It is interesting to compare the current ID debate with the
Calvinist-Arminian debate. The main issue is about truth, but as you can see,
Edwards was also convinced that the outcome had significant effects for
evangelism. It is hard for me to avoid feeling that the issue he was facing is
more important than the current debate (Does this reflect a degeneration in
Christian intellectualism?), and that even though Arminianism seems to have
mostly taken over in many popular evangelical circles today, Edwards' Calvinist
position and arguments deserve a better hearing.
Yours in Christ,
Don Page
##############################################################################
The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Volume I, Percy Miller, General Editor:
Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, edited by Paul Ramsey, Professor
of Religion, Princeton University, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957, and
London: Oxford University Press.
**********************************************************************
A careful and strict
ENQUIRY
into
The modern prevailing Notions
of that
FREEDOM of WILL,
Which is supposed to be essential
to
Moral Agency, Vertue and Vice,
Reward and Punishment, Praise
and Blame.
_____________________________________________
By Jonathan Edwards, A.M.
Pastor of the Church in Stockbridge.
_____________________________________________
Rom. ix. 16. It is not of him that willeth---
_____________________________________________
BOSTON, N. E.
Printed and Sold by S. Kneeland, in Queen-street
MDCCLIV
************************************************************************
Editor's Introduction:
Page 2: "This book alone is sufficient to establish its author as the greatest
philosopher-theologian yet to grace the American scene."
Page 8: "2. The Theological Issue
"Edward's argument in this treatise rests upon two pillars: the proof
from biblical revelation and the proof from reason."
Page 9: "For Edwards as a theologian the issue is a simple one: either
contingency and the liberty of self-determination must be run out of this
world, or God will be shut out. `If there be no absurdity or difficulty in
supposing one thing to start out of nonexistence, into being, of itself without
a cause; then there is no absurdity or difficulty in supposing the same of
millions of millions' (p. 183)."
Page 11: "3. The Philosophical Argument
"When Edwards applies to those who have `human understanding in
exercise,' he constructs a reasoned argument upon the subject of free will that
deserves much admiration for its tight, logical connection and its vigorous
statement. Indeed, from the point of view of the history of ideas, as well as
from the perspective of persons who are persuaded that the latest is bound to
be the most advanced philosophy, it is striking that two hundred years ago
Edwards was saying the same thing that is being said today, with variation and
often not so well, by the latest analysts of the determinist school. A brief
summary ... : (1) Since ordinary language is notoriously inexact, `freedom'
and all other terms to be used in this discussion must be carefully defined.
Freedom means the ability to do what we will, or according to our pleasure.
(2) That men indubitably have such freedom, and only such freedom, can be
demonstrated by an exhaustive analysis of an act of volition. ... (3) Not only
is the determination of action by will, motive, or pleasure of the agent
consistent with morality, but morality actually requires determinism, since law
and commandment, praise and blame apply to the motive or inclination inherent
in the willing agent. (4) There can be no event without a cause. ... There are
no grounds for supposing a `pure ego' intervening from without to influence the
course of voluntary action. (5) In speaking of causation, however, it is the
*connection* or *correlation* between antecedent and consequent rather than
efficient causation that we should have in mind. (6) Moreover, *moral*
necessity needs to be distinguished from *natural* necessity, and *determinism*
from *compulsion*. Determinism and moral necessity are consistent with
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness (indeed, they require it), while
compulsion and natural necessity are not."
Pages 70-71: "For Edwards the refutation of Arminian notions of free will was
the thing upon which hinged everything else of importance for the religious
thought of his century. ...
"Before concluding that he was in fact mistaken in this judgment one
ought carefully to examine the reason Edwards believed the Arminian doctrine of
the freedom of will to be the first step along the path of abandoning
Christianity in other, more essential respects; and why he thought the
destruction of this view its chief defense. When this is done it will be found
that there is a sure and certain---one might almost say organic---connection
between views of sin (and associated aspects of the Christian scheme of
redemption) and the conception of the will in any age. This connection
manifests itself in the fact that it is precisely by taking refuge in the
autonomy of their wills that people, and the thought-forms of any age, avoid
full-scale confession of sin. Men perhaps acknowledge the sins they are
conscious of themselves producing by self-determining acts of will. But once
they begin to search only for self-determining acts they are likely to find
nothing at all to confess, and this is precisely the virtue of such an
understanding of sin and of freedom. There is no such thing to be found in
human experience as choosing to choose the sinful act, and so, on these terms,
no sin to confess; or at least very little in comparison with confessing sin to
be a fixed and stated quality of human nature and a steady cause among the
causes of all the actions of natural man. Thus the self-determining power of
the will was, in Edwards' belief, an `escape clause' the Arminians wanted to
write into man's covenant with God by which to avoid, or diminish the severity
of, what piety requires. The step `from piety to moralism' was attractive to
may people because moralistic conceptions cutting sin down to the size of
self-determination seemed so plausible to them; and moreover, thus to deny or
diminish the disease was always more pleasant than to seek its radical cure
from grace. The ground had to be removed from under such moralism before piety
could be restored. The escape clause had to be expunged in order that the
ancient covenant might regain its former force. The exit into autonomy of the
will had to be stopped, or else people would never again need to halt where
they are and make, on the spot, full confession of their utter sinfulness and
seek a determining power not their own for righteousness sake."
Jonathan Edwards' Text:
Part I. Wherein Are Explained Various Terms and Things Belonging to
the Subject of the Ensuing Discourse
Section 1. Concerning the Nature of the Will
Page 137 (first text page): "And therefore I observe, that the will (without
any metaphysical refining) is plainly, that by which the mind chooses
anything."
Section 5. Concerning the Notion of Liberty, and of Moral Agency
Page 163 (first words of this section): "The plain and obvious meaning of the
words `freedom' and `liberty,' in common speech, is power, opportunity, or
advantage, that anyone has, to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his being
free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any
respect, as he wills."
Page 164: "But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly
called liberty; namely that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as
he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking
into the meaning of the word, anything of the cause or original of that choice;
or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition; whether it
was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened
without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing,
or not connected. Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will,
yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and
executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free, according to the
primary and common notion of freedom,"
Part II. Wherein It Is Considered, whether There Is, or Can Be Any
Such Sort of Freedom of Will, as That wherein Arminians Place the Essence of
the Liberty of All Moral Agents; and Whether Any Such Thing Ever Was, or Can Be
Conceived of
Section 3. Whether Any Event Whatsoever, and Volition in Particular,
Can Come to Pass without a Cause of Its Existence
Page 181: "Having thus explained what I mean by a cause, I assert, that
nothing ever comes to pass without a cause. What is self-existent must be from
eternity, and must be unchangeable: but as to all things that *begin to be*,
they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some foundation of their
existence without themselves."
Part III. Wherein Is Inquired, whether Any Such Liberty of Will as
Arminians Hold, Be Necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise and
Dispraise, etc.
Section 1. God's Moral Agency Necessary, yet Virtuous and Praiseworthy
Page 277: "Having considered the first thing that was proposed to be inquired
into, relating to that freedom of will which Arminians maintain; namely,
whether any such thing does, ever did, or ever can exist, or be conceived of; I
come now to the second thing proposed to be the subject of inquiry, viz.
whether any such kind of liberty be requisite to moral agency, virtue and vice,
praise and blame, reward and punishment, etc."
"...And yet Dr. Whitby, p. 300, allows, that God is without this
freedom; and Arminians, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, generally
acknowledge, that God is necessarily holy, and his will necessarily determined
to that which is good."
Part IV. Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reasonings of Arminians, in
Support and defense of Their Notions of Liberty, Moral Agency, etc. and against
the Opposite Doctrine, Are Considered
Section 7. Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will
Page 387: "I think, we know not what we mean, if we say, the world might have
been differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse of infinity; or,
that it might have been differently fixed in the long line of eternity: and
all arguments and objections which are built on the imaginations we are apt to
have of infinite extension or duration, are buildings founded on shadows, or
castles in the air."
Section 9. Concerning That Objection against the Doctrine Which Has
Been Maintained, that It Makes God the Author of Sin
Page 397: "I. If there be any difficulty in this matter, 'tis nothing
peculiar to this scheme; 'tis no difficulty or disadvantage wherein it is
distinguished from the scheme of Arminians; and therefore not reasonably
objected by them."
Page 398: "...this is a difficulty which equally attends the doctrine of
Arminians themselves; at least, of those of them who allow God's certain
foreknowledge of all events. For on the supposition of such a foreknowledge,
this is the case with respect to every sin that is committed: God knew, that
if he ordered and brought to pass such and such events, such sins would
infallibly follow."
Page 399: "II. They who object, that this doctrine makes God the author of
sin, ought distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase, `the author of
sin.' I know, the phrase, as it is commonly used, signifies something very
ill. If by `the author of sin,' be meant the sinner, the agent, or actor of
sin, or the *doer* of a wicked thing; so it would be a reproach and blasphemy,
to suppose God to be the author of sin. In this sense, I utterly deny God to
be the author of sin; rejecting such an imputation on the most High, as what is
infinitely to be abhorred; and deny any such thing to be the consequence of
what I have laid down. But if by `the author of sin,' is meant the permitter,
or not the hinderer of sin; and at the same time, a disposer of the state of
events, in such a manner, for wise, holy and most excellent ends and purposes,
that sin, if it be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and
infallibly follow: I say, if this be all that is meant, by being the author of
sin, I don't deny that God is the author of sin (though I dislike and reject
the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry another sense), it
is no reproach for the most High to be thus the author of sin. This is not to
be the *actor* of sin, but on the contrary, of *holiness*. What God doth
herein, is holy; and a glorious exercise of the infinite excellency of his
nature. And I don't deny, that God's being thus the author of sin, follows
from what I have laid down; and I assert, that it equally follows from the
doctrine which is maintained by most of the Arminian divines."
Page 403: "III. That there is a great difference between God's being
concerned thus, by his *permission*, in an event and act, which in the inherent
subject and agent of it, is sin (though the event will certainly follow on his
permission), and his being concerned in it by *producing* it and exerting the
act of sin; or between his being the *orderer* of its certain existence, by
*not hindering* it, under certain circumstances, and his being the proper
*actor* or *author* of it by a *positive agency* or *efficiency*."
Page 404: "IV. It properly belongs to the supreme and absolute Governor of
the universe, to order all important events within his dominion, by his wisdom:
but the events in the moral world are of the most important kind; such as the
moral actions of intelligent creatures, and their consequences."
Page 406: "On the whole, it is manifest, that God may be, in the manner which
has been described, the orderer and disposer of that event, which in the
inherent subject and agent is moral evil; and yet his so doing may be no moral
evil. ... Gen. 50:20: `As for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it
unto good.'"
Page 407: "There is no inconsistence in supposing, that God may hate a thing
as it is in itself, and considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his
will it should come to pass, considering all consequences. I believe, there is
no person of good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain that it
is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of
existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events, that there
should be such a thing as moral evil in the world." (Then in a footnote
continuing on to the next page, Edwards quotes George Turnbull as saying in
_The Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy_, vol. 2 [London, 1740], "if
the Author and Governor of all things be infinitely perfect, then whatever is,
is right; of all possible systems he hath chosen the best: and consequently
there is *no absolute evil* in the universe. . . . This being the case, all
the seeming *imperfections* or *evils* in it are such only in a partial view;
and with respect to the *whole* system, they are *goods*."
Page 410: "If any objector should say, all that these things amount to, is,
that God may do evil that good may come; which is justly esteemed immoral and
sinful in men; and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral
perfections of God. I answer, that for God to dispose and permit evil, in the
manner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that good may come; for it is
not to do evil at all."
Page 411: "We should not be afraid to affirm, that if a wise and good man knew
with absolute certainty, it would be best, all things considered, that there
should be such a thing as moral evil in the world, it would not be contrary to
his wisdom and goodness, for him to choose that it should be so. 'Tis no evil
desire, to desire good, and to desire that which, all things considered, is
best. And it is no unwise choice, to choose that that should be, which it is
best should be; and to choose the existence of that thing concerning which this
is known, viz. that it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be
most worthy to be chosen. ... If his [God's] will be good, and the object of
his will be, all things considered, good and best, then the choosing or willing
it is not *willing evil* that good may come. And if so, then his ordering
according to that will is not *doing evil*, that good may come."
Section 11. Of a Supposed Inconsistence of These Principles with God's
Moral Character
Pages 418-19: "From things which have been observed, it appears, that most of
the arguments from Scripture, which Arminians make use of to support their
scheme, are no other than *begging the question*. For in these arguments they
determine in the first place, that without such a freedom of will as they hold,
men can't be proper moral agents, nor the subjects of command, counsel,
persuasion, invitation, promises, threatenings, expostulations, rewards and
punishments; and that without such a freedom 'tis to no purpose for men to take
any care, or use any diligence, endeavors or means, in order to their avoiding
sin, or becoming holy, escaping punishment or obtaining happiness: and having
supposed these things, which are grand things in question in the debate, then
they heap up scriptures containing commands, counsels, calls, warnings,
persuasions, expostulations, promises and threatenings (as doubtless they may
find enough such; the Bible is confessedly full of them, from the beginning to
the end); and then they glory, how full the Scripture is on their side, how
many more texts there are that evidently favor their scheme, than such as seem
to favor the contrary. But let them first make manifest the things in
question, which they suppose and take for granted, and shew them to be
consistent with themselves, and produce clear evidence of their truth; and they
have gained their point, as all will confess, without bringing one scripture.
For none denies, that there are commands, counsels, promises, threatenings,
etc, in the Bible. But unless they do these things, their multiplying such
texts of Scripture is insignificant and vain.
"It may further be observed, that such scriptures as they bring, are
really against them, and not for them. As it has been demonstrated, that 'tis
their scheme, and not ours, that is inconsistent with the use of motives and
persuasives, or any moral means whatsoever, to induce men to the practice of
virtue, or abstaining from wickedness: their principles, and not ours, are
repugnant to moral agency, and inconsistent with moral government, with law or
precept, with the nature of virtue or vice, reward or punishment, and with
everything whatsoever of a moral nature, either on the part of the moral
Governor, or in the state, actions, or conduct or the subject."
Related Correspondence
Letter from Jonathan Edwards to Rev. John Erskine, August 3, 1757
Pages 466-68: "And not only have these errors a most pernicious influence, in
the public religious controversies, that are maintained in the world; but such
sort of notions have a more fatal influence many ways, on the minds of all
ranks, in all transactions between God and their souls. The longer I live, and
the more I have to do with the souls of men, in the work of the ministry, the
more I see of this. Notions of this sort are one of the main hindrance of the
success of the preaching of the Word, and other means of grace, in the
conversion of sinners. this especially appears, when the minds of sinners are
affected with some concern for their souls, and they are stirred up to seek
their salvation. Nothing is more necessary for men, in such circumstances,
than thorough conviction and humiliation; than that their consciences should be
properly convinced of their real guilt and sinfulness in the sight of God, and
their deserving of his wrath. But who is there, that has had experience of the
work of a minister, in dealing with souls in such circumstances, that does not
find that the thing, that mainly prevents this, is men's excusing themselves
with their own inability, and the moral necessity of those things, wherein
their exceeding guilt and sinfulness in the sight of God, most fundamentally
and mainly consist: such as, living from day to day, without one spark of true
love to the God of infinite glory, and the Fountain of all good; their having
greater complacency, in the little vile things of this world, than in him;
their living in a rejection of Christ, with all his glorious benefits and dying
love; and after all the exhibition of his glory and grace, having their hearts
still as cold as a stone towards him; and their living in such ingratitude, for
that infinite mercy of his laying down his life for sinners. They, it may be,
think of some instances of lewd behavior, lying, dishonesty, intemperance,
profaneness, etc. But the grand principles of iniquity, constantly abiding and
reigning, from whence all proceeds, are all overlooked. Conscience does not
condemn them for those things, because they `cannot love God of themselves,'
they `cannot believe of themselves,' and the like. They rather lay the blame
of these things, and their other reigning wicked dispositions of heart, to God,
and secretly charge him with all the blame. These things are very much, for
want of being thoroughly instructed, in that great and important truth, that *a
bad will, or an evil disposition of heart, itself, is wickedness*. ...
"It is of great importance, that they, that are seeking their
salvation, should be brought off from all dependence on their own
righteousness: but these notions above all things prevents it. They justify
themselves, in the sincerity of their endeavors. They say to themselves, that
they do what they can; they take great pains; and though there be great
imperfection in what they do, and many evil workings of heart arise, yet these
they cannot help: here moral necessity, or inability, comes in as an excuse.
Things of this kind have visibly been the main hindrance of the true
humiliation and conversion of sinners, in the times of awakening, that have
been in this land, everywhere, in all parts, as I have had opportunity to
observe, in very many places. ... They justify themselves with their
*inability*; and the design and end of the law, as a schoolmaster, to fit them
for Christ, is defeated. Thus both the law and the gospel are prevented from
having their proper effect."
Page 470 (last text page of the book): "Excuse me, sir, from troubling you
with so much on this head. I speak from the fullness of my heart. What I have
long seen of the dreadful consequences of these prevalent notions everywhere,
and what I am convinced will still be their consequences so long as they
continue to prevail, fills me with concern. I therefore wish that that affair
were more thoroughly looked into, and searched to the very bottom."
...
"You will see, sir, something of our sorrowful state, on this side of
the water, by my letter to mr. M"Culloch. O, sir, pray for us; and pray in
particular, for
Your affectionate and obliged
Friend and brother,
Jonathan Edwards