>My point again is that physical explanations seek to "explain" by appealing
>to more and more basic "laws' or physical "things." From this I point out
>that much metaphysical debate has centered arround origins. Little has
>been focused on the metaphysical underpinning of what is happening today as
>opposed to the time of origins. I say therefore that physics really is
>about descriptions and cannot ultimately explain. The final question is
this:
>
> In this space " " someone writes down the theory of
>everything.
>
>Now, I say explain this. What makes this work, or if you prefer, "What
>holds up the processes of the universe.?" This leads us to recognition of
>a metaphysical point that science cannot ultimately explain and that
>something outside of accessable physical entities is making all of this
>exist.
I'm no scientist, so let me address this from a philosophical perspective.
Bert, let's say that the answer to your question -- "What holds up the
processes of the universe?" -- turns out to be: "God." The same logic
inherent in your question now begs the old Sunday School query: "Well,
then, what holds up God?" It's like the similar response of children when
they learn that God created everything: "Who created God?" In short, we
are launched on an infinite regress, with no obvious place to stop.
Aristotle recognized that your question is a natural one, and also that it
is an illegitimate one. Science is an inquiry. Inquiries start somewhere,
from some basis. It is useless to ask the question, "Why start there?' or
"What supports that basis for inquiry?" It is like asking for the
foundation to the foundation -- it can't be done, because it inaugurates an
infinite regress from which we cannot escape. Ultimately that leads to a
thorough skepticism about all knowledge. In the long run, there is a
pragmatic streak to all inquiry. We start in a reasonable place, and
proceed along reasonable lines, and if what we get isn't reasonable, then
we make adjustments. But this never satisfies anyone looking for a deeper
foundation. Unfortunately, the search for deeper foundations has always
resulted in skepticism.
The basis for scientific inquiry may seem arbitrary and incomplete, but it
is the basis. There are no others. There is no additional "underneath it
all." (I see no reason why any Christian should dissent from this, unless
they are committed to epistemological skepticism). And Aristotle would
disagree that ventures beyond science are really exercises in metaphysics.
For him, metaphysics is also a scientific inquiry. The effort to
dichotomize science and metaphysics has been around since the middle ages,
and has never proved successful for either science or metaphysics.
Tom Pearson
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Thomas D. Pearson
Department of History & Philosophy
The University of Texas-Pan American
Edinburg, Texas
e-mail: pearson@panam1.panam.edu