Science in Christian Perspective
The Behaviorist Bandwagon and the Body of Christ. II. A Critique of
Ontological
Behaviorism from a Christian Perspective
MARY STEWART VAN LEEUWEN
Department of Psychology
York University
Toronto, Canada
From: JASA 31 (June 1979): 88-91.
In the first part of this paper, we were primarily concerned with
briefly describing
what can be understood by the term "behaviorism." We pointed out that
one can distinguish among (a) behaviorism as a total world-view
("ontological
behaviorism"), (b) behaviorism as a convenient working assumption in the
conduct of laboratory research into the behavior of animals and
people ("methodological
behaviorism"), and (c) behaviorism as a set of techniques for dealing with
certain behavior problems encountered in the world at large
("applied behaviorism").
It was further pointed out that someone can embrace behaviorism in the senses
implied by (b) and (c) without necessarily subscribing to the view of reality
implied by (a). We concluded, however, by pointing out that since contemporary
western mail is largely bereft of belief systems to help him make
some consistent
sense of his world, he can be very susceptible to the message of
ontological behaviorism
when it is proclaimed by an apparently' erudite and authoritative academic such
as Harvard's B, F. Skinner. For this reason, the second part of the paper sets
forth briefly some of the essential criticisms of ontological behaviorism, and
tries to provide some guidelines from a Christian perspective for grappling
with their manifestations in contemporary society.
Ontological Behaviorism: Some Problems
The essential features of Ontological Behaviorism include determinism
(that mail
is passively shaped by his environment and that free will is an
illusion), "mental processlessness" (a complete psychological account can he given of man by
studying his externally observable behavior to the exclusion of any
supposed events
taking place in his head), and materialism (even if man does appear to engage
in mental or spiritual activities, these activities are merely the by-product
of the physical and chemical activity of the brain and therefore need
to he examined
as legitimate, important phenomena in their own right.)
These assumptions are no more than faith assumptions that precede and
direct the
course of research, and are not decisively proven conclusions
resulting from that
research. Even Skinner himself, when closely questioned, admits that the state
of research is still in no position to state unequivocally that man is no less
determined than a pigeon (or a molecule) by his environment, but he
believes that
this is a "worthwhile scientific assumption"' which future
experimental
findings will continue to validate. When the "faith nature" of
this deterministic
model of man is thus revealed, its scientific trappings should become somewhat
less intimidating. We are dealing not with scientific conclusions
writen in stone
(in fact, there are no such fixed conclusions anywhere in science) but instead
with a belief system about the ultimate nature of man and his world
which, while
not devoid of supporting research evidence, goes well beyond it. In
this respect
it is no different from the faith of the Christian, or of the humanist, or of
the Marxist of ally other "true believer," all of whom
appeal to a combination
of faith plus empirical evidence to convince others of the truth of
their position.
A close perusal of the writings of ontological behaviorists shows
that they themselves
find it difficult to be consistent in practising their determinist assumptions.
This becomes evident when a curious exercise in double-think is
uncovered in the
writings of Skinner and others committed to a behaviorist view of mall. On the
one hand, it is suggested that man should resign himself to the
realization that
he, no less than the molecule, is totally determined by his environment, but,
having thus stripped man of his autonomy, Skinner repeatedly suggests that mall
both can and should exploit his scientific knowledge of mechanized
man to "raise
himself to new heights of kindness, intelligence, and happiness."2 How, we
are forced to ask, can a totally determined organism transcend his environmental
determinism to take charge of the environment that totally determines him?
If everything about us (including our moral values) is
environmentally determined,
on what basis can anyone's (including Skinner's) injunctions about
what we "should"
do be taken as peculiarly binding on us? Presumably his concern for
man to "raise
himself to new heights" is no less the product of his
environmental conditioning
than my concern as a Christian for the salvation of souls. As such,
neither value
can be said to he "better" or "worse" than the other; each
simply "is" the inevitable product of our respective reinforcement histories. And yet Skinner takes considerable pains to persuade
us that his
particular ultimate-value (the survival of the human race and of
western civilization)
is one that we "ought" to adopt. A brief glance into the history of
ideas reveals that this kind of double-think is nothing new: from the time of
the Enlightenment, western man (having progressively abandoned his faith in a
Creator-God) has struggled to reconcile his faith in the unlimited potential of
the natural-scientific method with an equally strong faith in the capacity of
autonomous man to exploit this knowledge of a mechanistic universe for his own
chosen ends. That these two idealsthe "science ideal" and
the "freedom
ideal"--are basically at odds with one another is one reason why Christian
philosophers like Herman Dooyeweerd have maintained that their adherents must
he basically misguided in their views of man and the universe.3
Implicit Appeal to "God"
Perhaps of greatest importance to the Christian is the observation
that the ontological
behaviorist, despite his insistence on a determined universe totally devoid of
irreducibly mental or spiritual aspects, still ends up appealing to something
like a "God outside the system" in order to make his system work. This is clearly evident throughout Skinner's
Walden II. A closer examination of Skinner's behaviorist Utopia suggests that
it is not everyone who can or will transcend his
environmentally-determined destiny
in order to plan a more perfect environment, but rather a particular elite of
planners who are experts in analyzing people's present response-reinforcement
patterns and changing them in such a way as to yield more desirable behavior.4
This, as we pointed out earlier, is exactly what the professional behavior
therapist
is doing when he helps a person to overcome a dog-phobia, or a
chain-smoking habit,
But while the average behavior therapist now sells his skills to a
clientele who
have come to him voluntarily and can leave him whenever they become
dissatisfied
with his product, Skinner envisages (yea, pleads for) the adoption of operant
conditioning techniques as a matter of policy in all the institutions
of society
that one might care to name-the school, the family, the prison, the hospital,
the market-place. His position boils down to a programme for the manipulation
of human beings, whether or not they know about it, whether or not they consent
to it, for their own supposed benefit and for the good of society as a whole.
But the notion of manipulation implies that somewhere there is a manipulator,
and (as many of Skinner's critics have repeatedly asked), who is to choose the
Grand Manipulators of us all, and whence do they derive their
authority to manipulate
us without our knowledge? To be wise enough for such responsibility
would require
an omniscience of all short and long-term consequences of all possible shaping
programs working singly and interactively in all possible places at once-a task
which even our most sophisticated computer simulations cannot begin to solve.
To be pure enough for such a task, even if we were to concede the possibility
of knowing all the pertinent factors operating, supposes that the
Grand Manipulator
can he trusted always to use his infinite knowledge in our best
interests. Either
way, we are assuming the possibility that there exist (or can exist)
human beings
who have attributes (omniscience, moral perfection) which Christians, banking
on the revealed-truth of Scripture, claim are exclusively God's.
Walden II: An Imagined Case History
That some such Nietschean god-complex lurks in the background of
Skiunerian thinking
is suggested by the character of Frazier, the hero of Skinner's
behaviorist Utopia,
Walden 11-a novel-cum-social vision which, thirty year after its
initial appearance,
is still being read in college courses all over the continent, and
which has even
been used quite seriously as the blueprint for at least one real-life attempt
at setting up a commune on reinforcement principles.5 Frazier is an
acknowledged
genius in the estimate of those visitors to the commune who realize
how successfully
and perfectly he has used principles of reinforcement to arrive at a
society where
all negative emotions (such as selfishness, jealousy, and aggressiveness) have
been shaped out, where technology and ecology, labor and leisure,
have been perfectly
wedded, and where charming, scintillating inhabitants go about their
daily routines in near-perfect harmony. When problems do occur, their solution
by an appeal
to the laws of operant conditioning is automatic.
Towards the end of the book, Frazier takes one of his visitors (a
fellow psychologist,
Burns, who arrives as a skeptic, but ultimately is converted to the Walden II
life-style) up to a high hill from which he can survey the entire
community with
a telescope. As he oversees Walden II through the glass, he comments that
"Not a sparrow falleth . I look on my work, and
behold, it is good,6 and, a little later, he adds that there is a
curious similarity
between himself and God-with this difference: "God's children are always
disappointing him . . . (but my) original design took deviations into account
and provided automatic corrections. It's rather an improvement on
Genesis."7
To Burns' accusation that he has "a sizable God complex".
Frazier replies,
"Of course I'm not indifferent to power! And I like to play God!
Who wouldn't
under the circumstances? After all, man, even Jesus Christ thought he
was God!"8 Skinner hastens to add that Frazier is not being the least bit blasphemous in
all of this; in fact, he speaks of Jesus as an "honored
colleague" who,
we discover earlier in the book, Frazier feels stumbled on the essence of the
principle of positive reinforcement when he told his followers to love (rather
than hate) even their enemies. Frazier himself is by no means
portrayed as perfect:
he is arrogant, socially somewhat awkward, and personally sloppy. But, Skinner
asks us, how could this he otherwise? How could he do other than
suffer from his
original, outside-world conditioning, not being a product of Walden
II from birth?
It is enough that he has set in motion, by his dedicated application
of the laws
of behavior, a system which can produce perfect people who, (unlike
God's children)
rarely if ever disappoint him.
And so we have, not a perfect messiah who vicariously redeems a
sinful race, hot
an imperfect messiah whose technological innovations nonetheless
result in a system
which produces automatic and consistent sinlessness, lie is
furthermore an anonymous
messiah; the "planners" and "managers" of Walden II have no
special status; they get no more credit nor blame than anyone else for the jobs
they do, and no one in the community accords Frazier, its founder,
any particular
dignity-indeed, few people even know who he is. But like the Deist's god, who
was presumed to have wound up the clockwork of the universe and then left it go
to its lawful, automatic' way, Frazier has designed the perfect environment for
shaping the perfect race, and is content to sit anonymously back and behold the
goodness of his creation.
The weaknesses of exploiting this particular type of god-talk to persuade us,
as readers, of the necessity of the mechanistic universe are
precisely those cited
previously, Firstly', to be able to apply so innovatively and
perfectly' the laws
of conditioning to others, Frazier has to have been able to transcend his own
conditioning in a way which releases at least one person from the confines of
this mechanistic universe of which he simultaneously' claims
everything and everyone
is a part. Hence autonomous man (or at least one autonomous man-or demi-god) makes
a sneaky return through the hack door of the clockwork. Secondly, to have used
the laws of operant conditioning to produce
a "perfect" people implies a standard of perfection, a set of values
against which man's behavior can be measured and the techniques of conditioning
(themselves value-neutral) used to produce. That such standards
(largely the product
of Frazier's personal faith about what constitutes the "good life")
abound in the novel is very clear-and, despite the novelty of the
communal setting,
sound to the Christian reader suspiciously like the protestant ethic
(now secularized)
tinder which Skinner himself was reared: people "should" be
industrious,
productive, content with a modest standard of living, individually creative and
self-reliant, yet prepared to co-operate with others for the common good.9
Children do not have the same rights and privileges as adults,
monogamy is considered
preferable to promiscuity, and (despite certain feminist sentiments
somewhat ahead
of the time the book was written) women still take their husbands' names.10
Assumptions of determinism, "mental processlessness," and materialism are no more than faith assumptions that precede and direct the course of research, and are not decisively proven conclusions resulting from that research.
We may agree or disagree with this particular pre-scription for the "good
life"-but the point still remains that, in a world where everyone's values
are merely the inevitable product of past conditioning, there can exist no way
by which Skinner's prescription can be declared the particular one to which we
should all adhere. Frazier, an empiricist and a pragmatist like
Skinner his creator,
appeals to the evidence of the senses to convince us: look around you, Burns;
Walden II really does work. It really has solved all those messy
post-war social
and political problems that the world at large has failed to grapple with. But
Walden II is still a fictitious Utopia, an extrapolation of faith
from Skinner's
limited (and only vaguely-alluded to) laboratory experiments to a world which he
believes could operate on the same principles. It is a blueprint which he has
personally never attempted to actualize, and those who have made such
an attempt
show as yet no sign of attaining the paradisal state of Walden 11.11
Hence, what we are being asked for as we read the book is ultimately
a faith-allegiance
to a Utopian ideal --an allegiance which can be nourished and maintained only
by faith in the superior competence and insights of its creator, to
whose visionary
extrapolations from the limited evidence of the laboratory we must necessarily
ascribe the status of special revelation.
Furthermore, religious - specifically, biblical - Image and
metaphor are constantly
being exploited in the novel to buttress Frazier's case for his operantly
conditioned
society. Why?? Is it merely Skinner's attempt to make light of
conventional religion
in order to exorcise its remaining hold on his post-World War 11 readers? Or is
it because he realizes that a quasi-religious appeal is needed to bridge the gap between the limited
findings of behaviorist
research and the vision of the totally-planned society to which Skinner would
like us to extend them?
Or again, are such images included to give the illusion of a
ready-made value-system,
without which we would have no guidelines for the application of a behavioral
technology? For whatever reason, we do have Frazier admitting that, with people
coming into Walden II from the outside, "we have to appeal to
something like
conversion."12 We have the humble return of Burris, prodigal-son-like, to
Frazier and to Walden IT after his final, unsuccessful attempt to
deny to himself
its perfection.13 We have the "Walden II Code", a decalogue-like set
of rules to which everyone agrees to adhere-not because they have been proved
scientifically workable in the laboratory, but because the original planners of
the community hypothesized (read: had faith) that they would be
empirically shown,
in the course of the community's development, to be the best slate of rules for
living.14 The psychologists of the community are "our priests,
if you like",15
who prescribe curative programs for members who are haying difficulty adhering
to the code. One is reminded of the way in which National Socialism in Germany
made a similar appeal to a combination of technological power and
religious zeal
in order to achieve its ends. That the latter did so to promote the power of a
single, so-called Master Race, while Skinner's Walden Ii is aimed at
an egalitarian
society does not alter the fact that each calls for an unlimited faith in the
powers of science and the superhuman capacity of a certain person (or persons)
to prescribe the ends to which such powers should be used. Our willingness to
accord such faith unreservedly will be determined by even deeper faith
assumptions
about the intrinsic fallenness or perfectibility of all men.
Is "Mental Processlessness" Valid?
Our final criticism of ontological behaviorism centers around its assumption of
"mental processlessness." If the behaviorist image of man is correct,
then neither our knowledge of, nor our consent or lack of consent to
the conditioning
process will affect the success of that process, since "knowing" and
"consenting" are regarded by the ontological behaviorist as mythical,
or at least irrelevant, internal processes which have no significant influence
on behavior. The pigeon it appears, cannot reflect upon the
conditioning process
he is undergoing in any way that alters the efficacy of that process
on his behavior,
and man's apparent capacity for reflection should likewise he useless to alter
the effects of the environmental program being imposed on him. But
the realities
of psychological research with human beings seem to contradict this
notion: experimental
social psychologists in particular have always realized that if a person in an
experiment knows about the nature and purposes of the manipulations
he is undergoing,
he will react differently than if he did not know about them.16
The researcher's
way of combatting this "ghost in the machine" has always been to lie
(often quite elaborately) to his research subjects about what is
going on in the
study, on the assumption that, lie will get a spontaneous,
uncontaminated reaction
to it by distracting their attention.
But quite apart from the ethical considerations surrounding the use
of such duplicity,17
its practical consequences simply seem to reaffirm the capacity of human beings
to "create their own internal environment" to add to (even
if not totally
negate) the effects of externally imposed factors: for as the
reputation of psychologists-as-liars
becomes increasingly widespread, fewer and fewer subjects (at least among the
student population and informed laity) enter the research situation prepared to
believe what they are going to be told about it. Hence, while they may not get
so far as to discern the real purpose of the study, they at least know what it
is probably not what it is said to be, and may proceed to react in accordance
with, not the experimenter's, but their own hypotheses about what is going on.
This process in itself does not eliminate the effects of the
experimental manipulation-but
it does reduce them from the status of total determinants to mere
influences.
Inconsistency of Ontological Behaviorism
We thus see that ontological behaviorism, with its assumptions that
man's behavior
is environmently determined, uninfluenced by mental processes, and the product
of a material, non-spiritual universe does not consistently live up
to these assumptions.
Determinism leaves no room for the moral pronouncements needed to guide the use
of conditioning principles. Materialism fails to supply man's
yearning for something
to worship outside the world of the five senses. "Mental
processlessness"
ignores the fact that people even in an experimental situation can
and do influence
its outcome merely by the way they conceptualize it in their heads. Does this
mean that the entire behaviorist enterprise is bankrupt, and has nothing good
to offer to the Christian community? To answer this question, we need to turn
to the area of applied behaviorism and examine its track-record. For,
as we stated
earlier, those applying the techniques of behavior modification may or may not
do so in rigid adherence to ontological behaviorism? Our answer is a qualified
"yes", and our elaboration of this answer constitutes the final major
section of this paper.
REFERENCES
l As interviewed in Learning and Behavior, A.A.A.S. films, C. 1958.
2 Ibid.
3See Kalsbeek, A. N. Contours of a Christian Philosophy, Toronto, 1975. Wedge
Publishing Foundation.
4See Skinner, B. F. Walden II, especially Chapters 8 and 29. (Note:
all references
to Walden II are from the 1968 MacMillan Paperback Edition)
5Scc Kinkadc, K., op. cit. (in Part I of this article)
6Skinner, B. F. Walden
Ii, p. 295.
7lbid., p. 297.
8lbid., p. 299.
9lbid,, throughout the novel,
10Ihid., especially
Chapters 12-15.
11Kinkade, K. "A Walden II Experiment",
Psychology Today, January, 1973, and February, 1973.
12 Ibid., p. 162.
l3Ibid., Chapters 35 and 36.
l4Ibid., p. 196.
15Ibid., p. 199.
16See Miller, A.
N. (Ed.) The Social Psychology of Psychological Research. New York,
The Free Press,
1972,
17For a discussion of the ethics of experimental deception in psychology
from a concerned
psychologist's point of view, see Kelman, H. C. A Time to Speak, San Francisco,
Jossey-Boss, 1968.