Narst Invited Session
William W. Cobern (icwwc@ASUVM.INRE.ASU.EDU)
Wed, 06 Mar 1996 12:19:03 -0700>Return-Path: <owner-narst-l@UWF.CC.UWF.EDU>
>Date: Mon, 4 Mar 1996 12:20:29 -0800
>Reply-To: Norm Lederman <lederman@UCS.ORST.EDU>
>Sender: National Association for Research in Science Teaching
> <NARST-L@UWF.BITNET>
>From: Norm Lederman <lederman@UCS.ORST.EDU>
>Subject: Narst Invited Session
>Comments: To: narst-l@uwf.cc.uwf.edu
>To: Multiple recipients of list NARST-L <NARST-L@UWF.BITNET>
>
>Dear NARST Members,
>
>Section H: History, Philosophy, and Epistemology will feature an
>Invited Session in St. Louis:
>
>TITLE: Reaching Consensus on the Nature of Science:
> Implications for the Classroom
>
>DATE: MONDAY, APRIL 1, 1996
>
>LOCATION: NEW YORK CENTRAL
>
>
>This invited session brings together 10 scholars with interests in
>students' and teachers' conceptions of the nature of science. These
>individuals bring varying perspectives to what we envision to be a
>highly provocative and interactive session. There is currently no
>single agreed upon conception of the nature of science. The
>implications of this lack of consensus will be discussed relative to
>(but not limited to) curricula reforms, science education research,
>and instructional practice. In addition, the feasibility and/or
>necessity for achievement of consensus will be discussed.
>
>In an effort to maximize discussion between presenters and audience
>we are providing abstracts (varying from 1-8 pages) of papers in
>advance. Full versions of each of these papers will be available at
>the NARST meeting. The format of the session will in volve a
>"jig-saw" approach with both small and large group discussions.
>Please take this opportunity to familiarize yourself with the various
>perspectives of the presenters AND prepare any comments you may want
>to include in addition to those of the pres enters or in response to
>their views.
>
>We apologize in advance for any typos and aberrations that have
>resulted in text as a consequence of electronic transmission. Your
>patience is appreciated. The presenters' abstracts follow in
>alphabetical order.
>
>
>The Nature of Science and the Claims of Reason, Faith, and Relativism
>
>William W. Cobern, Ph.D.
>Arizona State University West
>NARST '96 Symposium: Reaching a Consensus on the Nature of Science.
>
> In the early 1960s Joseph Schwab wrote about the structure of
>science as a discipline and promoted the development of science
>curricula and teaching strategies that reflected that structure. The
>clear implication was that the philosophy of science sh ould
>influence science education. What interested Schwab was soon to be
>known as the "nature of science." In 1967 Merrit Kimball published
>one of the very early research articles in this area. In 1969 James
>Robinson published perhaps what was the first book on the nature of
>science (NOS) specifically written for science educators. The
>proliferation of NOS research is attested to by Lederman's 1992
>thorough review of NOS research. Much of this research shows the
>strong influence of logical positivism though there is as well much
>variation. NOS researchers, in other words, do not offer a single
>answer to the question, What is the nature of science? The variation
>reflects in part the variation among philosophers of science. Loving
>(1991) provides a concise description of that variation which is at
>least as wide as the gap between realism and anti-realism.
>Considering the variati on of views among philosophers of science,
>Richard Duschl asks whether one can expect anything different among
>science educators. Probably not, but that does not mean that there
>are no crucial questions to be asked about the variation that does
>exist. In recent years that variation has extended from weak social
>constructivist views of science to multicultural, anti universal
>views of science. In turn, the more radical views have provoked
>heated responses from traditionalists. A critical issue here is the
>issue of epistemological universality versus epistemological
>relativism.
>
> In the past, views on the NOS were primarily influenced by
>philosophers of science. A science educator taken by the arguments
>of a Hempel would show the influence of a logical positivist view of
>science. A science educator who preferred Polanyi woul d show
>constructivist influences. In both cases the influences come from
>within the traditional boundaries of the philosophy of science.
>Today's radical views on NOS show the philosophical influence of
>Feyerabend, but more importantly they show the infl uence of views
>that come from the non traditional disciplines of the sociology of
>science and literary criticism, the strong program for the social
>construction of knowledge (e.g., Bloor, Lature) and deconstructionism
>(e.g., Derrida), respectively. That this has happened is an example
>of having sown to the wind, one now must reap the whirlwind. The
>careless sowing was the sowing of radical empiricism. Radical
>empiricism (what in science education Smolicz & Nunan called the
>"mythology of school science") invoked a strict separation between
>reason and faith which ultimately banished religion (the domain of
>faith as described by empiricists) from the academy. Science (the
>domain of reason as described by empiricists) then came to dominate
>the academy uncontested and claime d for itself a privileged status
>based on the universality and certainty of its epistemology. Other
>disciplines in the academy, especially the social sciences, quickly
>adopted the empiricist mantel. These disciplines, however,
>eventually turned radical empiricism's searing analysis back upon
>science itself. Lo and behold, the sciences were found incapable of
>empirically demonstrating their heretofore assumed superiority. All
>is faith! All is socially constructed.
>
> To further elucidate this unexpected turn of events I will borrow
>a line of argument from post modernist literary critic Stanley Fish
>who is known for his remark, "all preferences are principled... all
>principles are preferences." Fish's argument is about the
>incommensurability of theistic and atheistic epistemologies. His
>argument is drawn from Milton's Paradise Lost and the dialogue
>between Adam and Satan. Adam argues that because he did not see how
>he came into being, he must have been created - and the Creator is
>God. Satan challenges that since no one was seen creating Adam, Adam
>must have come from nothing - seeing is believing. Satan is a
>radical empiricist! Fish argues, however, that, "in neither case
>does the conclusion follow necessarily from the observed fact of
>imperfect knowledge. In both cases something is missing, a first
>premise, and in both cases reasoning can't get started until a first
>premise is put in place. What's more, since the first premise is
>what is missing, it cannot be derived from any thing in the visible
>scene; it is what must be imported - on no evidentiary basis
>whatsoever - so that the visible scene, the things of this world, can
>acquire the meaning and significance they will now have. There is no
>opposition here between knowledge by reason and knowledge by faith...
>[Adam and Satan] each begins to reason in ways dictated by the
>content of his faith."
>
> All is faith. It is not difficult, however, to paraphrase this
>argument with Adam cast as the defender of traditional science. "I
>cannot prove that scientific statements are Truth statements about
>the world. I can see that science statements are po werful and thus
>I believe they are Truth." To which that relativist Satan counters,
>"Many people have different ideas about the world. If you cannot
>demonstrate that science statements are True, how can you believe
>they are when there are so many other claims to Truth? Such claims
>are either equally True or equally False! Astronomy or astrology -
>it is simply a matter of preference."
>
> People such as Norman Levitt would have Adam build up the walls
>and fortify the gates against the onslaught of the barbarians of
>irratonalism. But the reactionary defense of radical empiricism
>shows no understanding of what caused the threat in the first place -
>that radical empiricism contains the seeds of its own destruction.
>The more one seeks to protect science from irrationalism the more it
>appears that science is itself being shielded from the same analysis
>that established the definition of irrationalism in the first place.
>What is there to hide?
>
> The community of science educators will not soon reach any
>consensus on the nature of science. Keeping in mind Eger's
>distinction between the interests of science and interest in science,
>there are views on the nature of science that do not serve wel l the
>objective of science for all. One of those is radical empiricism and
>its strict separation of reason and faith, rationality and
>irrationality. The more appropriate dichotomy is reason and faith
>versus all is faith. A respectful view of science and empiricism can
>be maintained in science education without sacrificing other
>epistemologies by remembering that:
>
>1) all epistemologies proceed from some presuppositional base.
>
>2) the merits of presuppositions, though underdetermined, are arguable.
>
>3) science does not presuppose a single set of presuppositions.
>Science can be (and is) supported from a number of different
>presuppositional basis.
>
>4) one should not antagonize needed allies by insisting on
>presuppositioal purity.
>
>
>
>
>THE NATURE OF SCIENCE AS PORTRAYED IN SCIENCE EDUCATION: THE
>HEGEMONY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
>
>Catherine L. Cummins, Louisiana State University
>
>
>Overview
>
> Studies of the history and philosophy of science are heavily
>biased toward the physical sciences. This bias is reflected in
>descriptions of the nature of science found in science education
>research and science education materials available to teacher s. The
>bias towards the physical sciences has resulted in a devaluation of
>comparative and descriptive methods of science in favor of
>experimental methods. These nonexperimental methods are especially
>important in the history and the current practice of the biological
>sciences.
>
> The theoretical framework for this paper was developed during an
>examination of science fairs and what they teach about the nature of
>science (Cummins, 1993). Briefly, the results of that study showed
>that, over a ten year period, the great majority of the botany and
>zoology projects at the International Science and Engineering Fair
>(ISEF) used experimental methods. However, experimental projects did
>not out compete nonexperimental projects when the award distribution
>was analyzed. The results of this research has in turn inspired a
>critical analysis of how the nature of science is taught in s chools.
>Two questions focus this research. First, if it is communicated to
>the students that nonexperimental methods are inferior in some way,
>then what does this tell the student implicitly and explicitly about
>the nature of science? This question is especially important to the
>field of biology where the descriptive and comparative methodology is
>so important. Second, where does the message that the experimental
>method is the only legitimate scientific method originate, and how is
>it communicated to teachers, parents, and students?
>
>Descriptive and Comparative Methods
>
> For the purposes of this paper, when the term nonexperimental is
>used, it does not indicate student work that simply illustrates a
>scientific concept. That type of work often resembles an illustrated
>book report, a demonstration, or a model. The non experimental
>research described in this paper is instead original research that
>gathers and analyzes data using descriptive and/or comparative
>methods.
>
> In contrast, the experimental method is characterized by the
>manipulation of variables and the establishment of appropriate
>controls.
>
> The type of nonexperimental research discussed in this paper uses
>the descriptive and/or comparative method as described by Mayr
>(1988). Mayr (1988) stresses the importance of observation and
>comparison to the development of knowledge in biology. Mayr (1988)
>states that biologists have realized that functional questions (using
>experimental methods) and evolutionary or ecological questions (using
>nonexperimental methods) are equally legitimate. Another excellent
>source for discussions on this theme is E. O. Wilson's (1994)
>autobiography Naturalist.
>
>Sources of the bias towards experimentation
>
> Let me state from the outset that I am not criticizing the
>experimental method per se. However, I do criticize the pressure to
>view the nature of science as being only experimental to the
>exclusion of other methods. Very few authors have critically
>discussed the rationale behind stressing the experimental method in
>teaching about the nature of science. One of the few critics is
>Derek Hodson. Hodson (1988) asks that we examine what we teach
>students about science when we do experiments in the class room and
>how that relates to theory building. He states that science teachers
>may not stress that many of the aspects of science they teach are
>unavailable to direct experimental study. One need only look at the
>first chapter of most textbooks to see "the scientific method"
>described as an experiment.
>
> The exclusion of nonexperimental methods as legitimate science is
>especially dramatic when one looks at the literature that relates
>specifically to science fairs. The production of science fairs at
>their many levels provides fine examples of diverse collaborations
>that involve students, parents, administrators, scientists, business
>leaders, science policy personnel, and many types of science
>educators, especially science classroom teachers. The science fair
>is often sighted as an effective way of letting students "do"
>science.
>
> Thus, students' concept of the nature of science could be strongly
>influenced by participation in this activity. The rules of the ISEF
>over many years give direct references to the preferred project as an
>experiment. Many people who consider themselves scientists (e.g.,
>paleontologis ts, ecologists, geologists, astronomers) would be
>surprised to find that their research would not qualify as a science
>fair project using the criteria found in the rules for the ISEF.
>
>Effects on biological learning
>
> The focus on experimentation is especially unfortunate in the
>biological sciences where the comparative method has been so powerful
>in both data analysis and theory building (Mayr, 1988). One aspect
>of biology that is virtually lost with the emphasis
> on experimental methods is research involving evolutionary concepts.
>Experimental methods are used mostly by biologists studying proximate
>causation (Mayr, 1988). Most students get very little experience in
>thinking about ultimate causation (causation related to evolution) in
>biology (Cummins and Remsen, 1992). Obviously, students will not be
>ab le to do research that studies evolutionary change during the
>duration of the school year. However, studies involving systematics,
>comparative studies of populations of organisms, and many types of
>ecological studies can have evolutionary conclusions. To a great
>extent, we de ny our students the opportunity to apply this
>fundamental theory to their thinking about biology if we stress only
>experimental methods.
>
> Another important aspect of biology that is rarely addressed by
>experimentation is natural history. Much of the basic natural
>history of many organisms is still unknown (Wilson, 1994). This type
>of student research can involve a high degree of scien tific rigor,
>technical expertise, and can produce research that is publishable in
>established scientific journals.
>
>Implications
>
> Many science education materials communicate that nonexperimental
>methods are inferior to experimental ones. Emphasizing experimental
>methods at the expense of descriptive and comparative methods does
>not convey an accurate portrayal of the nature of science. Many
>scientists do not use experimental methods, and we should allow
>students the same opportunities to learn about and perform research
>not bound by a narrow definition of the scientific method.
>
>References
>
>Cummins, C. L. (1993). Science fairs and the teaching of the nature
>of science or "would Charles Darwin have won a science fair?"
>Presented as a Contributed Paper at the 1993 Annual Meeting of the
>National Association for Research in Science Teaching, Atlanta, GA on
>April 17..
>
>Cummins, C. L., & Remsen, J. .V. (1992). The importance of
>distinguishing ultimate from proximate causation in the teaching and
>learning of biology. In Skip Hills (Ed.), History and philosophy of
>science in science education: Proceedings of the second
>international conference for history and philosophy of scien ce in
>science teaching (Vol. 1) (pp. 201-210). Kingston, Ontario, Canada:
>Mathematics, Science, Technology and Teacher Education Group and
>Faculty of Education, Queen's University
>
>Hodson, D. (1988). Experiments in science and science teaching.
>Educational Philosophy and Theory, 20 (2), 53-66.
>
>Mayr, E. (1988). Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations
>of an Evolutionist. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ.
>Press.
>
>Wilson, E. O. (1994). Naturalist. Washington, DC: Island Press.
>
>
>
>
>SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HAVE DIFFERENT GOALS
>
>Ron Good
>Curriculum and Instruction
>223 Peabody
>Lousisana State University
>
>
> The National Science Education Standards (1996), Science for All
>Americans (1989) and Benchmarks for Science Literacy (1993), and many
>other publications differentiate between science and technology.
>Regardless of such efforts over the years to make it clear that
>science and technology have different goals, most people, including
>many academics, fail to differentiate between these endeavors. In
>this paper I focus on the differences between science and technology
>in order to show certain consequences of failing to see the
>differences or to take them seriously.
>
> On The Differences Between Science and Technology As Wolpert
>(1993) has pointed out: Much of modern technology is based on
>science, but this recent association obscures crucial differences and
>the failure to distinguish between science and technology has played
>a major role in obscuring the nature of science. (p. 25) This
>statement by Wolpert, a British biologist and well-known author (The
>Triumph of the Embryo and A Passion for Science), introduces his
>second chapter (Technology is not Science) in The Unnatural Nature of
>Sci ence. Although many connections exist between the natural
>sciences and technology, as pointed out nicely in Science for All
>Americans (SFAA) and Benchmarks for Science Literacy (Benchmarks),
>the failure to understand the uniqueness of each field is a major
>obstacle to understanding the nature of science. In Chapter Two
>(Principles and Definitions) of The National Science Education
>Standards (National Research Council, 1996) there is this statement:
>...the central distinguishing characteristic between science and
>technology is a difference in goal: The goal of science is to
>understand the natural world and the goal of technology is to make
>modifications in the world to meet human needs (p. 24). The practice
>of science yields ideas while the practice of technology yields
>products and processes. Technology has been practiced for as long as
>there have been human beings while science is a relatively new kid on
>the block. The influence of technology on society is much more
>direct and, therefore, easier to see than is the more indir ect
>influence of science. Also, sciences knowledge base is much more
>counterintuitive than technologys knowledge base, causing most people
>considerable difficulty in understanding science concepts. Common
>sense is often an obstacle to the kind of thinking required in doing
>good science (cf. Cromer, 1993; Wolpert, 1993).
>
>
>Some Consequences of Conflating Science with Technology
>
>What harm is there in using the word science when technology is the
>correct choice? In the last chapter of his book that looks at
>various anti-science forces, Holton (1993) recognizes that the term
>anti-science lumps together many different kinds of complaints
>against both science and technology. There seems to be little effort
>(ability?) by critics to separate scientific ideas about Nature from
>the use of those ideas to develop things of utility. Wolpert (1993)
>devotes an entire chapter to emphasizing the importance of
>distinguishing between science and technology. Whether the
>conflation of science with technology is intentional or not, science
>is often held responsible for the negative consequences that
>technological products and processes have on societ y. From use of
>nuclear weapons to chemical pollution, science gets the blame when
>technology is equated to science. In science education, there is a
>movement toward multicultural science. Like social studies and
>literature studies, the natural science curriculum is under pressure
>by per sons sympathetic to postmodern ideals (cf., Gross & Levitt,
>1994 for a thorough critique of postmodernism) to include non-Western
>science that has been repressed by dominant forces in society. In
>earlier papers (Good, 1995; Good & Demastes, 1995) I provided
>examples of statements by science educators sympathetic to
>multicultural science and a statement by frequently-quoted feminist
>philosopher of science, Sandra Harding (1991): What kinds of
>knowledge about the empirical world do we need in order to live at
>all, and to live more reasonably with one another on this planet from
>th is moment on? Should improving the lives of the few or of the
>many take priority in answering this question? (p. 102)
>Understanding Nature, the goal of the natural sciences, is not
>concerned with how the as-yet-unknown knowledge might be used to
>benefit or harm society and the environment. Scientific knowledge
>about Nature is simply what it is, knowledge about the universal laws
>of Nature. Confusing that knowledge with technology or the folk
>knowledge of nonscientific cultures of the past leads to unwarranted
>criticism of the enterprise of science and the knowledge it has
>produced. Public confidence in the enterprise and knowledge base of
>science can be shaken when academics and others seen as experts
>conflate science and technology, blaming science for the invention
>and use of certain technologies.
>
> Science educators who take science seriously have a
>responsibility to make it clear that science and technology have
>different goals, even though there are many interconnections. The
>American Association for the Advancement of Science (Project 2061's
>Science for All Americans and Benchmarks for Science Literacy) and
>the National Academy of Sciences (National Science Education
>Standards) are two good sources of ideas on this issue, as are books
>by Gross and Levitt (1994), Holton (1993), Matthews (1994), Wolpert
>(1993), and many other scholars of the nature of science. More than
>ever, clear thinking and a serious commitment to science are needed.
>The appeal of the relativism of postmodern ideals is strong, but it
>is Nature and the natur al sciences that must be the fundamental
>organizers for education in the sciences.
>
>References
>
>AAAS, Project 2061 (1989). Science for all Americans. New York, NY:
>Oxford. AAAS, Project 2061 (1993). Benchmarks for science literacy.
>New York, NY: Oxford.
>
>Cromer, A. (1993). Uncommon sense: The heretical nature of science.
>New York, NY: Oxford.
>
>Good, R. (1995). Taking science seriously. Paper presented at the
>annual meeting of the National Association for Research in Science
>Teaching, San Francisco, CA, April 22-25, 1995.
>
>Good, R. & Demastes, S. (1995). The diminished role of nature in
>postmodern views of science and science education. In F. Finley et
>al. (Eds.), Proceedings, Volume 1, Third International History,
>Philosophy, and Science Teaching Conference, Minneapolis, MN, October
>29-November 1, 1995.
>
>Gross, P. & Levitt, N. (1994). Higher superstition: The academic
>left and its quarrels with science. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins.
>
>Harding, S. (1991). Whose science? Whose knowledge? Ithaca, NY:
>Cornell. Holton, G. (1993). Science and anti-science. Cambridge,
>MA: Harvard.
>
>Matthews, M. (1994). Science teaching: The role of history
>and philosophy of science. New York, NY: Routledge. National Research
>
>Council (1996). National science education standards. Washington,
>DC: National Academy Press
>
>Wolpert, L. (1993). The unnatural nature of science. Cambridge, MA:
>Harvard.
>
>
>
>
>The Nature of Science: Instructional Implications for a Process More
>Tentative than its Products
>
>NORMAN G. LEDERMAN
>SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS EDUCATION
>OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY
>CORVALLIS, OREGON 97331
>LEDERMAN@UCS.ORST.EDU
>
> The development of students' understandings of the nature of
>science has been perennially identified as a desired outcome of
>science instruction since the beginning of this century, and arguably
>earlier (Lederman, 1992). Our desire to help students d evelop an
>adequate understanding of the nature of science continues to this
>day, as is evidenced in both the National Science Education Standards
>(NRC, 1995) and the Benchmarks for Science Literacy (AAAS, 1993).
>However, there exists no clear consensus a bout the "true" nature of
>science. This observation has significant implications for science
>instruction, curriculum development, research in science education,
>current conceptions of scientific thought and inquiry, and the
>content and focus of science e ducation reform.
>
>SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT, PROCESSES, AND HABITS OF MIND
>
> Recent and historical reforms (NSTA, 1982; Welch, 1979) have
>introduced the goals of science process skills, scientific thinking,
>and scientific literacy. An often stated (but as yet unachieved)
>instructional objective has been to promote students' s cientific
>process skills (Shymansky, Kyle, & Alport, 1983), application of
>these skills to everyday problems, and understanding of the nature of
>science.
>
> The assumption has been that by "doing science" students will
>develop the fairly "traditional" list of process skills and an
>understanding of the nature of science. Recently, however, attempts
>to define scientific thought (Suchting, 1995) have indica ted that
>there may be no single definition. The subject matters of the
>sciences are continually engaged in the process of redefining
>themselves. Consequently, any discussion of what constitutes
>scientific thought or the nature of science must be made wi th
>respect to scientific context and qualified by the specific case
>under investigation. The validity of focusing science instruction on
>a particular, universal set of science process skills (and their
>accompanying logic and syntax) must be called into q uestion. The
>current generic and universal approach to scientific thinking and
>process skills may be unfounded at best and contrary to the nature of
>scientific thought at worst.
>
>NATURE OF SCIENCE
>
> If it is the case that what constitutes scientific thinking and
>process are continually changing, then it is also true that what
>constitutes science, as a way of knowing, is also in a state of flux,
>as a consequence of the inevitably changing subject matters of
>science. It is quite clear from an analysis of the different
>scientific disciplines that conceptualizations of science vary to a
>large degree (Lederman, 1992). For example, the establishment of
>cause and effect relationships and one's concept ion of teleology in
>the biological sciences differ drastically from what is noted in the
>physical sciences (Levins & Lewontin, 1985; Mayr, 1988).
>Furthermore, although Popper's (1959) conception of science held
>favor for an extended period of time, Kuhn' s (1962) alternative
>conceptualization was quickly followed by a series of
>reconceptualizations (Feyerabend, 1975; Giere, 1988; Lakatos, 1970;
>Laudan, 1977) significantly differing from one another.
>Consequently, it appears that conceptions of the nature
>of science are variable and tentative (House, 1991). The
>implications here are quite analogous to those noted with respect to
>science process and thinking skills.
>
> The conception of the nature of science being advocated across
>curricula reforms is a consistently universal one and can be most
>commonly characterized as a combination of Kuhn's (1962) and Laudan's
>(1977) views. As with process skills, the emerging literature
>related to the nature of science indicates that our current approach
>to the development of students' conceptions of the nature of science
>may not be at all consistent with the evidence. The current approach
>assumes a rather unitary nature of s cience and, as a consequence,
>may be promoting a particular conception of the nature of science as
>opposed to a more inclusive conception.
>
> It would seem that the most practical recommendation would be to
>revise instruction and curricula that profess to address the nature
>of science in a manner that would give "balanced" treatment to the
>varying conceptions of science. However, this may not be as easily
>done as said. Although Kuhn's (1962) seminal work is not intended to
>advocate particular pedagogical or curricular approaches, one of his
>critical points regarding paradigms has significant implications for
>the seemingly obvious response to the apparent multiplicity of models
>of science. In particular, Kuhn explicitly discusses the problems
>that occur when individuals of different paradigms or world views
>attempt to communicate on substantive issues. In his opinion,
>individuals can not hold two paradigms simultaneously and
>miscommunication is inevitable because even when such individuals use
>the same words and terminology the meanings are different. If we
>apply this dilemma to a science classroom setting problems abound.
>If we were t o attempt to promote student understanding of the
>multiplicity of conceptions of science an enormous dilemma would
>quickly arise. We would be expecting students to internalize a
>particular world view or paradigm so that they can understand subject
>matter derived from that particular paradigm. We would then be
>asking these same individuals to internalize yet another paradigm so
>that they can understand the subject matter perspectives derived from
>the alternative paradigm. According to Kuhn, and much of the recent
>research on students' learning, these students could only understand
>the second paradigm from the perspective of an individual possessing
>the first paradigm. This would be analogous to expecting a Darwinian
>evolutionist to understand the persp ective of punctuated equilibrium
>in response to the meaning of the lack of transitional species. Or,
>at a more foundational level, to understand the latter's insistence
>that it makes little sense to ask if there are transitional species
>(Gould & Eldredge , 1977; Mayr, 1982).
>
> When the aforementioned situation is related specifically to the
>nature of science, we are asking adolescents to internalize an
>understanding of a particular set of values and conventions for what
>constitutes evidence and the development of scientific
> knowledge, and then asking these same individuals to "shift gears"
>and use a significantly different set of criteria for the same or
>different situation. Although it may seem a bit extreme, the
>psychological stress created by such a situation is not muc h
>different than asking students to validly and objectively decide
>between creationism and evolution. Such debates are doomed to fail
>educationally because religion and science are different ways of
>knowing with different rules and conventions for eviden ce and the
>sources of knowledge.
>
>MULTICULTURALISM AND SCIENCE
>
> The role of multicultural perspectives in science instruction is
>currently receiving much attention (Aikenhead, 1993; Atwater & Riley,
>1993; Hodson, 1993; Stanley & Brickhouse, 1994). Relevant to the
>discussion here is the perspective that attempts t o recognize that
>science is culturally and socially embedded. The social and cultural
>embededness of science has long been recognized (Bronowski, 1956)
>within the literature pertaining to the nature of science. Although
>there are those who claim that We stern Science is the only "true
>science" (Wolpert, 1993), most would agree with Stanley and
>Brickhouse's (1994) contention that a universalist view of science is
>indefensible and that science and its practice are unavoidably
>intertwined with the culture w ithin which it is practiced and
>developed.
>
> Suchting's (1995) conclusion that there is no universal
>definition for scientific thought is as consistent with the
>multicultural nature of science as it is with the view that there are
>numerous natures of science. Indeed it can be argued that the mu
>lticultural influence on science is one of the reasons why there are
>multiple conceptions of the nature of science.
>
> The various curriculum reforms, as well as current approaches to
>science instruction, adhere to a rather universalist perception of
>science. In particular, Western Science appears to be the particular
>model that is accepted as the only model. The di lemma regarding the
>multicultural nature of science is quite similar to that regarding
>the nature of science in general. If we are serious about organizing
>instruction around a science that is not culturally biased,
>significant revisions must be made to existing science curricula and
>instructional methods so multicultural perspectives in science are
>clearly evident. However, this approach raises the question of
>whether it is possible for a teacher with a clear understanding of
>(and dedication to) Wester n Science to simultaneously understand and
>present science derived from an unfamiliar culture in an
>understandable manner to students.
>
>SUMMARY
>
> Current analyses of scientific thinking arrive at the conclusion
>that there is no universal definition of such thinking (Suchting,
>1995). Scientific reasoning, and science as a way of knowing, are in
>a constant state of change by virtue of the fact t hat the subject
>matter of science is constantly changing. Indeed, it appears that
>conceptions of the nature of science have shorter life spans than
>scientific knowledge itself. The process, if you will, is more
>tentative than the products.
>
> The instructional implications are clear. We have been grappling
>for many years with the idea that the knowledge of science is
>tentative. Our instructional efforts have met with only moderate
>success. Now we are faced with the realization that scie nce
>processes and nature of science are as tentative, if not more so,
>than the knowledge they are used to produce. Do we attempt to reach
>an admittedly biased consensus for pedagogical expediency? Is such a
>consensus feasible or academically honest? Wi thout such a
>consensus, we are faced with the new problem of having students
>travel back and forth between multiple paradigms of science in an
>effort to understand both the subject matter and epistemology of
>science. Is there a feasible or attainable sol ution to this
>enormous pedagogical problem?
>
>
>REFERENCES
>
>Aikenhead, G.(1993). Foreword: Multicultural issues
> and perspectives on science education. Science
> Education, 77(6), 659-660.
>
>American Association for the Advancement of Science. (1993).
> Benchmarks for science literacy. New York: Oxford
> University Press.
>
>Atwater, M.M. and Riley, J.T. (1993). Multicultural
> science education: Perspectives, definitions, and research
> agenda. Science Education, 77(6), 661-668.
>
>Bronowski, J. (1956). Science and human values. New
> York: Harper & Row.
>
>Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against method. London: Verso
> Publishing.
>
>Giere, R.N. (1988). Explaining science. Chicago: The
> University of Chicago Press.
>
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>
>Hodson, D. (1993). In search of a rationale for
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>
>House, E.R. (1991). Realism in research. Educational
> Researcher, 20(6), 2-9, 25.
>
>Kuhn, T.S. (1962). The structure of scientific
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>
>Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of
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>
>Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and its problems.
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>
>Lederman, N.G. (1992). Students' and teachers' conceptions
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>
>Levins, R., & Lewontin, R. (1985). The dialectical
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>
>Mayr, E. (1982). The growth of biological thought.
> Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
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>
>Mayr, E. (1988). Toward a new philosophy of biology:
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>
>National Research Council. (1995). National science
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>
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>
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>
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>
>Stanley, W.B., & Brickhouse, N.W. (1994). Multiculturalism,
> universalism, and science education. Science Education,
> 78(4), 387-398.
>
>Suchting, W.A. (1995). The nature of scientific thought.
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>
>Welch, W.W. (1979). Twenty years of science curriculum
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>
*************************************************************
William W. Cobern, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Science Education
College of Education
Arizona State University West
PO Box 37100
Phoenix, AZ 85069-7100
Voice: 602 543 6334 or 6300
FAX: 602 543 6350
Internet: icwwc@asuvm.inre.asu.edu