Science in Christian Perspective
Fails to Grasp Ontological Basis for Problem
Clark Pinnock
McMaster Divinity College
Hamilton, Ontario Canada
From: JASA 30
(December 1978):
158-159. Response to Montgomery
and Wykstra
The biblical message is full of references to the mighty acts of
God in history,
and Christian apologetics has often sought to advance good reasons
for believing
in them. Wykstra has brought to our attention some aspects of the
Humean critique
of this apologetic effort, and urged on us the need to improve its cogency.
It is irresponsible to go no repeating worn out arguments which seem to have
been refuted without at least attempting to deal with the
criticisms. His paper
is somewhat limited in that it focuses narrowly on the work of one historical
apologist, John W. Montgomery, leaving the impression that everyone argues
exactly as he does. Had he referred to Norman L. Geisler's
Christian Apologetics
(Chapter 14) as well, he would have found, I believe, a more
convincing answer
to at least some of Flew's points.
In the historical apologetic based on the bodily resurrection of Jesus, it is
important to observe the full context of the putative event. If the
occurrence
he wrenched from its setting like a severed toe and held up to
view, of course
the Christian significance of it cannot he registered. It must he an anomaly,
evidence of the greater versatility of nature, or more likely a
fraudulent claim.
If the apologist permits this to happen, all is lost. In fact no
one ever comes
to believe the sign of the resurrection of Jesus in this way, as an isolated
and unrelated marvel. The resurrection event is part and parcel of
a much longer
narrative and belongs to the broader context of man's search for meaning and
for God. It occurs at the end of an extended period of Israel's experience of
God at work in her life and history. Its subject is Jesus of
Nazareth who announced
the coming of the kingdom of God and God's future vindication of
him. It stands
at the beginning of a history that still goes on in which Jesus is a living
reality to millions. And furthermore it has to be seen in the wider context
of the issues of life and death which confront us as humans In his allusion
to the death problem, Montgomery is no doubt referring to this
existential setting.
The historical apologist should not allow himself to be lured into
the position
of defending the resurrection as a naked event. Unbelief cannot be overcome
by the production of a single fact, any fact. lie must be prepared to argue
for the resurrection on a wider front, such that the evidence for it is part
of the evidential picture, not the whole of it. Neither Flew nor Jesus' first
century sceptics are going to be converted by the resurrection as a
hare event,
barring some rare Damascus road illumination. Several of Wykstra's points are
eased by this perspective. The obvious question is not, did God or nature do
it, but rather did this happen or not, are the reports true or not? It helps
to explain the validity of referring to the death problem and makes the Uri
Geller parallel a little less interesting or relevant.
The most serious challenge which Flew makes to the possibility of developing
a historical apologetic on behalf of a miraculous event is methodological and
epistemological. It is not dogmatic prejudice which excludes rational belief
in miracles, he holds, but simply the principles of historical knowledge. Our
knowledge of the past, Flew claims, is governed by the assumption
of the complete
regularity of nature we
have experienced. However this is worded, the impression is unmistakable that
however strong the evidence for miracles may be, it cannot be sufficiently
strong
to overthrow Flew's invincible naturalism. He would sooner cast doubt on the
integrity of the testimony, however credible, than believe in a
miracle. Surely
this is an odd variety of empiricism. A miracle is an event that can occur,
but not one that can be known to have occurred! Indeed, any evidence for it
can he dismissed without being examined. One wonders what could
falsify Flew's
conviction about nature. Evidently nothing factual could. Surely
this is invincible
naturalism, fideism without faith, Is it possible that Flew's belief in the
ultimacy of nature is an unfalsifiable assertion?
Let us suppose a person was eyewitness to a genuine
nature-overriding miracle.
On the basis of empiricism, the person would be justified, would he not, in
believing the evidence of his senses even though the event lacked
analogy with
his ordinary experience? But if a person is justified in believing
that a miracle
occurred on the basis of his own experience, could lie not tell it to others,
and would they not be justified in believing it too, provided they judged his
testimony veridical?
Flew's naturalism is so strong that he is prepared even to
sacrifice his empiricism
for it. I fault Wykstra for not seeing through Flew's pretension to the real
nature of his hesitation which is ontological as well as epistemological.
Unlike Wykstra, I believe Hume and Flew have been answered, The principles of
historical research do not require that we be imprisoned in a
naturalistic framework
that excludes any reference to transcendence. Just because we make
use of analogy
in evaluating phenomena strange to us, we are not committed to accepting
Flew's omnipotence of analogy which postulates the unchanging homogeneity of
all reality and makes our ordinary experience the final norm for
understanding
everything. History is the realm of the unique, and the dogma of omnipotent
analogy unduly restricts historical novelty within a frozen homogeneity and
represents a closed minded attitude which ill-befits the historical observer.
Flew has tied himself to the familiar, and refuses to allow God's
intervention
in history to burst through his analogies and open up for him the
new creation.
As for the objection to a selective use of the principle of analogy
in assessing
the probability of Jesus' rising or the Roman soldiers bungling
their job, Wykstra
is right to notice an improper use of probability calculus. Again,
it is a matter
of the entire complex of happenings which constitute the event.
Christians claim
that what this complex points to is a resurrection reality which bursts through
the expected and the ordinary, and their perspective on the whole
is as plausible
as any other, and I believe much more so. A more rationally
convincing account
of the origin of the church and her faith without the assumption of
the resurrection
event has not yet been provided, and it is the subtlety of Flew's
logical move
that he is able to avoid having to provide one. Behind Flew's methodological
hesitation there lurks dogmatic naturalism, and the apologist's
task is to get
beyond admiring the gracefulness of his logical footwork and expose unbelief
in its lair.