Science in Christian Perspective
Deception and the Christian Psychologist
Ronald L. Koteskey
Department of Psychology
Asbury College
Wilmore,
Kentucky 40390
From: JASA 31 (March 1979): 58-59.
Some people say that scientists who are Christians use the same
methods as secular
scientists but interpret the results differently. Although this is true in many
instances, it is not always the ease. For instance, the use of
deception in psychological
research and testing, a widely accepted practice, raises both
methodological and
ethical problems. Christians must decide whether or not they can use deception
and, if not, what alternatives are available.
MeGuire (1969) pointed out that psychologists have taken for granted that the
subject should be kept unaware of the purpose of the research. This ignorance
is achieved by not telling the subjects about the nature of the research or by
misinforming them. This is sometimes done even for such prosaic
topics as psychophysics
or verbal learning. Seeman (1969) found that more than 10% of the
studies in general
experimental psychology used deception while nearly 40% of those in personality
and social psychology did so. Stricker (1967) noted that some areas of research
employ deception routinely. For example, he reported that 72% of the studies in
balance theory and 81% of those in conformity used deception. Some authors even
discuss ways of improving deception in experimentation. As Stricker (1967) put
it, "deception, per Se, has become a prestigious methological
device."
Psychologists argue that such deception is necessary in some types of research
and that nothing is wrong with it as tong as the subjects are
dehoaxed (told the
truth) before they leave the experiment. However, such deception has created a
whole new set of methodological problems. Subjects do not come to an experiment
completely blank, without expectations as to what is expected of them. Kelman
(1967) notes that many subjects now approach the
experiment with suspicion and try to figure out what the experiment
is "really
about--even when they are not being deceived. As one subject put it,
''Psychologists
always lie!" Of course, he was exaggerating since the evidence show's they
lie only from 10% to 80% of the time. Although the evidence is
conflicting, some
studies show' that suspicious subjects behave differently than
unsuspicious ones. Strickcr, Mcssick, and Jackson (196?) found this to he true in their
experiments,
where about 50% of their subjects were suspicious as to the purpose
of the experiment-and
their subjects were high school students, not college sophomores who know even
more about the ways of psychologists. As Seenian (1969) put it, ''we may soon
be reaching a point where we no longer have naive subjects, but only
naive experimenters''
(p. 1026). Although most ''counts'' of the frequency of deception were made in
the laic 1960's, Smang (1976) believes that suspicion is
becoming more widespread, and he again found less conformity by
suspicious subjects.
A similar situation is found in psychological testing. People taking projective
tests do not know what they are revealing about
themselves by their answers. Although there is a great deal of controversy over
the reliability and validity of such tests, the personality profiles arrived at
by these tests can profoundly influence she direction of a person's life. They
can be part of a battery of tests to have him committed to psychiatric rare or
to a program of special education. Persons taking personality inventories, such
as the Minnesota Multiphasie Personality Inventory, do not know whether their
answers will count toward the depression scale, the schizophrenic
scale, the paranoia
scale, and so forth.
Psychologists again argue that ignorance of the purpose of the test
is necessary.
If the person knew what he was revealing about himself, he would
change his answers
to present a more favorable picture of himself. As a result, individuals taking
these tests try to guess what each answer might "really mean." They
naturally believe that they are being tricked because they do not
know what they
are revealing about themselves. They know only that the psychologist
is searching
for hidden symbols and deep meanings. The psychologists are on guard
because they
know that the patients are on guard. Testing, like experimenting,
becomes a game
of which can outwit the other.
Although such methodological problems are serious, the related ethical problems
are even more serious to us as Christians. Is lying a legitimate means to the
end of truth? Seeman (1969) maintains that the end of any process is inexorably
embedded in the means used to reach it, so that a process which uses deceptive
means cannot lead to truth. Thus deception is not only not a legitimate means
to truth, but not a means to truth at all. It is difficult to
conceive how psychologists
devoted to the search for truth can maintain that it is necessary to tell lies
in that search. How can they condone deception when the discovery of truth is
the basic moral imperative which is the core of their vocation?
McGuire (1969) points out that most psychologists feel some moral revulsion and
embarrassment when deceiving a subject, even if they believe that the deception
is in the interest of discovery of a higher truth. The widespread use
of the post-experimental
dehoaxings is impressive evidence of the felt ethical concern. Most
psychologists
maintain that such deception is permissible as long as it can be removed. After
reviewing the available literature on dehoaxing, Holmes (1976) concludes that
in most cases dehoaxing is an effective technique for eliminating
misinformation
learned by the subjects as a result of being deceived in an
experiment. Although
this meets the standards set in the Ethical Principles in the Conduct
of Research
with Human Participants adopted by the American Psychological Association, I do
not believe it is a high enough standard for us at Christians. Since
it is unethical
to lie in everyday life, it should also be considered unethical to
lie in an experiment.
Lying is still a violation of the dignity and respect with which a
person, created
in the image of God, should be treated, even if that person is involved in an
experiment.
The 1953 American Psychological Assocation Code of Ethics
stated that psychologists should refuse to support unwarranted
assumptions, invalid
application or unjustified conclusions in using psychological tests,
it also declared
unethical any procedure likely to deceive a client. Stagner (1974) noted that
if the code were strictly enforced, many personality measures might be outlawed
completely. In recent years psychologists have questioned their
measures and the
answers have placed psychologists in an ethical conflict. However, rather than
resolving the conflict by abandoning tests which do not meet the
ethical standards,
they have changed the standards. Psychologists now are not to use
techniques which
"fail to meet professional standards" established in
particular fields.
Again, I believe that, as Christians, we should abandon particular tests rather
than abandoning our standards.
When searching the literature for research on deception, I found no related or
synonumous terms which were consistent with a Christian worldview.
Psychological
Abstracts said, "See also cheating, malingering, faking,
pathological lying,"
The American Psychological Association Thesaurus of Psychological Index Terms
listed "lying, behavior disorders, cheating, confabulation,
faking, malingering,
and dishonesty," under "deception." I
propose that, as Christians, we do not condone the use of deception,
in research
or testing. When students write research proposals including
deception, we should
not approve them. Journals taking a Christian perspective should not
publish research
using deception. We should not teach testing methods based on deception.
Rather than spending our time rationalizing the use of deception and creating
more elaborate schemes of deception, we should spend it developing
new methodologies
and perfecting existing ones which do not use deception. Kelman (1967) suggests
role playing as an alternative to deception. Eisner (1977) suggests
using simulations,
naturalistic observation, and unobtrusive measures. Changing methodology will
change the nature of psychological research, but existing methods are already
questionable with the suspiciousness on the part of our subject population. Of
course, this may mean that we are unable to do research in some subject areas,
such as conformity or balance theory, at least until we develop
adequate procedures
which do not involve deception.
We should also be open and honest in our techniques of personality assessment.
Although this has been repeatedly proposed, it has never been adopted by large
numbers of psychologists. Kelly (1955) proposed what has come to be called the
credulous attitude. He said that if you do not know what is wrong
with the person,
ask him-have a straightforward talk with the person in an interview situation.
Wallace (1966) proposed that instead of concealing the purpose of the test, we
tell the person about it. For instance, on the Thematic Apperception
test, rather
than just having a person tell a story about a picture, ask him to
tell the sexiest,
or most aggressive, or most compassionate story he can think of. MeMahan (1969)
describes a personality test he published in which each item was
completely transparent,
so that the test takers could easily tell whether or not a given response would
count "against" them. Such tests, emphasizing openness, honesty, and
personal encounter, are much more in keeping with a Christian perspective than
are the more popular tests today.
References
Eisner, MS. Ethical problems in social psychological experimentation
in the laboratory.
Canadian Psychological Review, 1977, 18, 233-241.
Holmes, D.S. Debriefing after psychological experiments I. Effec
tiveness of postdeception dehoaxing, American Psychologist,
1976, 31, 858-867.
Kelly, G.A. The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton, 1955.
Kelman, H.C. Human use of human subjects: The problem of
deception in social psychological experiments. Psychological Bulletin, 1967, 67, 1-11.
McGuirc, W.J. Suspiciousness of experimenter's intent. In R.
Rosenthal & R.L. Rosnow (Eds.), Artifact in behavioral research. New York: Academic, 1969.
McMahan, F.B., Jr. Personality testing-A smoke screen against logic. Psychology
Today. January 1969, pp. 54-59.
Seeman, J. Deception in psychological research. American Psychologist, 1969, 24, 1025-1028.
Stagner, R. Psychology of personality. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974.
Stang, D.J. Ineffective deception in conformity research: Some
causes and consequences. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1976, 6, 353-367.
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Stricker, L.J., Messick, S., & Jackson, D.N. Suspicion of
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