Science in Christian Perspective
The Behaviorist Bandwagon and
the
Body of Christ
I. What Is Behaviorism?
MARY STEWART VAN LEEUWEN
Department of Psychology
York University
Toronto, Canada
From: JASA 31
(March 1979): 3-8.
This is the first of a three-part series on behaviorism from a
Christian perspective.
To all appearances, they were simply an attractive and successful young couple:
middle class, professional, and upwardly mobile. I had met them during a summer
conference for Christian graduates, and discovered that from a liberal-church
background, they had recently come into a more deeply biblical faith which they
hoped the conference would expand and enrich. But further conversation revealed
a complication in their lives which bid fair to ruin their marriage and shatter
their young faith: they were the parents of an autistic child who was
slowly driving
them both (but especially the wife, who was his primary caretaker) to despair.
After meeting four-year-old Billy, it was easy to sec why. Despite
that preliminary
impression of haunting, almost other-worldly beauty which so many
autistic children
seem to emanate, he had never learned to talk, and showed virtually no signs of
social attachment to-or even real awareness of-his parents or anyone else. His
failure to develop communication skills was ironically more than made tip for
by a physical dexterity which could empty drawers of their contents in seconds
flat, tear up a shelf full of books page by page, pick locks, divest Billy of
all his clothes dozens of times each day, or take him ten blocks away from home
the moment his mother lapsed from a state of constant vigilance over his every
move. His mother was becoming weary and desperate, and his father, finding it
harder and harder to deal supportively with her, was beginning to withdraw into
an unhealthy over-preoccupation with his job. A month later, when I stayed at
their home during a professional conference I was attending in their city, the
family situation seemed on the verge of collapse because of the child, for whom
they could find no place in any existing scheme for exceptional children.
The situation seemed bleak indeed-yet in our next exchange of correspondence a
few months later, a
totally new note was being sounded: Billy had been accepted into a
behavior modification
program, and within weeks had begun to talk, to show other signs of
social awareness,
and desist from his bizarre behavior. His mother, progressively released from
the tyranny of the child's former behavior, was full of hope, and the marriage
relationship was improving steadily. The behavior modification
program, she said,
had been an answer to their prayers, and for the first time in years, life was
worth living again.
Basic Definitions
What is behavior modification all about, and why should thinking Christians he
concerned to understand it? Therapies for so-called disturbed people come and
go; they all seem to work sometimes for some people, but no single
one has emerged
as a cure-all. Behavior modification might be just one more such tool ill the
therapist's hag of tricks were it not for a couple of other considerations: on
the applied level, over the past ten years or so, it has had an
impressive record
of bringing back to some semblance of normality certain categories of
people who
had long since been abandoned (after the failure of more traditional therapies)
to a life of minimal custodial care. These have included not only
autistic children
like Billy, but hack ward schizophrenics, retardates, and certain other types
of emotionally or socially disturbed persons.1 On the theoretical
level, the techniques
of behavior modification are undergirded by a philosophy of man and the world
which has attracted both ardent disciples and hostile critics. On
both levels-the
theoretical and the applied-there are far-reaching implications of
which Christians
need to be aware.
The term 'behaviorism" (from which the clinical techniques of
behavior modification
originally derive) needs to be understood on three different levels: there is
first of all what I will call ontological behaviorism set of
faith-assumptions
about the nature of human beings, and about the way they ought to he studied
by psychology. Secondly, there is methodological behaviorism2-a "model" which directs much laboratory research on human
and animal learning, and which may or may not presuppose ontological
behaviorism,
depending on the researcher. Thirdly, there is applied behaviorism,
which includes
techniques of behavior modification and behavior analysis and which, in turn,
may have a very tight or a very loose relationship to ontological behaviorism
and methodological behaviorism depending on the practitioner. To evaluate the
behaviorist movement in psychology in terms of a Christian worldview, we need
to know what each of these three levels comprises.
The term Behaviorism came into use in the early 1900's when many
academic psychologists,
anxious to sever their historic ties with philosophy and to establish
psychology
as a discipline amenable to the scientific method, declared that it
was both possible
and desirable to develop a "science of man" which made no reference
to what went on inside man's head, but rather concentrated exclusively on his
externally-observable behavior. Behavior (usually defined quite simply as the
movement of muscles and the functioning of bodily organs) could, after all, he
reliably observed and measured by the researcher, whereas one could,
they claimed,
only theorize and argue endlessly about the nature of internal mental phenomena
such as anxiety, love, hope, hostility, and the many other processes which the
ordinary man on the street would naively expect to make up the subject matter
of psychology.
The early behaviorists thus took it as their assumption that man
could be studied
in the same way the Newtonian physicist studied force and matter, or
the biologist
studied plants and animals: neither the physicist nor the biologist
works on the
assumption that the rock or the tree has internal feelings or mental processes
which may account for their activities; only animistic,
pre-scientific man thinks
about rocks and trees in such ways, said the behaviorists. Rather,
the scientist
sees the rock or the tree as being essentially a passive reactor to
the physical
and chemical events of the environment, and the business of science
as the establishment
of clear relationships between environmental causes on the one hand, and their
subsequent effects on matter, animal tissue, plant organs, or whatever. Indeed,
science (and its offspring technology) began to make headway in the
16th century
only inasmuch as it did consistently regard its subject-matter or
this impersonal
and objective way. The time had come, said the behaviorists, to study
the behavior
of man and animals in the same way, abandoning speculative
pre-scientific notions
about mental events which could not he seen or measured, arid
concentrating rather
on experiments which revealed lawful relationships between measurable
environmental
causes (or "stimuli") on the one hand, and the organism's measurable,
external behavior (or "responses") on the other. In this way, it was
claimed, behavior could ultimately be understood, predicted, and
controlled with
the same mastery now displayed by the physicist over his lump of matter, or the
biologist over his piece of animal tissue.3 Hence, this extreme form of early
behaviorism implied in the first place a mechanistic or
"deterministic"
view of man: man passively acted upon by his external environment rather than
freely acting on it.
Secondly, it implied that human beings were devoid of any relevant,
internal mental
processes (such as free will, imagination, feelings, motives, or
purposes) which
might need to be studied over and above their externally-observable behavior in
order to have a complete picture of what it means to he human.
Thirdly, extreme ontological behaviorism assumed that man was part and parcel
of a totally materialistic universe-that is, a universe in which even
man's apparent
capacity to think, create, and make moral choices was reducible to the physical
and chemical activity of the brain, leaving no place for any
phenomena of a non-physical,
mental or spiritual nature.
It must quickly be pointed out that this extreme form of behaviorism
was progressively
qualified in psychological circles (following J. B. Watson's original statement
of it in 1913.4 Nevertheless, its "deterministic,"
"mental process-less,"
and "materialistic" flavor has dominated North American
psychology-both
academic and applied-ever since.
Methodological Behaviorism
Deterministic views of man-i.e., the notion that man is passively shaped by his
environment and that as a consequence "free will" is an
illusion-stretch
back much further in the history of ideas than the advent of
behavioristic psychology
early in this century.3 What made the behaviorist notion unique was (as we have
just outlined) its combined emphasis on determinism, "mental
processlessness,"
and materialism in its view of man. In addition (and perhaps more importantly),
behaviorists proposed to take their view of man into the research
laboratory and
test it out experimentally. In those areas of psychological research leading to
the practices of behavior modification, this has led to two major
streams of research
known as respondent conditioning and operant conditioning. Some
behaviorists indeed
took their view of man into the laboratory apparently convinced in advance that
the research results would progressively confirm him to be a mechanical being,
whose behavior is determined almost, if not totally, by the present
shape of his
environment and not at all by any relevant, mental or spiritual processes. Such
researchers were what we might call "hard" ontological behaviorists.
Other researchers, equally committed to the same experimental methods, did not
assume the underlying view of man suggested by ontological behaviorism. Rather,
they merely concluded that the most convenient and fruitful way to study man's
behavior was to do laboratory studies as if man were a mechanical being totally
at the mercy of his present environment. It is this latter position,
saying "let's
suppose just for the purposes of organized research that man is in
some respects
like a machine," which we will designate "methodological
behaviorism."
The adherence to methodological behaviorism in laboratory experimentation led,
as we have just mentioned, to two major research foci: the first was respondent
conditioning, which deals with those behavioral responses for which
human beings
appear to be pre-wired (reflexes such as heart-beat, pupil dilation,
respiration,
eye-blinking, sweating, and so forth); the other was the operant conditioning
of non-reflexive, muscular movements which we ordinarily think of as
"voluntary"
(such as picking up an object, putting food
into our mouths, walking to the store, and so on). The applied
techniques of behavior
modification later drew from loth these research traditions.
Respondent Conditioning
In the area of respondent conditioning, the classic experiments (as
every introductory
psychology student knows) were done by the Russian physiologist Ivan
Pavlov, who
demonstrated with dogs that the "unconditioned" (that is,
"built-in")
response of salivation following the placement of meat-powder in the
mouth could
become "conditioned" to a stimulus (such as the ringing of
a bell) which
originally had no power to elicit salivation at all, provided that the hell was
first paired for several trials with the original meat-powder, which
could later
he withdrawn. Pavlov, of course, went m to demonstrate that the situation was
more complicated than this: the dog who has learned to salivate to the sound of
a bell will not do so indefinitely if he is never given meat-powder again-his
salivation response will "extinguish". Further, if he has learned to
salivate to the tone of middle-C, for instance, his salivation will
usually "generalize"
somewhat to B and to B-flat, or to C-sharp and D in direct proportion as those
tones are like the original. However, we can get the dog to
"generalize"
his response lessthat is, to make it more "discriminating"-by making
sure, during the training period when hell and powder are presented together,
that he is always given meat-powder with the middle-C tone, but never
to any other
tone, no matter how close to middle-C. Research in respondent conditioning has
undergone many sophisticated refinements since these early experiments, but the
above description suffices to give the reader a general idea of its approach to
the study of learned behavior,
Operant Conditioning
The second stream of laboratory research contributing to the behavior
modification
movement is that of operant conditioning, in which we are not dealing with an
environmental stimulus (such as a bell, or meat-powder) which
precedes and "pushes
out", or elicits, a reflex response, such as salivation or fear rather we
are taking advantage of spontaneously emitted motor responses and
"shaping"
them in the way we want them to go by rewarding them immediately
after they occur.
In the classic experiments of this research tradition, B. F. Skinner
used hungry
pigeons placed in what is now universally known as the Skinner box,
an apparatus
in which, to get hits of food, the animal has to learn to peek at a
plastic disc,
which then automatically releases a bit of grain into a trough. The
animal's disc-pecking
behavior is shaped by "reinforcing" with food first its
mere proximity
to the disc, then a little later, proximity plus raising its head
toward the disc,
and finally only actual pokes with its beak at the disc itself.
Again, the animal's
behavior is assumed to he totally determined by the environmental
conditions
in its internal environment, the pigeon is hungry; in
the external environment, the experimenter has set certain conditions which the pigeon must meet with its behavior in
order to eat-and
eventually, it does. The situation can be complicated by requiring the pigeon
to peck not once, but perhaps ten times for
Can the researcher assume that all behavior is determined, and proceed to establish universal laws about the causes of any and all behavior, including such things as moral actions, aesthetic preferences, and religious activity?
every piece of grain, in which case it will peck harder and faster to reach the
imposed quota. Or we might reinforce the pigeon with grain on an
erratic schedule
-after random, unpatterned numbers of peeks, in which ease the animal
will continue
his pecking behavior indefinitely, even after the grain-reward has
been permanently
withdrawn. We can also build in what are known as "secondary
reinforcers":
if the pigeon's pecking yields grain only when a red light is on in the Skinner
box, the animal will learn to work to get the red light (the
secondary reinforcer)
to turn on so that he can then peck successfully for food.
Human Conditioning
Early research in both respondent and operant conditioning was
conducted entirely
on animals. But it was not long before laboratory experiments were
being conducted
which seemed to show similar conditioning propensities in human beings.
As an example of respondent conditioning in human beings, a puff of air to the
eyeball reflexly causes a person to blink; if the puff of air is preceded often
enough by, say, a hell or a flash of light, eventually the
"conditioned stimulus"
of bell or light will be enough, by itself, to elicit the eye-blink response.
In a more practical example, a toddler touching a hot stove will very quickly
and very reflexly withdraw his hand. Thereafter, the mere sight of the stove
(previously
neutral, or even attractive to the child) will act as a
"conditioned stimulus"
to produce a "stay-away response."
Operant conditioning could also be reliably demonstrated in human beings. For
instance, a child before a set of colored buttons in the laboratory
may be required
to learn that pushing the "blue button" will yield him the
"reward",
or "positive reinforcement" of a marble. Although the child may start
out playing with all the buttons in a more or less random fashion, once he has
discovered that "pushing the blue button" yields a marble, he is more
apt to focus his buttonpushing "responses" on the
particular "stimulus"
of the blue button to the exclusion of the others. Or, in a more
everyday example,
the child learning to talk will make all kinds of unstructured
babbling sounds-but
gradually, as his parents use praise and encouragement to
"positively reinforce"
those sounds which approximate real words, the child begins to use
such real-word
approximations more and more to the exclusion of nonword babblings.
In all of this, the question again naturally arises: is the animal or person in
a respondent or operant conditioning situation a totally passive
organism, simply
reacting to the conditions set up by the experimenter, unable to
"think about,"
or "choose" his responses? Is lie reacting as passively and
thoughtlessly
to externally
imposed, present conditions as two chemicals react to the manipulations of the
chemist? And if he is, can the researcher then assume that all
behavior-both human
and non-human-is so determined, and proceed to establish, through
further experimental
research, universal "laws" about the causes of any and all behavior,
including such things as moral actions, aesthetic preferences, and
religious activity?
Psychologists engaged in such research differ in their responses to
this question-but
as methodological behaviorists they are generally all agreed on one
issue, namely,
that whether or not mental processes such as "free will"
and "reflection"
exist in man, animals, or both, the most fruitful and
"scientific" way
to study behavior is to proceed as if such processes did not exist.
That is, the
laboratory researcher should assume, for the purposes of his research that the
organism whose behavior he is studying is totally at the mercy of the
environmental
manipulations imposed on it, and that, furthermore, one can come up
with an adequate
psychological description of him by concentrating
only what one can see and measure the organism doing externally, with no need
to infer any "mental events" going on inside its head. This way, one
can set about establishing "S-R" (stimulus-response) laws-laws about
which environmental stimuli systematically and reliably produce which
behavioral
responses. Research psychologists may or may not transfer these assumptions to
themselves as behaving organisms. Indeed, most probably do not, but
rather credit
themselves with both free will and other creative mental processes which they
routinely use. Nevertheless, they continue to research the behavior
of other people
and of animals according to the assumptions of methodological
behaviorism because
they are convinced that this is the approach which will yield the most useful
results, both for psychological theory and clinical practice.
Applied Behaviorism
We have just sketchily outlined the behaviorist laboratory research approaches
of respondent and operant conditioning. How are such research orientations then
applied to practical human behavior problems such as you and I might
conceivably
encounter?
On the applied level, the behavior modifier (or behavior therapist) transfers
Pavlovian assumptions and techniques of respondent conditioning to human beings
particularly in the treatment of maladaptive phobias. A person who
has a pathological
fear of dogs, for instance, is presumed to have picked up the reflex, emotional
reactions which (to the behaviorist) are the essence of fear
(increased heart-rate,
sweating, pupillary dilation, butterflies in the stomach) in the same
way Pavlov's
dog picked up his habit of salivating to the sound of a hell. The
sight of a furry
dog to a child is usually neutral, if not positive-but if traumatically paired
with the pain of a bite (which reflexly elicits crying), the sight of a dog may
become a conditioned elicitor of the fear response, which never
extinguishes because
the child never allows himself to get close enough to a (log again to discover
that not all dogs bite, and, indeed, that sonic are quite pleasant to
be with.
To reverse this state of affairs, the behavior therapist uses processes known
as "systematic desensitization" and "counter conditioning":
the phobic client is first taught (sometimes with the help of drugs) to relax deeply and peacefully in the
therapist's office. Once this has been accomplished, "dog-images" are
very gradually introduced, beginning with small, innocuous, far-away dog-photos
and eventually working up to slides and movies in living color, and
then to actual,
unchained dogs right in the office. At no point does the therapist move on in
the "stimulus hierarchy" of dogs before the client is able
to maintain
a state of complete relaxation in the presence of a less-threatening dog-image.
What the therapist is doing is teaching the client to learn a new
response (relaxation)
to an old stimulus (the sight of dogs), and it is assumed that the acquisition
of both the original fear and the new relaxation has been as
automatic and lawful
a response to engineered environmental conditions as what went on in Pavlov's
laboratory. The behavior modifier is merely the specialist who has acquired a
detailed knowledge of these "laws of behavior" and is fairly reliably
able to analyze and change behavior as a result of their application.
Many behaviorists are fond of pointing out that the success rate of
such treatment
procedures of neurotic phobias is an impressive 90%, in contrast to the older
methods of psychodynamic therapy, whose rate of remission (an
embarrassing study
in the 1959's records) is no higher than that of untreated neurotics
who get well
spontaneously.6 Furthermore, it can all be done with essentially
no reference
to the patient's personal history, subjective feelings, or internal
mental processes
such as thinking and choosing: whether these things exist or not,
many behaviorists
claim that a science of behavior (normal and abnormal) is
possible-and desirable purely
on the basis of externally-observed behavioral responses to
presently-manipulated
environmental stimuli.
Practical applications of research in operant conditioning began to
attract much
attention in the 1960's, when an entire mental hospital ward of
apparently hopelessly-regressed
patients was turned, as it were, into a gigantic Skinner box situation. Rather
than being humored in their bizzare behavior, patients were gently but firmly
required to begin approximating socially acceptable activities. For a severely
disturbed patient, this might mean something as basic as learning to
use the toilet
in return for meals. For a less-regressed patient, it might mean spending time
reading the newspaper in return for a much desired cigarette or candy bar. In both
cases, the behavior required is simple and undemanding at first, but gradually
more and more is required for the same amount of reinforcement,
analogous to the
pigeon's being reinforced only once every ten pecks, or only randomly. In this
way, the socially desired behavior, which begins by needing continuous
reinforcement
to keep it going, eventually becomes such a well-ingrained habit that it needs
only occasional reinforcement. (This is undoubtedly the kind of
programme in which
young Billy, the autistic child described earlier, ended up).
Likewise, the principle of secondary reinforcement was borrowed from
the Skinner
laboratory: patients who might first of all work only for actual food or other
goodies soon learned to work for plastic poker chips, which could then he turned
in for a variety of primary reinforcers ranging from cigarettes to yard
privileges. Again, the results seemed amazing: patients for whom
traditional talk-and-insight
therapies had long since been abandoned, many of whom had spent years
in a zombie-like
state on the back wards, were learning how to talk again, how to socialize, and
even hold down jobs simply through judicious manipulation of the
present environment,
with no appeal made to personal insight, choice, or will-power, and
no reference
to past personal history.
From experimental work in laboratories and selected institutions,
behavior modification
programs based on such operant conditioning have now spread to
classrooms, kitchens,
rehabilitation wards, prisons, churches, reform schools, nursing
homes, day-care
centers, factories, movie theatres, national parks, community mental
health centers,
stores-and just about any environment one might care to name. The
programs, riding
high on their apparent initial successes, are heavily funded by governments at
all levels, and staffed by efficiently trained experts in
"behaviorese"
who often appear confident that, with enough time and latitude, whole
cities (perhaps
even the world?) could be turned into one gigantic Skinner Box. By the planned
use of positive reinforcement, disadvantaged children have learned to
read, delinquent
boys have begun engaging in productive work, parents have eliminated children's
untidiness, factory workers have increased productivity, public facilities have
brought littering under control. These are only a few of the areas in
which behavior
modifiers have found ready consumers for their product, and there is
no indication
that the buying trend is about to stop.7
Let it he pointed out, however, that just as the methodological behaviorist may
or may not intrinsically hei eve in the mechanistic, mental process-less model
of man after which he patterns his laboratory experiments, so the
behavior modifier
working in the applied setting does not have to regard human beings
as total robots
in order to practice his trade. Indeed, most behavior modifiers,
being primarily
oriented towards using whatever method works for a given client, usually have
no qualms about adapting techniques from psychological traditions
other than behaviorism
where the prohhem at hand appears to demand them.8 Furthermore, many
behavior modifiers
may not even concern themselves much about the image of man that is presupposed
by ontological behaviorism. While such a vagueness of connection between belief
and practice may seem strange to most Christians (who presumably labor to make
their whole lives consonant with their biblical view of reality), it is by no
means an uncommon phenomenon among contemporary North American psychologists,
must of whom have been trained to believe that there is no intrinsic connection
between one's metaphysical world-view and the way one practices science. At any
rate, it does not appear to be usual for most contemporary
practitioners of behavior
modification to adhere very strictly to the mechanistic, historic
mental process-less
view of mao set forth by ontological behaviorism.9
B. F. Skinner
However, ill a world where traditional belief-systems have largely
been abandoned,
leaving contemporary man in ii spiritual vacuum which cries out to he filled,
a
The combined effect of Skinner's behaviorist treatise and the early success of applied behavior modification has been to unloose a burst of Utopian enthusiasm on the part of some, and a storm of criticism on the part of others.
single articulate and authoritative spokesman for a particular worldview will
often have a disproportionately great impact on the thinking and the
policy-decisions
of his day. Such a person is B. F. Skinner, the chief protagonist for
ontological
behaviorism and the pioneer of operant conditioning, who has devoted
much of his
extra-laboratory work life to articulating and defending a strictly
behavioristic
view of man. In the '40's, he wrote the novel Walden 10,his portrait view
of the behaviorist Utopia in which everyone was naturally and effortlessly good
simply because the environment had been successfully designed to
reward them for
nothing but good behavior. In the early '70's, his Beyond Freedom
and Dignity11
stated in even more unequivocal terms what the essence of man must
be, given the
findings of Skinnerian-type research: If, as Skinner concludes from behaviorist
(and especially operant conditioning) research, roan can he shown to be totally
controlled (apart from a few inborn reflexes) by the reinforcing events of his
environment, then human freedom is a myth; indeed, we mistakenly assume that a
person has done something "freely" when we have merely
failed to discern
what environmental pressure "made" him do what he did. Likewise, the
"dignity" of man is also mythical: we praise a person for
his accomplishments,
but again simply because we have not isolated the environmental circumstances
or reinforcers to which the real credit is due. To Skinner, it is the
lamentable
tenacity of these myths of human freedom and dignity which keeps the
totally-planned,
Walden II-type society from becoming a reality. If only we would look
to the environment,
(rather than to illusory notions of human freedom and accountability) and set
it up in such a way that desirable behavior would always he
reinforced, and undesirable
behavior never reinforced, then we would be well on our way to heaven
on earth.
The combined effect of Skinner's behaviorist treatise and the early success of
applied behavior modification has been to unloose a burst of Utopian enthusiasm
on the part of some, and a storm of criticism on the part of others.12 Having
dealt with the (undeniably solid) research foundations of respondent
and operant
conditioning and the (undeniably effective) applications of behavior
modification
to certain types of behavior problems is, we will he concerned ill the
later portions
of this paper to deal with some of the criticisms leveled against
the whole enterprise.
Some of these criticisms are theoretical, others practical, others
mural. We will
deal not only with some of the more common criticisms submitted by the science
and humanities communities at large, but also attempt to comment both
on the behaviorist
model and these criticisms of it from a Christian perspective.
References
1 For representative collections of articles on the growing use of
behavior modification
techniques, see Rubin, R.D., Fensterheim, H., Lazarus, A.A. and
Franks, C.M. (Eds.)
Advances in Behavior Therapy (New York; Academic Press, 1971) or Uliman, L. P.
and Krasner, L. (Eds.) Case Studies in Behavior Modification (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1965)
2See Meehi, P. What, Then, Is Man? (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing
House, 1958)
Chapter 3, for an elaboration of this term.
3See Watson, J. B. 'Psychology as the behaviorist views It" Psychological
Review, 1913, 20, 158-177.
4For a comprehensive review of the changing face of behaviorism, see Koch, S.
'Epilogue" in Psychology: A Study of a Science, Vol. III, pp. 729-788. New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.
5Ibid.
6Evsenck, H. J. The effects of psychotherapy in H. J. Eysenck (Ed.) Handbook
of Abnormal Psychology. New York: Basic Books, 1961.
7Goodall, K. Shapers at work. Psychology Today, 1912, 53ff.
8 See Five years of the Twin Oaks Community. New York: Wrn. B. Morrow, 1973
for examples
of very unbehavioristic, humanistic psychology techniques used in a
setting which
purports to hold to strict ontological behaviorism!
91n the case of behaviorism and its adherents, this theory-practice
schizophrenia
may he a blessing in disguise, since a consistent adherence in
practice to ontological
behaviorism might long since have resulted in the Orwellian, 1984 type
of society
which many critics of behaviorism fear.
10Skinner, B. F. Walden II. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1948 (Note: page
citations in this article are from the 1968 paperback edition)
11Skinner, B. F. Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
1971.
12See particularly Chomsky, N.: Psychology and Ideology, in For
Reasons of State.
New York: Random House, 1970; Koestler, A. The Ghost in the Machine. New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1967; Wheeler, H. (Ed.) Beyond the Punitive Society. San
Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973.