
> the
> > neo-Darwinian mechanism can do, when its creative power has to be
> > demonstrated by experiment rather than deduced from naturalistic
> assumptions.&
> > nbsp; I do not cooperate with attempts to evade that question."
> > I think that pretty much settles the question.
>
> I think that pretty much evades the question, as Johnson continues to avoid
> explaining his theology of God's action in nature. He gives lip service to
> God being able to work through natural processes.
That clearly isn't the charitable interpretation of Phil's statement.
> The question is, if
> Johnson's evaluation of the evidence is incorrect and natural evolutionary
> mechanisms really do explain (at a physical level; I'm not talking about
> ultimate causation) the development of life (I fail to see what is "vague"
> about such a statement), does that exclude God from being the Creator.
> If so, then Johnson, if he is consistent, would also have to say that God is
> not the creator of stars and mountains, since we have well-verified
> explanations for their formation in terms of "naturalistic" mechanisms that
> make no reference to God.
The answer to your first question is 'no'. Therefore, the second conditional is
irrelevant.
> If not, then one may argue the evidence for and against Darwinian evolution
> as a scientific question, but it should have no theological impact. In which
> case Johnson's arguments are not defense of the faith, but just another
> argument about whether or not scientific consensus is correct or not, much
> like his writings on HIV and AIDS.
Yes. Exactly. Johnson's arguments against macroevolution are not drawn from
theology but from scientific evidence (whether he is right or wrong). The
theological impact has to do with exposing methodological naturalism. (As a side
note, for those who hold that it is a theologically-established truth that God
directly acted upon nature after creation say, to create new life, scientific
confirmation or refutation of that claim will obviously have a theological
impact.)
> Maybe we could try him on another question:
> From a theological standpoint, are explanations of the development of life in
> terms of "natural" mechanisms incompatible with Christianity? If so, are the
> "natural" explanations of the formation of mountains in terms of plate
> tectonics also incompatible with Christianity?
Your good analogy provides the answer your own question. 'Natural' explanations
of mountain formation are obviously not incompatible with the doctrine of
providence, proving that in principle, natural explanations are not incompatible
with the doctrine of providence. Therefore, to be consistent, it must in fact be
a scientific, not a theological reason, that forms the basis for rejecting a
particular natural explanation (e.g. neo-Darwinian evolution) of a particular
event (e.g. the origin of various forms of life).
> I think all the arguments about the scientific evidence are a waste of time
> until these fundamental philosophical issues about how God is allowed to act
> in the world, and about what natural explanations "mean" metaphysically, are
> thought through.
Why do you think that? Do you think it is not possible for a theist to reach
conclusions about scientific evidence for any particular natural phenomena until
he or she has worked out a theology of divine action through second causes? If
so, it would seem quite easy to provide counterexamples. If not, then why not?
> Richard Dawkins thinks natural explanations like evolution
> "mean" that God is not there. I disagree, based on what the Bible says about
> God's sovereignty over nature. Phil Johnson *appears* to agree with Dawkins
> on this fundamental view; at least he keeps dodging opportunities to disagree
> with Dawkins' view of what evolution means. Once one agrees with Dawkins
> there, one has sold out to semi-deism and must then argue against the science
> as though the truth of the faith were at stake.
Phil Johnson "appears" to agree with Dawkins only if one (mis)interprets his
affirmation of providence as mere "lip service". Somehow, you interpret Johnson's
view of the nature of providential action through natural causes as equivalent to
Dawkins's "natural causes alone without any providence". But there is absolutely
no justification for such an equivalence claim. Believing that there are limits
to what can be done by means of providence does not entail or imply (in any way)
a rejection or diminution of the doctrine of providence. Denying this begs the
question.
George Murphy wrote:
>You are quite right & Johnson's statement:
>
> "The question is not what God can do but what the neo-Darwinian
mechanism can
> do, when its creative power has to be demonstrated by experiment rather
than
> deduced from naturalistic assumptions."
>
>gets it completely wrong. _If_ God could create through a neo-Darwinian
mechanism then
>the question of whether or not that mechanism is correct is of purely scientific
>interest & all the rhetoric about the baneful effects neo-Darwinism in itself
would
>become pointless.
The so-called 'rhetoric' is not about the baneful effects of neo-Darwinism per
se, but about the theological bias of the methodological naturalism that
presently undergirds neo-Darwinism. That life and all its diversity originated
via macroevolution by natural causes is very far from being established
scientifically. The presumption, indeed the emphatic insistence, that it can all
be explained via natural causes, before the evidence is there to support such a
claim, is a symptom of a methodology that is intrinsically hostile to the
possibility of God acting directly upon nature.
> It would then be a matter of pointing out that Dawkins, Provine et al
>draw incorrect inferences from the theory, whether or not it is correct.
True.
> Secondly, PJ's apparent belief that one can do science with "experiment"
apart
>from "assumptions" suggest that his understanding of the way science works is
pretty
>much on a level with his understanding of theology.
Again, the uncharitable misconstrual. Johnson never said that one can do science
without assumptions. He is opposing 'scientific' claims based on naturalistic
assumptions. He wants the data to be interpreted *without* the assumption that
nothing beyond nature is necessary and therefore *with* open-mindedness to the
possibility of direct divine action.
I hope that my perception is mistaken, but it appears that you are not that
concerned about accurately and charitably interpreting Johnson. Hopefully there
is some other explanation.
- Bryan
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