David Campbell wrote:
> This depends on what one considers simpler. The existence of an underlying
> teleology explains why things work (why natural laws and fundamental
> constants allow our existence, why evolution worked out to produce us, why
> we can figure out natural laws, etc.), whereas its absence requires myriad
> assumptions that things just happened to work out the way they did. In a
> way, the view of Dennett, etc. is a bit like special creation. All the
> features of nature originate independently, and the apparent overall
> connection is coincidental. Is the addition of teleology or of incredible
> luck the one to shave?
>
> Spiritual things provide a much more substantial challenge to the purported
> merit of rejecting teleology. Jesus just being lucky about not staying
> dead is not very plausible.
>
> David C.
Agreed. But I was talking about "a complete system of natural causation" as
mentioned in Karl's post. You are talking about a broader description of the world
in which both the setting up of initial conditions and (I take it) certain later
events (e.g. Christ's resurrection) are not themselves part of the system of natural
causes. Apart from biblical miracles, a scientific explanation of a phenomenon need
not be considered an attempt at describing how God normally *does* [present tense]
things, because a dressed-up deism will give you just as much underlying teleology.
If such a deism provides the same underlying teleology, then simplicity requires
that present tense "God doing" talk be shaved off from scientific explanations of
phenomena, unless, of course, one has overiding theological reasons to the contrary.
But in that case one must not affirm the present completeness of natural causes, for
otherwise, apart from miraculous interventions, there would be nothing left for God
to be doing [present tense] with respect to the natural order.
- Bryan
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