Science in Christian Perspective

Reflexivity in North American Psychology: Historical Reflections on One Aspect of a Changing Paradigm
MARY STEWART VAN LEEUWEN
Department of Psychology
York University
Toronto, Canada

From: JASA 35 September 1983): 162-167.

The concept of reflexivity is both a very old and a very new one. In its broadest sense, it refers to something that we all take for granted implicitly if not explicitly: our human capacity to "reflect upon" the events and forces within and around us, and through the very process of this reflection, to have at least some active part in changing them.

Two very different but equally current examples may be offered: first of all, when members of liberation movements speak of the importance of doing "consciousness-raising" with their potential or actual recruits, they are acknowledging the fact that, once persons begin to question or "reflect upon" their previously taken-for-granted views and circumstances, they are on their way to transcending and reorganizing them in potentially powerful ways. This kind of sociopolitical evidence for reflexivity has led one sociologist, Anthony Giddens, to define reflexivity as "the rational basis for freedom."¹ Secondly, while the scope and power of such human reflection is obviously not unlimited, the emerging results of blofeedback studies suggest that it may even extend to aspects of our physiological functioning, previously assumed to be beyond conscious control. When persons are able to monitor their own bloodpressure, heart-rate, or brainwave patterns with the aid of electronic devices, the resulting signals allow them to identify internal bodily changes and often learn to control them.² This too is an aspect of reflexivity.

As these two preliminary examples imply, both the range and potential significance of human reflexivity phenomena are anything but trivial. Consequently, it might come as a surprise that the term cannot even be found as an entry in Psychological Abstracts, nor in the commonly-used encyclopedias and dictionaries of psychology. There are at least two possible reasons for this: the first possibility is that reflexivity has simply been denied or ignored as a significant psychological topic in North America. The second possibility is that the phenomenon has been recognized as significant, but called by other names, and perhaps investigated in a somewhat haphazard and uncoordinated fashion. In actual fact, both of these processes can be seen to have occurred in psychology. Indeed, more than one critic has argued that there has been a historical sequence since psychology's birth as a formalized discipline in 1879, beginning with a preliminary acknowledgement of the fundamental importance of reflexivity, followed by a period of its denial, and then more recently an emergent return to reflexivity-based theory and research concerns.³

It is a matter of historical record that when psychology first emerged as a distinctive science, its paradigm (in Kuhn's sense of the term)⁴ included the definition of psychology as the analysis of immediate conscious experience into its constituent elements,⁵ and specified its method of study as that of pure introspection--a trained "looking within," as one pioneer psychologist put it, "to distinguish (psychology) from the observation of physical science, which is inspection-a looking-at."⁶ Although the term reflexivity was never invoked in connection with this early paradigm in psychology, and although its defined range of "immediate experience" was of a carefully-restricted sort ⁷ it seems clear that the capacity for reflexivity, as I have defined it, was a takenfor-granted feature of psychology's subject-matter and a condition of psychology's method.

All of this changed very dramatically in the second decade of the 20th century, when pioneer behaviorist J. B. Watson published his 1913 paper, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," in which he stated that

Psychology as the behaviorist views it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science, its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness.

The behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute. The behavior of man, with all of its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of the behaviorist's total scheme of investigation .⁸

In this quote are summarized what one historian⁹ sees as the three major factors contributing to the revolution in psychology away from a reflexivity-based paradigm towards the mechanistic, natural-scientistic one which has dominated psychology almost up to the present.¹⁰ First of all, the introspective method was unreliable: even carefully-trained introspectors, or "self -observers" often came up with conflicting conclusions when asked, for instance, to reflect upon an experimentally-presented stimulus. Consequently, Watson argued, it would be better for psychology to stop relying on such a methodology and to concentrate only on outwardlyobservable behavior, which was more public and consequently more intersubjectively verifiable. Secondly, only human beings-indeed, only adult human beings-were capable of trained introspection. Consequently, psychologists who were interested in animal behavior (as more and more were in the wake of Darwinian arguments about the continuity of species) or in child development had no acceptable method for conducting their studies. By re-defining psychology's mandate as the study of outward behavior, Watson thus aimed at "a unitary scheme of animal response [which] recognizes no dividing line between man and brute -or, one might add, between adults and children. Finally, the introspective paradigm was purely structuralist in intent: it aimed at a pure description of the "elements" of conscious experience, and showed no concern for elucidating functional, or causal, relationships which might then have practical significance for areas such as education, child-rearing, or industrial management.¹¹ Consequently, when Watson announced that psychology's "theoretical goal [was] the prediction and control of behavior," and that its methodology was to be that of objective experimentation, he was not only advocating a radical shift from a structuralist to a functionalist paradigm, but also voicing a uniquely North American frustration with a European-evolved psychology which had often dismissed any concern for practical application in psychology as "ganz Amerikanisch"-typically American!¹²

In light of the above historical comments, the shift from an implicitly reflexive paradigm in psychology to one that more deliberately aped the extraspective, causal, and mechanistic assumptions of classical natural science is quite understandable. But in addition the entrenchment of this paradigm shift was substantially aided by the emergence of logical positivism and operationalism as dominant philosophy-of-science trends in the 1920's, both of which attempted to cleanse science of metaphysical (and by implication mentalistic) concepts by tying all theoretical constructs to sense-observable phenomena expressed in mathematical terms.¹³ The results of all of this for psychology, between 1913 and the present, have been a distinctly mixed blessing. On the one hand, no one can deny the pragmatic fruits of psychological research, functionally and extraspectively understood, for concerns as diverse as diagnostic and selection-test construction, educational techniques, child management, and the rehabilitation of disturbed or socially-deviant persons. But in the process of pursuing such pragmatically-determined ends, and adhering to the received view of natural science in doing so, most North American psychologists simply came to ignore (if not actually deny) the significance of human reflexivity both in themselves and in their human subjects.

In the extreme case, psychological researchers regarded themselves as detached, unbiased observers of events that they presumed were determined by laws quite independent of their own human eff orts to uncover them. In addition, they regarded their human research subjects as passively determined by such laws quite independent of any active reflection they might engage in during the research process. Such a view has, of course, been considered outdated in the philosophy of the natural sciences ever since Bohr's (1934) quantum postulate asserted that "any observation of atomic [and by implication, supra-atomic] phenomena will involve an interaction with the agent of observation not to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation."¹⁴ But at least in the physical sciences, the actual research matter was not seen as having an independent "mind of its own, " whereas in psychology (and the other human sciences) reflexivity poses a double problem within any research community determined to mimic the classical natural-science tradition: not only must researchers contend with the effects of their own human reflexivity on the research process; they must also contend with the reflexive processes in which their equally-human research subjects engage, and as a result of which the intended purity of the research endeavor is compromised.

If reflexivity-mediated values are implicit in the concepts, methods, and applications of all scientists, then it is perhaps better to make them explicit than to ignore them and have them come creeping back unannounced and unaccounted for.

study in which they are about to participate.¹⁵ Less attention was paid to the possibility that the investigator's reflections might also need to be controlled at the same time, in order to keep them from contaminating either the expression or the interpretation of the subjects' responses. The most sophisticated (and perhaps the only) research design in which both types of reflexivity have been routinely controlled is the so-called "double blind" procedure of chemotherapy studies. In experimental investigations of the efficacy of (say) a new anti-depressant for mental patients, it has become commonplace for neither the patients, nor the personnel who must judge their degree of improvement, to know which subjects are receiving the active drug, and which are receiving an inert "placebo" until after the experimental period is overthus controlling for the contaminating effect of either the patients' or the personnels' expectation of improvement on the influence of the drug alone.¹⁶

But once we leave behind the closed environment, and the less-than-normally functioning minds of the residents of mental institutions, the power of subject-reflexivity (which has come to be known in the methodological literature as the "reactivity- phenomenon)¹⁷ becomes much harder to control. First of all, it is usually impossible to administer experimental manipulations to all the subjects at once (unlike the drug given at meal-time to the entire ward of a hospital); consequently, one must contend with the rumor-mill by which speculative scuttlebut about the study is passed on from one subject to another. Secondly, it becomes much harder to conceal from subjects the knowledge that they actually are participating in a research project; for even if the true purpose of the study is disguised, the subjects' very awareness that they are in an experiment may set them reflecting upon its probable purpose in a way that renders them less than passive in their reactions. Both of these problems are compounded by the fact that the majority of research subjects in many areas of psychology are drawn from college-student populations. For not only is the average college campus a place where news of any local event is transmitted by a grapevine as efficient as that of a small town; it is also the case that college students, most of whom are of above-average intelligence (and many of whom are psychology students to boot) are capable of generating extremely ingenious reflections about the nature of the research in which they participate.

Irwin Silverman's recent work on The Human Subject in the Psychological Laboratory¹⁸ gives a detailed account of the varying reflections (and consequent actions) of which such normal, intelligent human subjects are capable. Most, it turns out, are what are termed "good" subjects, motivated to deliver the "right" responses by a well-socialized awe of the scientific enterprise. Yet even this can backfire: Silverman reports the distress expressed to him by a colleague at overhearing a group of male students, waiting for his experiment, .1 conclude with much certainty and satisfaction that his attractive lady assistant strutting up and down the corridor on her chores was the independent variable. He decided it was probably useless to discard this group's data [as being atypically contaminated] because after all, he did not know what was in the corridor when he was not listening!"¹⁹ in addition, a sizable minority of subjects, mindful of a supposed connection between psychology and psychoanalysis, tailor their responses in accordance with a fear that they are being analyzed for defense mechanisms which they might find too ego-threatening to have exposed. Said one subject about his handling of the Rorschach ink-blot test: "On one card I saw vaginas all over-but I wasn't going to tell him [i.e., the investigator) that-so I said they were eaves."²⁰ in the methodological literature, such responses are usually subsumed under the term "evaluation apprehension."

Finally, a third sizable minority of respondents have been found to be what are called "perverse subjects"-those who, possibly out of anger at previous experimental deceptions, or at the grossly unegalitarian nature of the investigator-subject relationship, deliberately set out to scuttle the study as they perceive its probable intent to be. One experienced subject summarized his behavior in an experiment as follows: "After a while I just wanted to find out what the experimenter wanted to prove I couldn't do, so I could prove that I could."²¹

Reactions in the Psychological Community

In drawing together the implications of all this work on the phenomenon of reflexivity in psychology, I suggest that three different reactions have emerged in the psychological community. The first (and most common) has been a purely methodological concern: reflexivity (especially in subjects, but also in investigators) is seen as something which jeopardizes the validity of research conclusions, and consequently is something to be overcome by more and more sophisticated methodological controls, including, for instance, the conduct of "candid-camera "-like field studies in which respondents do not even know they are being manipulated or monitored. This response does not question the hegemony of the naturalsciences paradigm in psychology-it merely adapts it in light of the added "problems" of reflexivity inherent in the investigation of human beings by other human beings.²²

Secondly, there has been a minority, but vocal, response of ethical concern: subjects are routinely deceived or underinformed in the interests of reducing their reflexive activity during the research process, and this is seen as a form of manipulation that is not only self-defeating in the long run (as more and more people find out that "psychologists usually lie")-but also morally questionable, both as deception per se, and especially in the substantial proportion of studies where that deception involves exposure of subjects to a very calculated (but false) manipulation of self-esteem, exposure to stress, or false expectation of benefits.²³ This response also does not seem to question the ruling paradigm in psychology: it merely notes that moral considerations may or should reduce its range of acceptable methods and/or research questions, and that this is a regrettable but necessary compromise.

The third, and most recently-emergent response is an ontological one which says, in effect, that human reflexivity, both in investigators and their subjects, is such a fundamental and pervasive psychological process that it makes more sense to develop a paradigm that takes it into positive account and works with it rather than against it. As one pair of critics put it, "[we must conceive of ] man as an actor ... it is not the person himself who [has been] the subject of analysis, but the character he plays. if man is indeed a self-directing agent ... it makes eminent sense for the behavioral scientist to treat him as such."²⁴ Although such a statement may seem no more than an obvious truism to persons outside psychology, the extent to which it runs counter to the accepted paradigm can be seen in the comment of one reviewer that this is a "radically different premise ... discrepant from an implicitly accepted notion of man as an emitter of responses, an organism to be manipulated and then monitored ... and whose social nature and social content might be interesting, but coincidental.²⁵ in addition, such a view necessarily levels the traditional ontological gap that has been implicitly assumed between investigators and their subjects. As one critic in this camp expresses it,

At the heart of most psychological theories is a fundamental distinction between 'scientist'and 'organism.'Tbey provide different languages for the two, and imply that the 'scientist' is psychologically a very different kettle of fish from the 'subject.' Thus, in learning theory terms, the subject is 'being conditioned' while the experimental psychologist is testing hypotheses., . . . [But] the difference between psychologist and subject is at best only a matter of level of abstraction ... An acceptance of the need for reflexivity is intrinsically a denial of the doctrine that scientists think and are purposive while their subjects are mechanical and determined.²⁶

Indeed, this kind of "ontological reform" in psychology often seems bent on a reactionary reversal of this past conceptual gap between investigators and subjects. There is a gathering rush of concern to attribute to (and explore in) subjects that degree of reflexivity (and, by implication, autonomy, rationality, and dignity) previously reserved for investigators alone. Conversely, (although somewhat more slowly), there is a growing concern to make investigators realize that they and their entire research endeavors are more passively at the mercy of historical, sociological, and ideological forces (of a sort formerly attributed only to their subjects) than they ever dreamed possible. In other words, psychologists are slowly being pressured to abandon the received view of science (and scientists) as trans-temporal, ahistoric quasi-Platonic "ideal forms," and to submit to a rigorously corrective dose of sociology of knowledge.²⁷

Indeed, one sociologist, Alvin Gouldner, gives us a definition of reflexivity that nicely embraces both aspects of this dual process: he defines reflexivity as "self-awareness concerning the rules to which one submits and by which one is bound."²⁸ Using Gouldner's definition, we might say that psychology's human subjects are becoming (and being recognized as) increasingly self-aware regarding the hidden rules of the psychological research microcosm to which they tended formerly to submit without question: less and less are they docile "good subjects," and more and more are they feeding back their accumulating, reflexive awareness of the research process into alternative decisions about how they will behave therein-so much so that they are forcing psychologists (by default, if not out of conviction) into a changed paradigm. Analogously, but at the level of the macrocosmic scientific community, psychological investigators are slowly becoming more aware that they, too, are "subjects"-subject to paradigmatic, psychological, and even metaphysical assumptions about their subject-matter and their procedures from which they previously assumed themselves largely exempt.

It is too soon to predict what the final results of all this ferment will be. One clearly-emerging trend is towards research which is more collaborative with subjects and which is consequently more iterative, descriptive, and consumer accountable in method, and more emancipatory in motivation.²⁹ But let me conclude by briefly treating two questions that Christian observers might do well to consider during this period of anomalous, extraordinary science in psychology. The first has to do with implications for theories of human nature, the second for views of the nature of science.

With regard to the former, it is nothing new for Christian scholars to wrestle with what Stephen Evans calls the "mechanistic/personalistic dilemma":³⁰ that is, the conflict between the received social scientific view of persons as totally material, determined entities and the scriptual account of them as God-created, God-related, and at least partially free, creative, and accountable. But, to date, it is relatively rare for Christians to resolve this dilemma other than through a species of "perspectivalism" (also Evans' term) according to which the social sciences, including psychology, are left to regard and study human activity only in its determined, mechanistic aspects, while the pursuit of reflexivity-conditioned human activity, while admitted to be important, is relegated to the humanities.³¹ This position is due not only to convictions about the "proper" (i.e., natural scientific) paradigm for the social sciences; it also seems to be based on the conclusion that if one has to choose between a model of persons as unscripturally passive and one which sees them as unscripturally autonomous, it is safer to choose the former. In Dooyeweerd's language, such thinkers seem to prefer the risk of flirting with the "science ideal" (the notion that the entire universe is impersonal and mechanistic) than with the "freedom ideal" (the notion that at least some people can transcend their own determinism and "play God").³² At least (it is suggested) the former tends toward a wellregulated society in which impulsivity, hedonism and revolution are kept in check, and this may be somehow seen as more Christian than a view which concerns itself with the (equally biblical) tbemes of justice, individual calling, and the equality of all persons before the cross of Christ."³³ In point of fact, what we must all strive for is a unified (not compartmentalized, or "perspectivalized") view of persons which does equal justice to both their creaturely and their creative aspects, and to both their imago Del and their fallenness. Clearly this will be a long time in coming.

Finally, with regard to differing views of science, there seems to be a tendency on the part of Christian social scientists to judge the received view of science (transtemporal, objective, value-free) as being somehow more compatible with a high view of the sovereignty, omniscience, and unchanging character of God than one that relativizes the scientific enterprise by an appeal to the sociology of knowledge and to the post-empiricist debate which has followed in the wake of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions.³⁴ Indeed, such a position has recently been expressed by Donald MacKay, who seems to see any questioning of the ideal of objective, value-free knowledge (a questioning that I have tried to show is the inevitable result of a recovered respect for human reflexivity) as "symptomatic of the practical atheism of our day."³⁵ Yet, it can also be argued that a greater sensitivity to the "through a glass darkly" quality of all human (including all scientific) endeavors is not necessarily an attack on God's perfect knowledge, nor an attempt to relativize all efforts to arrive at reliable knowledge in the social sciences. At the very least, it seems to me that when well-trained, much-respected scientists begin (by very virtue of their intimate experience with science) to show a greater humility and historical relativity concerning their own efforts, ³⁶ and a greater respect for the demonstrated reflexivity, autonomy and rights of their human subjects, we are being not more, but less objective when we ignore their conclusions in pursuit of an inflated but outdated view of the purity of scientists and the passivity of the human beings they study. In addition, if reflexivity-mediated values are implicit in the concepts, methods, and applications of all scientists, then it is perhaps better to make them explicit than to ignore them³⁷ and have them come creeping back unannounced and unaccounted for. In this respect, Christians are at a potential advantage over secular scientists in having a world-view with implications for all of life upon which they are called constantly to reflect. Surely it is time that we brought these "control beliefs"³⁸ to bear on the current preoccupation with reflexivity in psychology.

¹Anthony Giddens. Studies in Social and Political Theory. (New York; Basic Books, 1977), P. 28.

²See for example G.C. Luce and E. Peper. "Mind Over Body, Mind Over Mind." New York Times Magazine, Sept. 12,1972.

³Allan R. Buss. "The Structure of Psychological Revolutions." Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciencies, 1978, 14, 57-64. See also David S. Palermo. "Is A Scientific Revolution Taking Place in Psychology?" Science studies, 1971, 1, 135-155.

⁴Thomas Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1971).

⁵Wilhelm Wundt. Outline of Psychology (7th Ed.) Trans. C.H. Judd (3rd Ed, Leipzig, 1907), p. 2.

⁶E.B. Tichener, A Textbook of Psychology (New York, 1910), p. 20 (Quoted in Palermo, Op. cit., note 3). (My emphases.)

⁷More specifically, psychology was seen as the study of the sensations, feelings, volitions, and ideas of the human adult.

¹⁰For a more detailed treatment, from a Christian perspective, of the emergence and consequences of this shift, see Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen, The Sorcerer's Apprentice: A Christian Looks at the Changing Face of Psychology (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 1982).

¹¹Ibid. (For a more detailed treatment of the history of American functionalism and pragmatism in psychology). For a more general consideration of the "pragmatic criterion" in science and a debate about it relevance for social science, see Mary Hesse, Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science (Indiana State, University Press, 1980).

¹²This is how Wundt is reported to have dismissed the American J.M. Cattell's proposal for thesis research on individual differences in reaction-time, whose potential usefulness in education and industry had captured his attention. See H. Misiak and V.S. Sexton, History of Psychology: An Overview (New York: Greene and Stratton, 1966).

¹³See Frederick Suppe (Ed.). The Structure of Scientific Theories (2nd Ed.) (University of Illinois Press, 1977), esp. parts I & II of the first section on "The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories."

¹⁴Neils Bohr. Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature (Cambridge University Press, 1934).

¹⁵Although this paper deals mainly with the methodological problems and anthropological assumptions implicit in the use of deception, there exists a growing literature on the ethical and legal implications of it as well. See Van Leeuwen, Op. cit., (Note 10) for a summary of same and for the relevant bibliography.

¹⁶B.S. Glick and R. Margolis. "A Study of the Influence of Experimental Design on Clinical Outcome in Drug Research. " American Journal of Psychiatry, 1962,118,1087-1096.

¹⁷E.J. Webb, D.T. Campbell, R.D. Schwartz and L. Sechrest. Unobstrusive Measures: Nonreactive Measures in the Social Sciences. (Chicago: RandMcNally, 1966).

¹⁸Irwin Silverman. The Human Subject in the Psychological Laboratory. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1977), esp. Ch. 2.

²²See for example, Robert Rosenthal. Experimenter Effects in Behavioral Research (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966); R. Rosenthal and R.L. Rosnow (Eds.) Artifact in Behavioral Research (New York: Academic Press, 1966); Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand-McNally and Company, 1963), Webb et al., Op. cit., Note 17; L. Bickman and T. Henchey, Beyond the Laboratory: Field Research in Social Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972).

²³See for example Herbert Kelman. A Time to Speak. (New York: Jossey-Bass, 1967); Arthur G. Miller, The Social Psychology of Psychological Research (New York: The Free Press, 1972); John lung, The Experiment4ws Dilemma, (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). Also Van Leeuwen, Op. cit. (Note 10), Chapter 2.

²⁴Rom Harr6 and Paul Secord. The Explanation of Social Behavior. (oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1972), p. 313.

²⁵Lloyd H. Strickland, "Priorities and Paradigms." in L.H. Strickland, F.E. Aboud, and K.J. Gergen (Eds) Social Psychology in Transition (New York: Plenum Press, 1976), p. 4.

²⁶Donald Bannister. "Personal Construct Theory and Research Method." In P. Reason and J. Rowan (Eds.) Human Inquiry: A SourcebDok of New Paradigm Research. (New York: John Wiley, 1981), pp. 194-195.

²⁷See for example Allan R. Buss, "The Emerging Field of the Sociology of Psychological Knowledge," American Psychologist, October 1975, pp. 9884002.

²⁸Alvin Gouldner. The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 55.

³⁰Stephen C. Evans. Preserving the Person: A Look at the Human Sciences. (Downers Grow, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 1978). See also Donald M. MacKay, The Clockwork Image (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1974) and Human Science and Human Dignity (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1976); Malcolm Jeeves, Psychology and Christianity. The View Both Ways (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 1976); David G. Myers, The Human Puzzle: Psychological Research and Christian Belief (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); Paul C. Vitz, Psychology as Religion. The Cult of Self-Worship (Grand Rapids, Wm. Eerdmans, 1977).

³²A.N. Kalsbeek. Contours of a Christian Philosophy. (Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1975); Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought. (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1960).

³³In particular, see Vitz, Op. cit. (Note 30). Christian social scientists who, oppositely, try to correct what they perceive to be the abuses of the positivistic paradigm with regard to human freedom and dignity include Van Leeuwen, Op., cit. (Note 10), and David Lyon, Doing Sociology: A Christian Perspective (London: Intervarsity, In Press).

³⁵Donald M. MacKay. "Value-Free Knowledge: Myth or Norm?" Faith and Thought, 1980,107,202-209.

³⁶For a landmark and much-cited paper demonstrating such a revised view of psychology, see Kenneth J. Gergen, "Social Psychology as History," journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 26, 309420. (reprinted in Strickland et at., Op. cit. (Note 25).

³⁸Nicholas Wolterstoff. Reason Within the Bounds of Religion. (Grand Rapids, Wm. Eerdmans, 1976).