Science in Christian Perspective
Scientific Theorizing and Societal Good
EVELINA ORTEZA y MIRANDA
Department of Educational Foundations
University of Calgary
Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4
From: JASA 29 (March 1977): 4-8.
This paper discusses the problem of when to translate scientific
theorizing into
actual societal practice such that society will be in a state of psychological
readiness and be willing to accept whatever results may come out of
the scientific
experimentation. One suggestion is for society to develop a system of
scientific
beliefs such that what is scientifically desirable is also that which
is desirable
for man/society. To the extent that a societal system of belief
becomes thoroughly
scientific, to that extent the problem of psychological readiness
will be solved,
for the ends of Science and Man/Society will be one and the same.
The problem of psychological readiness may be dissolved, but at a
price that may
well cost the meaning and significance of human life made in the image of God,
If a society becomes thoroughly scientific in its total beliefs, it
must not expect
that convictions will be settled. Rather they will always be in a
critical state
that does not contribute to an individual/societal feeling of
totality and well-being.
Introduction
A major question for most scientists is when to translate theory into practice
such that the nature of its results is controlled and that society,
to which such
practices are to he applied, will he in a state of psychological readiness to
accept such predicted consequences, especially if they involve
changes in society's
basic system of beliefs expressed in its conduct of life. To disregard societal
feelings and human concerns over these matters is surely an immoral act. This
question arises, perhaps, because society continues to hold beliefs which may
be uninformed by knowledge (true scientifically! logically), which is
the result
of scientific theorizing. If society's beliefs were derived from such
scientific
knowledge, perhaps psychological readiness would not be a problem.
Societal scientific
beliefs would he supportive of scientific theorizing and of its attempt to find
out if their theories are true and if true in what ways they may be considered
desirable.
This paper inquires into two questions: (1) will the gap between
scientific theorizing
and that which is judged desirable be resolved if society holds
scientific beliefs,
and (2) will scientific social beliefs encourage a sense of societal stability
and cohesiveness, assuming that this is a social good?
Beliefs Based on Science
Let us envision a society where the basic beliefs are derived from scientific
theorizing and knowledge. Obviously, not all beliefs would be
acceptable scientifically
and the task for society is to 'refine' its beliefs such that they
meet the requirements
of scientific knowledge. Whenever scientific theorizing is refined, such that
its results are highly predictable, it is released to society for its
application.
The results of the applications are, of course, predicted to benefit society as
a whole. Should the results, however, turn out to be wrong, even
humanly destructive
and undesirable, society interprets this to he characteristic of the process of
theorizing-a trying and finding out with no promise of guaranteed
certainty. Some
risks necessarily remain, given that risk is a basic element in
belief. For whether
a belief is scientific or not, it never achieves apodictic certainty or else it
is not a belief. But the risks involved in scientific beliefs are minimized and
calculated on the basis of what is known as a result of scientific theorizing.
(This calculation does not obtain where beliefs are inspired solely
by the existence
of a Divine Order or a personal theistic God, because His reality is
independent
of man.) The risks are understood and accepted by society if it is
guided in its
practical conduct by scientific beliefs. Society is, therefore, always ready to
try out what science theorizes to be beneficial to man. Societal readiness or
fear that the dignity of life might be threatened are no problems.
For according
to the scientific theorists, society accepts the view that it is the
scientists'
laboratory. When a new theory is tried out and its results are judged good by
society, it itself having been a participant in the experiment, it is adopted
and practiced as a part of the plan of life.
Human Genetics
Huxley's speculation on how to improve the quality of human genetics,
for example,
could be tried out.' It is possible to divorce sex for love, from sex
for mere
(1) Will the gap between scientific theorizing and that which is judged desirable be resolved if society holds scientific beliefs? (2) Will scientific social beliefs encourage a sense of societal stability and cohesiveness?
procreation or breeding purposes. If such experiments indeed lead to
a scientifically
better genetic type of human species, and if there is also fulfillment of the
human need for physical love, then it is socially adopted. Of course,
the meanings
of certain concepts, such as marriage, family, wife, etc. may have to
be revised
in order to fit new social practices. But for scientific purposes, the changes
are justified and are, perhaps, insignificant when compared to the
possible improvement
of the genetic quality of the human race. With such improvement, new
human possibilities
could indeed be generated.
Evolutionary Theory
Indirectly, perhaps, the influence of other scientific theorizing upon societal
practices and human relationships is already evident. It is indirect because it
cannot be shown that there is a one-to-one correlation between the scientific
theorizing and new societal practices engendered by it, nor can it he
shown that
the particular scientific theorizing is the direct cause of such
societal practices.
The scientific theorizing referred to here is the biological
evolutionary theory.
Grounded in scientific evidences, its practical implications for a way of life
are easily accepted and implemented. Each one creates his own meaning, for life
as such has no meaning in itself. The destiny of each largely depends
upon one's
self. The values of society are wholly man-made, hence, changing and primarily
instrumental for the continuous search for the human good. Since
human life shares
the same basic elements as that of the lower forms of life, such as the amoeba,
the paramecium, etc. somehow it is suggested that human life is not as sacred
as when viewed as a creation of God, made after His own image. The sanctity of
human life can be easily obscured if not missed altogether. This is
not, of course,
to suggest that there cannot be a totally humane attitude toward
life, which may
he also one of respect, of decency, of compassion for that which is
human independent
of a belief in Cod. There can be a kind of "sacredness," a
"spirituality,"
in man which arises out of his human qualities. Nonetheless, there
have certainly
been those who drew, rightly or wrongly, implications from the
biological evolutionary
theory of life for new types of individual and societal human relationships. To
repeat, this is not to say that such influences or changes can be
directly attributed
to the theory itself. But it is not impossible nor illogical to say that one's
way of life, its meanings, and its activities may change when influenced by the
evolutionary theory of life.
Once the theory is made the justification for certain social actions,
practices,
and reforms, then it ceases to be a theory. The biological evolutionary theory
is not merely believed that but more important now believed
in, It becomes a scientific social belief which now operates as one
of the principles
that underlie basic practices of a way of life. The scientific
belief, a necessary
condition for actual practice, now displaces other beliefs that contradict it.
Displaced beliefs are treated as inquiries, subjected to criticism or
theorizing
in order to find out if they are worth keeping, modifying, or testing. If they
prove themselves acceptable to the standards of scientific knowledge, they are
retained in the belief system. Now they have a right to be believed
in, not because
society feels deeply about them, but because they meet the demands of the rules
of logic, of stubborn facts, and of human knowledge. As such, there is public
agreement about them as beliefs because they are not relative to the believers
but to the conditions of scientific knowledge which are independent of man.
Refining Scientific Beliefs
Having been subjected to scientific scrutiny, the accepted beliefs form a part
of the conditions of actual practice. Similarly, other beliefs will
be the object
of theorizing and criticism before their right to belong to the
societal scientific
belief system is ensured. Still other beliefs, however, failing to
meet the standards
of knowledge, are replaced by scientific theories which may have become beliefs
or presuppositions for the purpose of action. The process of
"refinement"
of beliefs continues ad infinitum; theories are accepted as scientific beliefs,
beliefs cease as beliefs and become theoretical inquiries and, in
turn, are either
accepted or rejected as beliefs once more, or, perhaps are rejected forever. On
and on the process goes until society's belief system is completely
"refined"
and consists only of scientific beliefs. Such a societal belief system then is
fully informed by scientific knowledge, to the extent that scientific beliefs
become identical with scientific knowledge itself. What one knows is also what
one believes in and is the basis of conduct in life. There are no irreducible
elements and the original problem of psychological readiness stated
in the beginning
of this paper is now solved.
Belief vs. Action
But, perhaps, this is too strong a claim to make. To say that there are now no
irreducible elements is to say that the grounds for knowing
(theoretical propositions),
the grounds for believing in them, and the grounds for acting on them
are identical.
But, surely, this is not so. To say that society holds scientific
beliefs is not
to say that what society holds is scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is
that which is true, and it is not a necessary condition for action. It simply
is. Scientific beliefs, on the other hand, are a condition for action informed
by scientific knowledge. The action, although based on scientific beliefs, is
not shown to be either true or false, but is rather judged to be desirable or
not, reasonable or not, etc. Likewise, saying that value judgments
are scientifically
informed is not to say that they are scientific statements. They
remain as judgments
and are assessed not as true or false statements but as sound,
reasonable, sensible,
meaningful, arguable, etc. judgments. The scientific theory, which is the basis
of the beliefs/action, is a set of logically related propositions and
is subject
to questions of logic. The hypotheses it generates respond to
questions of evidence.
The practices drawn
from the theory or induced from the hypotheses, however, do not correspond to
either logic or evidence, but to the question of desirability. The
act of believing
in the desirability of certain practices and practicing them are not matters of
truth or falsity. One may insist that he believes in the truth of the practice
because the practice is derived from a certain verified theory, for
example, biological
evolution (if it is verified). But saying this does not establish the truth of
the practice, because truth refers to the theory, not to the
practice. One asks:
"Is the practice sound, reasonable, etc?" but not "Is
the practice
true or false?" Of course, it is acceptable to say "Is the practice
based upon that which is true?" Granting that scientific knowledge informs
the question of the verifiability of the belief (is it true/false),
of the feasibility
of the practice (can it be carried out), such information, although necessary,
is not sufficient to make a decision on the desirability of the
practice nor does
it lead necessarily to action on such a decision. The conditions for knowing,
believing, and acting, (whether they be of the scientific kind or not) are not
identical; the gaps between and among them remain and they must be
reckoned with.
Scientific Desirability
It may be argued that the notion of "desirability" is no
longer a problem.
It is also informed by scientific knowledge such that what is
"desirable"
is "desirable scientifically." But what does this mean? To say that
an object is desirable to me means that the object has certain properties that
please and satisfy me. Independent of me, such properties would not
in themselves
have desirable qualities. It is I, therefore, that determine what
object is desirable
and what object is not. Now, if we speak of "desirable
scientifically,"
what are the desires of science? Obviously, we are not using "desires of
science" in the same way as "desires of persons." Science does
not have desires in the same way that people do. Rather to say that something
is "scientifically desirable" is to say that something has
qualities/characteristics
that meet the approval of science or scientific thinking. For example, to hope
that there can be different kinds of "banks" to house different human
organs from which those in need of replacement of an organ may draw,
may be repugnant
to society, given its supposedly humane attitude toward the human
person and his
organs. Or, the human organs may be "farmed out" in
"green houses"
where they could be nurtured (kept alive) while waiting for the call of those
in need of them.
There is nothing basically wrong about such ideas if they could be
put into practice.
Scientifically, the body is viewed as a machine, although admittedly complex,
and its different parts, when worn out, can be replaced. Heart and
kidney transplants
could be only the beginning of a systematic, total program of human
organ transplantation.
Such a practice, if possible, is attractive to science and its purposes, among
which are the continuous refinement of its techniques and
methodologies such that
a body of true propositions about the world, about society, and about humankind
may be developed. Science has been successful, on the whole, with its attempts
at knowing the world, but much less so at knowing human society and humankind.
To conduct scientific experiments on the latter entities is, indeed,
scientifically
desirable.
Is this to say that we are treating the human person with disrespect
in treating
human organs like pieces of hardware that are easily replaceable or like plants
that can he rooted or uprooted? Not at all. If anything, scientific knowledge
teaches us to view the human body as it is, that is, truthfully, as an object
that can be inquired into as thoroughly as possible such that its functions and
malfunctions may be understood. With such an understanding, much of what we now
know to be "incurable" diseases, even "old age," would be
no longer a threat to those who want to live a long life. More important, such
an understanding could possibly generate new types of human possibilities. But
to view the human body, on the other hand, with scientifically false notions,
with myths and superstitions, is to disrespect it. It is to encourage attitudes
of physical inadequacies and frailties, thereby thwarting any notions for new
potentialities for total growth.
Investing the human body with sentimental feelings prevents the study
of science
from knowing fully well what the human body is all about; hence some
public "good"
does not ensue. Science aims to correct societal beliefs about what
is desirable
and what is not. To say that something is "humanly desirable" is not
to say that something is "scientifically undesirable," Rather, it is
to say that it can also be "scientifically desirable." In
the same manner,
that something is "scientifically desirable" is not to say that it is
"inhumane, degrading to the human person."
"Science" and "human/
humane" are not mutually exclusive possibilities. Wrong thinking has made
them so.
To be scientifically desirable any practice must be in consonance
with the canons
and thinking of science If a practice fails to meet the standards of science,
such a practice must be either doubted, subject to further inquiry,
or rejected.
Any practice is justified on the ground that it is scientifically based, and,
therefore, contributing to the inspirations of science. The goal is science and
the fulfillment of its aims, which is nothing short of knowing everything that
is true, empirically and scientifically, of the world, of human society, and of
humankind. For purposes of experimenting with and testing some of its theories
on problems of human society, science views society to be the ideal laboratory,
with its members the objects of scientific experimentation.
Such a situation can, therefore, be envisioned, where the conditions
of knowing,
believing, and acting are completely reducible one to the other. It
is a societal
situation where the aim of life is to uphold science and the achievement of its
goals, to the extent that life is not only scientific but, more
important, science
itself. "Life" and "science," implicated in each other, are
one and the same.
Is this too much to ask of human society? Perhaps not, if the
conviction of contemporary
society is to develop and adopt a societal belief system that is
thoroughly scientific.
Scientific Belief and Societal Stability
What arguments may be made for societal scientific beliefs considering that the
encouragement of a stable society is a social good? A scientific belief system
is
Scientific beliefs provide society with certain goods, but to stabilize societal beliefs is not one of them.
viewed as a form of human development in man's understanding of
himself, his problems,
and his environs, with no sanctions from an Absolute Truth or God. Scientific
beliefs, like scientific knowledge, emphasize tentativeness, make no promise of
being right, true, adequate for all problems for all times and for us
all. Constant
criticism and examination of them, their bases, evidences, and
corresponding claims,
based on new questions and forms of inquiries, are encouraged. As a result, a
scientific belief system does not create a feeling of increasing stabilization
of belief nor does it encourage total commitment. On the contrary, one's faith
in scientific beliefs is constantly being undermined. There is only a
theoretical
attachment to them which could easily be suspended, replaced, or
discarded altogether
any time they are no longer functional or viable. One could ask: "Does it
really matter what one believes in? Or, does it matter that one
believes at all?
All is uncertain and beliefs make no difference. What is the use?"
A scientific system of belief, more analytic than synthetic, leads to further
questioning and criticizing, and not to the deepening of one's faith
in the system.
It does not lead to the cultivation of "settled
convictions" or "solidarity
of beliefs," but to the continuous settling and unsettling of
them. Constant
criticisms, which may lead to alteration of beliefs, create the loss of a sense
of uniformity of sentiment which is the condition of social
stability, the feeling
of total well being.
Claiming justification or criterion in contemporary knowledge,
scientific beliefs
cannot claim a monopoly of truths/Truth. Such an orientation
encourages the development
of different systems of beliefs and life styles, different
alternatives to values
and truths, and different points of view. These differences can become extreme
in their demands and radical in their insistence on certain kinds of values and
behaviors which may be deemed disruptive of societal unity. After all, no one
system of belief is strong enough to put down the claims of others or to show
that they are completely and totally wrong, while it is completely and totally
correct. Different systems of beliefs, each one threatening the viability and
credibility of the other, could lead to societal divisiveness and
disruptions.
The critical orientation of scientific beliefs leads also to practical doubts,
suspension of action, hesitancy of conclusion, and other theoretical
moods which
are antithetical to the function of beliefs, which is to encourage action based
on one's convictions. Scientific beliefs characterize the present
academic posture
which is judged by contemporary youth to be ineffectual, sterile, and
irrelevant,
a cop-out. Highly informed of knowledge and made critical by logic, it is impotent
of action! In behaving like scientific knowledge, scientific belief
fails to fulfill
its function. Like scientific knowledge, it also says that because something is
possibly the case, does not imply doing something about it. The
motivation to
act is not a necessary condition of scientific beliefs.
Do we therefore arrive at the conclusion that societal beliefs must
not be judged
on whether or not they are informed by knowledge, sensible, or rational, but on
whether or not they are able to maintain the stability and well-being
of society?
Is a stable form of life, grossly empty of reason and truth, justifiable? Not
at all. The point is that a thoroughly scientific societal belief
system may not
be able to cope with all societal problems, the solutions to which
may sometimes
have to go against the rules of logic. Not all of life's problems are problems
of science, although, admittedly some aspects of some of life's
problems respond
to the inquiries of science. To the extent that such problems in life
do respond,
to that extent life can be scientific. But total life, with its hopes, dreams,
and aspirations, is not science. A societal belief system needs to be informed
by reason and truth, but need not be thoroughly scientific to the extent that
it is identical with scientific knowledge or science itself.
Conclusion
It is true that scientific beliefs provide society with certain human
goods, for
example, belief in medical science, belief in forecasts of climatic conditions,
belief in the "uniformity of nature," etc., but to stabilize societal
beliefs is not one of them. Given their orientation to constant
criticism, evaluation,
and clarification, everything, including life, can be dissolved under
the scrutiny
of truth and logic. "One begins to feel that his bread or the salvation of
his soul hangs on the fortunes of scientific and theoretical arguments."2
When criticizing is allowed to alter fundamental convictions to which most are
committed, then,
"it is like the trembling of a solid earth," and like "moving to
a new planet and the work must be begun all over again.3 But for society
to maintain a temporal continuity and to advance "it is
necessary that beliefs
should he transmitted together with problems and opportunities.
Unless the burden
is to fall, the young must not only grasp what the old have let go,
but they must
obtain the same foothold."4
It is possible for contemporary society to desire to adopt a
thoroughly scientific
societal system of belief, such that every societal practice is adopted because
it is scientifically based. Science then is the be-all and end-all of
such a society.
But before such a societal posture is adopted, the price that a given society
must pay must also be known. And after it is known, society must decide whether
or not it is willing to pay the price in the name of scientific
theorizing, scientific
knowledge, and Science itself.
REFERENCES
1Julian Huxley, Man in the Modern World: Selected Essays.
New York: Mentor Book, 1955. See chapter on "Eugenics and Society,"
pp. 28-61. In modern times, the attempt at "selective breeding" was
actually carried out by Heinrich Himmler's programme known as
Lebensborn. Needless
to say, Huxley and Himmler had different motives and interests. Other matters
relative to Huxley's point are discussed in Journal of American
Scientific Affiliation.
Vol. 26, No. 4, December, 1974.
2Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophic Tendencies. New
York: Longmans, Green, 1929, p. 21.
3Ibid., p. 12.
4Ibid.