Science in Christian Perspective
Paradigm Shifting and the Apologetics Debate
Robert M. Price
Bergen Community College and
Passaic County Community College New Jersey
From: JASA 32
(June1980): 120-123.
Of late, a new piece of jargon has intruded itself into discussions
of theological
and religious language. The newcomer is the "paradigm." One may find
this concept, borrowed from the philosophy of science, in theological works as
far removed from each other as Thomas Torrance's Theological Science
and Charles
Kraft's Christianity in Culture. It seems safe to suggest that the
recent currency
of this term and its attendant concept is in large part due to the efforts of
Thomas H. Kuhn. Though Kuhn himself is a philosopher of science, the relevance
of his work for other fields such as theology has become apparent. We
would like
to suggest the utility of his theory for the field of evangelical apologetics.
More specifically, his schema of "paradigmshifting" will be shown to
provide the key for grasping the differences in the evidentialist vs.
presuppositionalist
debate in apologetics.
In his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn takes issue with
the common
conception that scientific advancement has proceeded mainly by way of "new
discoveries." in fact, really new data are relatively seldom discovered.
Scientific progress has more to do with scientists coming to formulate new ways
of construing the same old information, new keys to solve the puzzles presented
by the data. One such paradigm will be accepted by scientists as long
as it teems
to make plausible sense of most of the evidence. Only when the paradigm starts
to appear inadequate to the task of explaining this or that
phenomenon do scientists
begin looking for an alternate gestalt. The new paradigm will seek to
incorporate
much of the explicative power of the old, yet starting from at least a slightly
different point, so as to deal plausibly with more of the hitherto troublesome
data. When the cogency and comprehensivencss of a newly proffered
paradigm becomes
evident, a "paradigm-shift" occurs. The new model for construing the
data becomes the basis for the next stage of theorizing and research. Of course
the likelihood is that it, too, will be superseded in time.
Copernicus and Super-paradigms
To give a famous example seen through the lenses provided by Kuhn, we will look
at the contest between the geocentric paradigm of Ptolemy and the heliocentric
paradigm of Copernicus. Ptolemy's model of the planetary system functioned well
enough to predict the motion of the (apparently earth-orbiting) planets, but it
ran into trouble when it came to the mysterious retrograde motion of
the planets.
In order for the geocentric model to predict accurately these erratic movements
(hitherto considered to be the "free will" of the
planets!), Ptolemaic
astronomers had to postulate myriad series of "epicycles," or wheels
within hypothetical wheels on which the planets turned. Copernicus found that
the whole system might be simplified by postulating that the son, not
the earth,
was the center of planetary orbit. This way all the epicycles
disappeared. Eventually
Copernicus' view became dominant. It wasn't that Copernicus had
somehow "discovered"
the earth to be orbiting the sun instead of the other way around. Such a thing
would have been (and probably still is) incapable of observation.
Rather, he merely
formulated a new gestalt for the data which made its explanation less
problematic, more natural, than before. And this is basically the way
all scientific
progress comes about, by a "conversion" from one paradigm
to another.
But there is an important tension, often unnoticed, in Kuhn's schema.
Are paradigms
selfsealing? That is, do they carry their own criteria of
plausibility of explanation?
Mustn't they, if they are truly comprehensive systems for
understanding data (so
that only in light of them is the data "data for" anything)? But if
they do, then how is any shift from one paradigm to another ever possible? In
terms of our example, why should Ptolemaists have felt ashamed of all
those epicycles?
Given the fundamental postulate, geocenteieity, there could be
nothing embarrassing
or implausible about the resulting complexities. Why should not
things be complex?
If she paradigm itself carries its own criteria of plausibility, then
any explanation
assigned to "problematic" data must ipso facto be plausible.
But of course, the shift did occur. This implies that paradigms do not contain
within themselves their own criteria of plausibility. And if they do not, they
must be seen as sub-paradigms, or subsets of a larger,
all-comprehensive paradigm.
This super-paradigm will be the field of presuppositions in which
scientific thought
occurs. It will include criteria by which given subparadigms (geoeentricity or
heliocentricity, Einsteinian or Newtonian physics, Big Bang or
steady-state cosmologies)
can be preferred to one another. Included among these criteria would probably
be something like "economy and inductiveness of explieability of
the data."
Such criteria will be the arbiters of which paradigm makes
"better sense"
of the evidence. They will tell which sense is the "better"
sense.
Evidentialists vs. Presuppositionalists
This issue, merely implicit in Kuhn's discussion, is raised explicitly (albeit
in different terminology) in the long-standing debate between
"evidentialist"
apologists (Clark Pinnoek, John Warwick Montgomery, Josh McDowell, etc.) on the
one hand, and their "presuppositionalist" rivals (Cornelius Van Til,
Gordon Clark, etc.) on the other. In this context, the issue is that
of "common
ground," i.e., does any exist between believers and
nonbelievers? Evidentialists
build their whole enterprise on a positive answer to this question.
Indeed, they
say, there can properly he no apologetics at all unless some commonly
acknowledged
criteria exist, whereby the evangelical position may be rendered
probable or compelling
to the fair-minded non-believer. Before examining the
presupposisionalist objection
to this belief, let us analyze the evidentialist position further in the light
of Kuhn's categories. In effect, the evidentialists assume that both they and
their imagined non-Christian partners in dialogue assent to a
"super-paradigm"
of shared criteria for plausibility and explicability. The same kinds
of grounds
will determine which is the "better" sense made of the evidence. By
their amassing of evidence, what McDowell, Montgomery, Pinnock, et al., seek to
do is to show that the secular naturalists' paradigm cannot
adequately (plausibly)
explain "troublesome data" like, e.g., the empty tomb. Of
course, this
is the point of the stock rehearsals of how "no explanation fits the facts
of Easter Morning as well as the Resurrection does." The
naturalists' explanations
"demand more faith than the Resurrection itself' (Montgomery).' That is,
the "swoon theory," the "wrong tomb theory," etc., are like
epicycles. They are implausible. What makes them implausible? A common set of
criteria including the notion that eyewitness reporting is valid,
that crucified
but surviving men are not likely to be able to roll away stones and
stagger into
Jerusalem, etc. So no matter how much she skeptic cherishes his
naturalistic paradigm,
he really should admit its inadequacy to explain the evidence of
Easter Morning.
He should convert his paradigm (and with it, in this ease, his
eternal destiny).
Presuppositionalists, of whom we may take Van Til as the paramount
example, repudiate
this whole approach. There can be no common ground, he insists, because of the
"noetie effects of the fall." It is a fundamental mistake to imagine
that (Christ-rejecting) unregenerate persons can perceive enough of the facts
correctly
to be led from them (the common ground) to faith in Christ.3 No,
"all things
hold together in Him" (Colossians 1:17). Since every single fact is to be
construed properly in the light of faith in Christ, then any
perception by a Christ-rejecting
(or Christ-blind) person is a misapprehension, even a delusion. Leaving aside
the fact that this is pretty much the same rationale that has led historically
to the branding and treatment of religious dissidents as insane, we
will proceed
to develop our interpretation of this view in Kuhn's terms. Van Til
is essentially
arguing that paradigms are self-sealing. They must carry their own criteria for
plausibility within themselves, so that whatever explanation assigned
to a datum
is ipso facto plausible and natural. The apologetical/ epistemological meaning
of this is that religious certainty may be achieved only if it is defined into
the system from the start. One can never reason his way to certain
faith in Christ;
he may have certainty only if he begins by defining Christ (the Logos) as the
ground of reason. They by definition faith in Christ is not only
"a reasonable
option," it becomes the only rational option. The evidentialist approach
is unsatisfactory at least partially because it makes the
Christ-Logos posterior
rather than anterior to she reasoning process. In Kuhn's terms,
evidential apologetics
makes the evangelical Christian subparadigm subordinate to the larger paradigm
of neutral, common criteria. And if it does this, then the same bridge from one
subparadigm to the evangelical one, could as easily one day be the
bridge to still
a third sub-paradigm. Theoretically, this possibility must be left
open. And what
kind of faith-certitude would this be?
Evidentialists like Pinnock reply that such absolute theoretical certainty is
neither available nor necessary to live any other area of life, so why here? We
can have practical certainty. As Gordon Allport observes,
"The believer is often closer to the agnostic than we think.
Both, with equal
candor, may concede that the nature of Being cannot be known [with
absolute certainty];
but the believer, banking on a probability ... finds that the energy engendered
and the values conserved prove the superiority of affirmation over
indecisiveness."4
However, as full of common sense as the evidentialist position seems to be, the
presupposisionalist critique is still a good one. Acquaintance with
the literature
of evidensialiss apologetics makes it clear that their religious faith is more
certain than is allowed by their common-ground approach with its
inherent provisionalisy.
For instance, John Warwick Montgomery writes of the doctrine of the
Trinity, "I
believe it with all my heart. I believe it because
it offers the best available 'construct' or 'model' for interpreting
the biblical
descriptions of God as Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier."5 Can
one appropriately
cling to a (mere) "model" or paradigm with "all one's
hears"?
Or to put is another way, can anyone reading such a statement really envision
any other interpretation of the evidence changing Montgomery's mind? Along the
same lines, it is clear from a reading of much evidentialiss
literature that facts
have been amassed so buttress beliefs already held on other grounds,
and by willpower.6
A subtle shifting of ground occurs. The apologist's faith causes him
to deem "best"
the reading of the data most in accord with his beliefs, even if it
muss be harmonized.
But he proceeds to offer this reading to the non-believer as if it
were the best
reading of the facts in and of themselves. He claims to appeal to "common
ground" (e.g., "economy and inductiveness of explanation") but
actually appeals to partisan criteria (e.g., "which reading of
biblical criticism
conforms with evangelical beliefs?"). This results in what James Barr has
called "maximal conservatism," the serving of a hidden
dogmatic agenda.'
The presuppositionalists on the other hand, are quite open about their dogmatic
agenda. They drop the pretense of a "common ground" and
admit that the
paradigm is self-sealing.
We have just suggested that, like their presuppositionalist rivals,
the evidentialists
actually seem to place their faith anterior so argumentation, though
their principles
call for the placing of it posterior to argumentation. (Both then are really in
effect "presuppositionalists" though one side doesn't
realize it.) And this
inconsistency is no accident. Indeed if one thinks to use a truly evidentialist
approach, he it dooming his apologetics from the start. There is
something inherent
in the common-criteria approach that makes its use in apologetics fundamentally
wrong-headed.
The Principles of Analogy
Basically the trouble is that the only common ground is contemporary
human experience
of the world. (In terms of our discussion of paradigms, this is the
same as "economic
and inductive explanation" of the data at hand, without recourse
to extraneous
hypotheses.) Historical critics have a term for this: "the
principle of analogy,"
as formulated by Ernst Troeltseh.8 This principle, the basis of the
historical-critical
method's "denial of the miraculous," is a red flag to evangelicals.
Yet they use exactly the same principle, only with a different name and applied
to different cases. This is the famous "empirical fit" argument used
by Francis Schaeffer and Os Goiness to write off Eastern religions as failing
to ring true to the depths of human experience.9 In both eases, the
idea is that
though theoretically anything (ancient miracle stories or modern philosophical
worldviews) is quite possibly true, there is no available criterion
for plausibility
except present, shared human experience. This is why users of electric lights
and radio may have trouble accepting the miracles of the New Testament. This is
why those who know suffering or love may find it difficult to accept
the Eastern
denial of she reality of these things. If the
"common-ground" or "empirical
fit" argument works at all, it works too well. Consistently pursued, such
an inductive approach could of course lead only to some kind of
natural theology,
not to a "revealed religion" like evangelical Christianity.
Now if "common ground" is a chimera for apologetics, on
what basis may
the outsider opt for revealed religion? The evangelistic appeal of a consistent
presoppositionalist most seem (from the human side) as a "leap
of faith."
And what the prospective convert sees, that the apologist-evangelist may not, is
that this is only one of several invitations to leap in several directions. And
the leap is known to be she right one after the choice has been made ("I
once was blind, hot now I see"). How is he to decide which faith to leap
into? Walter Kaufmann said it well a few years ago:
"They say their doctrine is infallible and true, but ignore the fact that
there is no dearth whatsoever of pretenders to infallibility and
truth... scores
of other doctrines, scriptures, and apostles, sects and parties,
cranks and sages
make the same claim .... Those who have no such exalted notion of
themselves have
no way of deciding between dozens of pretenders if reason is proscribed"
i.e., if common ground criteria are disallowed because of the
"noetie effects
of the fall"].10
Quite a dilemma! The common ground approach can never lead to conviction, but
the presuppositionalist "leap of faith" could lead to Jim
Jones as easily
as to Jesus Christ! How could one decide? "Revolutionary suicide" in
a Guyana rainforest is quite reasonable once one accepts the proper
presuppositions.
If one flinches because "obviously that's pathological,"
isn't he holding
out on his piece of common ground, just like the unbelieving skeptic who judges
the cross to be foolishness? If we east away everyday experience as
our standard
of judgment, there can be no standard of judgment until after we make the leap
of faith. But we could make that leap in any direction. And after we made it,
it would seem right. The paradigm would carry with it its own criteria.
The upshot of all this is that the evidentialist apologetic with its
common ground
approach finally backfires. A really inductive approach to
this-worldly evidence
can lead one only to this-worldly (i.e., non-revealed) religion. The
presoppositionalist
apologetic is consistent hot not at all compelling, since she
immunity from doubt
that it wins for those inside the circle of faith simultaneously
cancels its attraction
to those outside. It can look neither more nor less plausible since there is no
standard with which it
may be compared. And the same approach is amenable so every sect. But
the evangelical
Christian (or believer in any sect) does not need to trouble himself
about this.
If he is safely within the circle of the troth himself, he can
dismiss the other
sects. And as for the outsider, doesn't the believer trust in she
Spirit's conviction
- it not actual predestination, then at least prevenient grace?11
Then why worry
about common ground, or for that matter about apologetics at all? Believers may
plant the seed, hot isn't it op to God to give the harvest (I
Corinthians 3:67)?
Shouldn't faith rest on Clod's Spirit, not the persuasive words of man's wisdom
(I Corinthians 2:4)? Shouldn't it be revealed by the Father in heaven, not by
flesh and blood (Matthew 16:17)?
And finally, seen from the outsider's perspective, it would have to
be said that
the way so certain faith is an overwhelming "final
experience," an enlightenment.
Though she question of rational certitude is not theoretically
solved. it is psychologically
settled, since the new believer will no longer care so ask is. Now he
knows.
Summary
By raising the question of the structure of paradigm-shifts and how
they are possible.
Thomas H. Kohn has provided a set of categories with which better to understand
the long-standing apologetics debate. When seen in terms of his theory, the two
apologetical strategies presently dominant in evangelical circles,
the evidentialist
and the presuppositionalist, seem to be beset with surprising difficulties. In
fact, these difficulties run so deep as to indicate that the only
consistent apologetic
is fideistie presupposisionalism, which is in a sense no apologetic
at all, since
on principle it removes any external standards by which its faith
might be "vindicated"
or "defended."
References
1Thomas H. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. ISO.
2John Warwick Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology
(Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship Inc., 1975), p. 39.
This line of reasoning is to be found in a large number of books, and with very
little variation. See, for example, John Stott's Basic Christianity; J. N. D.
Anderson's The Evidence for the Resurrection; Michael Green's Man
Alive!; Josh
McDowell's Evidence That Demands A Verdict, Vol. 1; Clark Pinnoek's Set Forth
Your Case.
3Among his many works, see for example The Protestant Doctrine
of Scripture ([n.p.] den Dolk Christian Foundation, 1967), p. II.
". . . one
most be a believing Christian to study nature in the proper frame of mind and
with proper procedure."
4Gordon Allport, The Individual and his Religion (New York: Macmillan
Publishing
Company, Inc., 1974), p. 83.
5Montgomery in Robert Campbell (ed.), Spectrum of Protestant
Beliefs (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1968), p. 20.
6This assertion, I realize, invites a foil-scale demonstration for which
there is no space here. Basically, let me say that much apologetic
argumentation
for, e.g., the total reliability of the gospels as historical records, and for
she historicity of the resurrection, are totally out of date and do not come so
grips realistically with modern biblical criticism. This is true even of such
recent works as Josh McDowell's Evidence That Demands A Verdict, Vol. 11; and
Boell and Hyder's Jesus-God, Ghost or Guru? The interested reader may
find a full-scale
treatment of these questions in my forthcoming book Beyond Born Again.
7
See his incisive work Fundamentalism (Philadelphia: The Westminster
Press, 1978).
8For two clear and sympathetic treatments of the principle of
analogy, see Van A. Harvey, The Historian & The Believer
(New York: The Macmillan Company. 1972); and F. H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical History (Chicago: Quadrange
Books. 1968).
9See, for example, Francis Schaeffer's The God Who is There (Downer's
Grove, Illinois:
InterVarsity Press, 1968); Escape from Reason (Downer's Grove,
Illinois: InterVarsity
Press, 1968); and Os Guiness, The Dust of Death (Downer's Grove,
Illinois: InterVarsity
Press, 1973). Shaeffer's and Guiness' use of this argument, incidentally, shows
them to be less consistently presuppositionalist than, e.g., Van Til.
10Walter Kaufmann, The Faith of a Heretic (Garden City, New York: Doubleday
& Company, Inc., 1963), p. 86.
11Van Til certainly does: "And it is only when the Holy Spirit gives
man a new heart that he will accept the evidence of Scripture about itself and
about nature for what it really is. The Holy Spirit's regenerating
power enables
man to place all things in true perspective." (Ibid., pp. 10Il).