This is an important distinction, because what you're describing is
not a "CANNOT" theory, such as the "fully gifted creation" Functional
Integrity view of Van Till.
Perhaps we should talk about TENDENCIES toward certain modes of
thinking (such as the "CANNOT" of Van Till, or the "MUST" that has been
attributed to Johnson), since most of us are INFLUENCED by our background
beliefs, rather than CONTROLLED by them. If a person really believes that
miracles in formative history are IMPOSSIBLE or are NECESSARY, then their
scientific conclusions will be totally pre-determined. But I think most
OECs and TEs either don't have views this strong (or won't admit it) so
thinking in terms of "tendencies" and "influences" are probably more
appropriate. But it's also more difficult, especially when we want
to "win" an argument by the force of our logic.
>The assumption that most of God's sustenance of nature is
>"natural" may be based both upon the observed rarity of miracles in the
>Bible, history,
"most of... rarity..."
But you know that creationists agree with this, so why should you
suggest that this is an argument against creationism? The difference
is between OCCASIONAL miracles (OEC) and NEVER miracles (TE), rather
than between OCCASIONALLY miracles (all theists agree with this) and
USUALLY miracles (which nobody claims, so it is a strawman).
By the way, I'm using OEC (Old-Earth Creationist) because I feel
more comfortable if there is no need to defend young-earth views,
which are implied by the word "creationist" and the way it has been
used during the past few decades.
>the need for things to behave predictably for us to fulfill our calling
>as stewards over creation (Gn. 1:26).
Even if miracles in formative history (or in human history) are
OCCASIONAL (instead of NEVER), stewardship is still possible, and is
still expected (and commanded) by God. But you know this, don't you,
David, so why should you think this is an argument for TE?
>On the other hand, such a criticism can be applied to many ID or YE
>advocates. Insisting that God had to have intervened non-naturally in
>creation is just as much a constraint as insisting that he must not have.
Yes, I agree, as stated clearly in my post.
>In creation (as opposed to in history), the latter is a much better
>approximation of the observed patterns.
Again, this is missing the whole point. (see above, regarding
"occasionally" and "never" and "usually". If there is one miracle
per month in a city, is it more accurate to say that miracles never
occur, usually occur, or occasionally occur? An OEC will not claim
"usually" so this criticism should not be used against OEC.
>The statement is also grossly in error in asserting that positive
>evidence for a creator must come from non-natural evidence.
I agree with you here, as (I hope) do most OECs. To the extent
that there is any confusion about this, OECs should do a better job
of being clear. Again, this is not an argument for TE, it is an
argument against an extreme form of OEC.
Craig Rusbult