Dennis L. Feucht
Innovatia Labs
14554 Maplewood Road
Townville, Pennsylvania 16360
(814)789-2100
dfeucht@toolcity.net
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> From: Robin Collins <RCollins@mcis.messiah.edu>
> Subject: More on Phil of ID
> Date: Thursday, October 09, 1997 5:25 PM
>
> Since sending my message a few days ago about philosophy of ID, I got
three
> responses back all of which said they basically agree with my position.
But
> my sense was that people did not see why it was particularly important to
> talk about the philosophy behind it. Let me say why I do think it is
> important.
>
> As far as I can tell, the major objections to ID are philosophical. [Of
> course, those on the front line, such as Phil, are in a better position
to
> comment on this than myself.] For example, one common objection is that
we
> should not invoke intelligent design in explaining biological phenomena;
> another related objection is that citing some extra-mundane intelligence
> such as God is vacuous as an explanation. Because of the philosophical
> nature of the objections, it seems to me it would be rhetorically wise to
> get clear on what the intelligent design program is all about. Moreover,
> because ID is a new paridigm in science, I think that it is important to
> carefully consider what we are about, so that we not only can answer our
> critics, but coordinate our efforts. I was trying to take a first stab
at
> that.
>
> At the risk of repeating myself, let me try to clarify and elaborate on
my
> remarks a little. Unlike what I take Behe to be saying, I do NOT think
the
> ID program really needs to actually invoke a designer as a explanation.
> Rather, it seems to me that all we need to propose is that scientists
should
> be open to treating the world, especially biological phenomena, AS IF
they
> are designed, instead of AS IF they are not designed, as people like
Dawkins
> propose. In other words, the ID program advocates a METHODOLOGICAL
THEISM
> (or a methodological intelligent design]. This means we are open to the
> existence of, and actively seek out, designlike patterns in nature but do
> not require that those patterns themselves be explicable in terms that
those
> who do not believe in a designer would accept. The methodological theist
> can thus take those patterns as simply brute givens that do not admit of
any
> further SCIENTIFIC explanation, much like physicists do not necessarily
> require any explanation of the most fundamental laws of physics; they are
> just taken as given. In fact, the methodological theist could even agree
> with the methodological naturalist in claiming that scientific
explanations
> should only invoke natural causes. But, because methodological theists
> believes that the designer has left visible marks on creation, they need
not
> require that a further explanation be given of these designlike patters.
>
> Essentially, what I am proposing is that the difference between ID and
> accommodationists and philosophical naturalists is that, because we can
> accept designlike patters as givens (like the laws of nature), and work
from
> there; unlike naturalists, we do not need to require that they be
explicable
> in terms of chance plus natural selection. Thus, ID need not be seen as
> requiring that we include an intelligent designer as part of our
scientific
> explanations of the world: just as theists believe that the laws of
nature
> were created by God, but do not consider God as offering a scientific
> explanation of these laws, I am proposing that we consider the designlike
> patterns as created by God, but do not consider God or an intelligent
> designer as part of the scientific explanation of them.
>
> IN SUM: I propose that ID be seen as the position that we should treat
the
> natural world in our scientific endeavors AS IF it were designed, not as
a
> position that invokes supernatural causes in its scientific explanation
of
> the world. ID could then be seen as an extension to areas such as
biology
> of what scientists in physics seem already to be doing--that is,
implicitly
> treating the world as if it were designed by searching for and choosing
> those theories that are the most simple, elegant, and mathematically
> beautiful theories. This way of construing ID would answer many of the
> objections that its critics have to it, and show how it is continuous
with
> how science is practice elsewhere, namely physics.
>
> Thanks to those who have responded; what you say is helpful to me as I
> attempt to clarify my own thoughts on the issue.
>
>
> Robin Collins
> rcollins@messiah.edu
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