Science in Christian Perspective
Brain, Mind and Computers
STANLEY L. JAKI
Department of Physics
Seton Flail University
South Orange, NewJersey 07079
From: JASA 24 (March 1972): 12-17. Comment by Richard H. Bube
A Search for a Proof
Originally, my book Brain, Mind and Computers
was supposed to be a chapter with the title, "Physics
and Psychology," in another book of mine, The Relevance of Physics. I must therefore say something about The Relevance to help
you understand the real aim of the Brain, Mind and Computers. The
Relevance grew
out of air experience which I had in 1952 as a young professor of
systematic theology.
In that year the lectures had to he on the essence, existence and attributes of
God. It was then that the idea seized me that I should work out a
watertight and
overpowering proof of the existence of God based
modern physics' and astronomy.
In retrospect this was brashness itself, but perhaps natural for a
scholar still
in his twenties. I must say, however, that I vent about the business
rather methodically.
Providence too helped. Through a surgical mishap I lost my voice and
had to give
up teaching. It did not take too long to decide what to do with all the time on
my hands. Since I already had a B.S., I entered graduate school in the fall of
1954. My hopes were that by the time I had my Ph.D. in physics I would have the
proof in my hands.
I received my Ph.D. four years later, but not the scientific proof of
the existence
of God. Luckily enough, I was still without my voice. This meant ample time for
further studies. During my graduatestudent years it became evident to me that
the question of a scientific proof of the existence of God had a very important
history to it. As a result, I spent the years 1958-60 reading history
and philosophy
of physics at Stanford and Berkeley. It was there and then that I received the
answer to my problem. For reasons inherent in the method of physical science,
no watertight proof of the existence of God can be built on its data
and conclusions.
But this also meant that no
refutation of the existence of God could he built on physics either.
This was my first glance in depth on the limitations of exact science
and of its
method. I also soon began to realize that I learned something which
had tremendous
bearing on the whole context of modern scientific culture. It was not difficult
to see that the major ills and woes of our modern society come from
an undue emphasis
on the scientific or quantitative method. In all this there was no
basically new
insight. Others said it long before me, but one aspect of the problem was still
to be spelled out in detail. This special aspect consisted in giving a detailed
documentation of the limitations of physics through the very words of its best
practitioners. To present the
limitations of physics convincingly, it had to be done by physicists themselves
and by physicists of all ages.
This is what The Relevance of Physics is about. It is a
multidimensional analysis
of the history of physics through the reflection of physicists on
their own aims,
hopes, accomplishments and failures. By multidimensional analysis I mean that
the book retraces the history of physics through eight different angles. Four
of these relate to the frustrated hopes of reducing other areas of studies to
a branch of physics. In The Relevance I tried to illustrate this failure with
respect to biology, philosophy, ethics and theology. Originally I also planned
in that section of the book one more chapter that has grown into a
separate book
with the title Brain, Mind and Computers. In it I did not aim at
producing a resounding
proof of brain-mind dualism. I merely tried to show that when it comes to the
problem of brain-mind interaction the positions known as physicalism,
reductionism
and behaviorism, fall very short of their high-flying claims.
Defense of Dualism
In other words, if I have made any contribution to the question of
the brain-mind
relationship, and to the defense of dualism, it was a negative one.
What I tried
to do was to clean the air, to dissipate some heavy fog, to unmask a
very systematic
and very successful publicity campaign which tries to create the illusion that
every notable investigator of the topic has turned his back on dualism.
Whether I succeeded is really unimportant. But we must recognize that in every
major field of human endeavor, proofs and demonstrations have a
restricted role.
Much depends also on creating or dissipating a mental or cultural atmosphere.
To take an example, nobody has ever proved that the universe was a
clockwork mechanism,
but for two centuries everybody came to believe it. How did this
happen? Any student
of cultural history knows it or should know it. It came about by a combination
of wishful thinking and of a systematic publicity campaign. Those of
wishful thinking
wanted a disarmingly simple solution; those of the publicity campaign had an ax
to grind. Voltaire and the encyclopedists made no secret about that.
Future history will tell how much planning has been behind the attack
on the world
of values and on dualism in particular by 20th-century physicahism
and behaviorism.
Preliminary conclusions can, however, be safely drawn by those who
have some insight
or first hand experience into the hiring policies of many departments
of psychology,
sociology and philosophy. The presence of wishful thinking should be
all too evident
for those who can read between the lines, or Who have read, for
instance, Skinner's
Walden Two.
Of course, as long as theological and philosophical values were the target of
this campaign and wishful thinking, the academe, society and
publicity-media kept
applauding. There was no particular concern shown either when man's mind became
equated with a feedback mechanism. Things, however, suddenly went sour when a
new generation began to implement a basic tenet of their elementary,
high-school
and college education. The tenet is that ethical values are merely
patterns that
can and must keep changing. Consequently, all that is needed for the
justification
of a new morality or new social philosophy is that a sufficient
number of individuals
should act it out. The reasoning is that if you have a certain number of people
behaving in a specific manner, you have a pattern which however distasteful or
destructive, should be acceptable, because it is a pattern.
There is an inner logic in everything, or in a more colloquial form, one has to
pay the piper one day. Nowadays, modern society is doing just that,
but I wonder
if its own havoc would bring it to its senses. At least, I (10 not see any sign
that a serious reconsideration of false and destructive premises would already
be under way. Twenty-five years ago history had witnessed the conclusion of a
great crusade fought for human rights, for the inalienable rights of
any individual
whatever his color and social status. Today, expressions like
inalienable rights
of the individual, are frowned upon in the sophisticated academe as conceptual
dinosaurs.
Modern secular and technological society still has to come to terms
with an unavoidable
reconsideration. It still must admit that there is no escaping from
the labyrinth
of patternphilosophy except by recognizing that there is something eternal and
spiritual in man which should be given unconditional respect. Herein lies the
existential background of the ultimate explanation of the presence of
consciousness
and thoughts in man. As I said before, the fashionable and prevailing
presumption
is that mind and soul are only names and are of concern only for
theologians and
clergymen.
This was rather bluntly put two years ago by
Mortimer Adler in his book, The Difference of Mon
and the Difference it Makes. There he stated that the defense of an immaterial
principle in man, call it soul or mind, is today a matter of concern only for
Roman Catholics and Orthodox Jews. His failure to mention Protestants should be
rather revealing. At any rate I am most pleased to be among scientists who are
un
compromising Christians as well, who refuse to sell
out to pattern-philosophy and to a sophisticated godlessness
prevailing even among
Christians.
I also have to tell you that few things can shock me more than when I am told
by fellow Roman Catholic theologians, mostly younger ones, that we should not
be concerned with the defense of dualism. It is outmoded, they say, and we can
very well do without it. Well, I asked one of these whether he would
still exist
after his body had been duly cremated and his ashes scattered into the nearby
river? Then and only then did he realize the obvious, namely that
Christian existence
is inconceivable without the acceptance of dualism.
Vindication of Dualism
A reacceptance of dualism by secular society is the only road toward
social health.
Vindication of dualism
For reasons inherent in the method of physical science, no watertight proof of the existence of God can he built on its data and conclusions. But this also means that no refutation of the existence of God can be built on physics either.
means, of course, far more for us believing Christians. It means for
us the securing
of rational grounds without which faith cannot survive in any thinking man.
Vindication of dualism also means for us a basically
favorable climate in which one could speak more confidently about the
Magna Carta
of Christianity, the resurrection of Christ and our eventual
resurrection on the
last day.
The problem has a very deep relevance for each of us personally.
Moreover, a thorough
acquaintance with the problem can help a great deal in strengthening
Christians,
especially the younger ones, and increasing their number. I said
"great deal"
and frankly I am somewhat uneasy' about it. I should have rather said
"great
deal, yes and no".
A "great deal" is a quantitative expression. It refers to measurement
and measurement is always a comparison, along a scale. A good grasp
of the "grain,
Mind and Computer" problem should mean a great deal in a sense.
But I doubt
that good philosophy and good scientific philosophy alone can produce
many convinced
adepts for dualism. If dualism is still around and strong, it is
largely because
there are still Christians around, and Christians are generated not so much by
lengthy arguments as by the immediate, instinctive grasp of the
incomparable greatness
of Christ.
That Beethoven's Ninth Symphony or Rembrandt's Nightseateh are
incomparable masterpieces,
such a proposition must be grasped largely instinctively. By instinctive I do
not mean mystical or mysterious. What I have in mind was once very forcefully
expressed by the Nobel-laureate physicist, and a great Christian, A.
H. Compton.
As he discussed in a lecture at Yale the claim that the laws of physics left no
room for the freedom of will he raised his little finger, bent it and said: if
the laws of physics ever should come to contradict my conviction that
I can move
my little finger at will then all the laws of physics should be
revised and reformulated.
Of course, most people would say that they know that they can move their little
finger at will, and that they are conscious of that. But very few are those who
are able to see the immensity of such obvious experiences. Technical
discussions
about "Brain, Mind and Computers" can help a great deal to
deflate modern
biases against dualism. Such discussions can clear the atmosphere but would not
necessarily prompt one to an enthusiastic appreciation of the clean air, much
as lie may suffer from its pollution.
Arguments for Dualism
So much about some background factors that determine the value and
effectiveness
of those airclearing arguments. The rest of this paper should deal
with the arguments
themselves. The arguments are in a sense negative. They probe on four
fronts the
phvsiealist claim that with the advent of electronic computers one has on hand
a physical model on which the phsicalist explanation of mind can
safely be based.
But a physicahst explanation of mind also presupposes that the human brain is
really analogous to some specifically known mechanism, and preferably
to the electronic
computer. Again, a physicalist explanation of mind presupposes the successful
analysis and classification of all psychological processes along a quantitative
framework. Finally, it is the burden of the phvsiealist explanation
to show that
human reasoning corresponds to the combination of atomistie concepts, which in
turn are faith images of sense perceptions.
Do Computers Think?
It is these four major claims that are placed under
close scrutiny in the four chapters of the Brain, Mind
and Computers. Of the contents of the first chapter, entitled, "Computers
and Physics", I would here recall only one point. It is about
the endlessly
repeated claim of many present-day computer engineers and writers on computers
that computers do really think. They indeed succeeded in building up
a consensus,
an atmosphere in which it has become an infallible sign of progressive thinking
to attribute at least some rudimentary thinking ability to computers. To unmask
the fallacy of this consensus the historical approach seemed to be
rather appropriate.
Computers, it is generally believed, are the products of our own age. Actually,
they have a very long history. They have been in the making for the
past 300 years
ever since Pascal constructed the first adding machine. The next genius to work
on computers was Leibniz. Another mathematical genius, Charles Babbage, built
in the 1820's the first modern digital computers, and the first analog computer
was designed in the 187O's by Lord Kelvin and by his brother, Professor James
Kelvin. The twentieth century merely witnessed the electrification
and electronization
of those machines in the hands of Vannevar Bush at MIT and Aikcn at Harvard. If
there was in our century a truly creative addition to computer theory
it was the
work of John von Neumams. It concerned mainly the generalization of
memory storage
and of combinatory procedures.
All of these men, so distant from one another in time, temperament
and background
had at least one thing in common. They all took pains to emphasize
that computers
do not think in any sense of the word. You can find the detailed documentation
of this in the first chapter of my honk. To bring together
that documentation was a rather straightforward task. All I had to do
was to dig
up the material which was at most hinted at, hut usually passed over in silence
in all hunks on "thinking machines". Well, frankly, why that silence?
The art of burning bunks, of an
nihilating records, or of removing them from easy
circulation, or of keeping a methodic silence about them is more with us than
ever. It certainly does not indicate scholarship or objectivity or
unconditional
love of truth. But how would you expect the recognition from
plssicalists, allegedly
respectful only of facts, that all the great creative contributors
to' computers
had a view diametrically opposite to the physiealist claim about computers.
Physicalists, I am sorry to say, are more concerned about creating an
atmosphere
favorable to them, than about the careful, balanced presentation of
facts. A
When it comes to the problem of brain-mind interaction, the positions known as physicalism, reductionism and behaviorism, fall very short of their high-flying claims.
very good illustration of this is the way in which Babbage is handled in modern
computer literature. Take, for instance, the best modern monograph on Babbage,
Charles Babhage and his Calculating Engines, written by Philip and
Emily Morrison.
There, in a short footnote, you find mentioned that Babbage based a
proof of the
possibility of miracles on the theory of digital computers. Well, actually lie
wrote a whole book on this which was published as The Ninth
Bridgcwatcr Treatise,
a famous series of apulogetieal works discussing problems of natural theology.
Babbage was a must devout Episcopalian, of which no mention is made
in the Murrisons'
monograph. To crown the comedy, if not conspiracy, there is an excerpt from The
Ninth Bridgewater Treatise in the work by the Morrisons, but the excerpt is an
Appendix in the Treatise. It has little if anything to do with the
train of thought
which represented a most integral and important part in Babbage's intellectual
convictions, namely his religious and dualistic belief.
One may, of course, argue that Babbage was mistaken in basing a
scientific proof
of the possibility of miracles on computer theory. But this is purely
a secondary
matter. The important point is that no one
can gain an objective picture about Babhage's theory and philosophy
of computers
without a careful study of The Ninth Bridgcwater Treatise, a very
fine theological
work. But giving an adequate account of that work would also reveal
in one stroke
that the most creative contributor to calculating machines was also a
most literate
advocate of brain-mind dualism. It is of these and similar facts that
the physicalists
do not like to remind their readers or their audiences.
Brain Research
Physicalists do not like to dwell either on the long
series of rebuffs administered to them by brain research. Special
emphasis should
here be put on the expression "long series," as intellectual debates
often bog down in the gossip of the moment. How often do we hear
stated that such
and such a discovery led us to the threshold of a major breakthrough
and yet somehow
that magic threshold is never crossed. A sobering monograph could,
for instance,
he written on the role of wishful thinking in the evaluation of
recent biomolecular
research into the secret of life. But even more sobering should be a detailed
illustration of the fact that recent failures to produce life in
vitro are merely
the last phase of at least a centurylong process. This is not to suggest that
a dualist should be alarmed if selfreproducing units would be formed
in test tubes.
The step from the non-living to the living is enormous. But it should dwarf in
comparison with the gap that separates the living from what is living
and self-conscious.
So far there is no physicalist explanation for the former, and of
this phvsicalists
should constantly be reminded. The burden of producing quantitative,
experimental
proofs is on him and not on the dualist. Physiealists like to appear ten-feet
high. Actually they are stooped under the gigantic burden of
producing two proofs,
of which not even the far easier is in sight yet.
Christian existence is inconceivable without the acceptance of dualism.
The incomparably more difficult of the two is the still awaited
physicalist account
of memory and consciousness. Here again, the disparity could hardly he greater
between the physicalist claims and the profound mysteriousness that envelopes
the two areas. In the second chapter of my book, entitled "Computers and
the Brain" I dwelt at length on the enormous com
plexity of human memory, and of its dogged resistance
to any classification neat enough for the purposes of physicalists.
But in addition,
there remains the problem of identifying memory units, memory storing
and memory
retrieval processes in the brain. Headlines in the New York Times and
in Scientific
American notwithstanding, ignorance on these points is complete. The same holds
true about consciousness. There is no indication whatever that a physiological
explanation of thinking and consciousness is anywhere near.
Sir Charles Sherrington, the foremost student of brain in this
century, took indeed
the view that four hundred years of research would still be needed to have that
physiological explanation. Well, four hundred years is an awful lot of time and
prophecies of this type demand a great deal of faith. Sir Charles himself wrote
and spoke during much of his career in a style that could give no real comfort
to a dualist. Being a great scientist, he did not sweep under the rug
the enormous
difficulties which a physiological explanation of human thinking had to face.
But he looked askance at the notion of an immortal, immaterial
principle of human
cogitation as a violation of causal reasoning. While recognizing that
"mind,
for anything perception can compass, goes in our spatial world more ghostly as
a ghost," he also insisted in the same breath that
With the insertion into the human individual of an immortal soul . 'i trespass is committed. The very
concomitance of the two concepts, which seems a basal condition of our knowledge of them, is thrown aside as if forgotten. Such amplification of the one concept may he legitimate for a revealed religion. Its evidence then rests on the ground we do not enter upon here. But as an assertion on the plane of natural knowledge it is an irrational blow at the solidarity of the individual; it seems aimed against that very lsarmouy which unites the concepts as sisterconcepts. It severs them and drives oft one of them, lonely enough, on a flight into the rainbow's end.
This statement, made in 1940, was probably his most publicized utterance on the
matter, but not his last one. Twelve years later, he asked to his home Sir John
Eccles whom he considered his intellectual heir. I have the privilege to know
some details of that conversation from Professor Eccles himself, a good friend
of mine. Sherrington spoke a great deal about the mystery of
brain-mind interaction
and concluded: "For me now the only reality is the human soul." What
follows are the words of Professor Eccles who is, as you know, a
leader in brain
research and a Nobellaureate. "I did not break in to ask if this statement
was an act of faith expressing a religious conviction, though I thought he so
implied. Five days later he was dead."
Psychology
The soul to which Sherrington gave his vote refers today to a clearly
metaphysical
or theological reality. The original Greek name for soul, psyche, has of course
no metaphysical connotation when used to describe a major preoccupation of our
time, the study of psyche, or psychology. This change in semantics can easily
he understood if one takes a quick look at the origin of modern
psychology. Modern
psychology was horn in the wake of the first triumphs of Newtonian or
mechanistic
physics. Beginnings in intellectual history are difficult to define but Locke
is as good a choice as any to represent the start of modern psychology. It was
made in the hope that a physics of the soul could be written. Such was at least
the perspective in which Voltaire and Hume saw Locke's chief merit. A hundred
years later, during the early nineteenth century, textbooks of psychology often
carried titles, "intellectual Physics", "Mind Physics", and
the like. That the 18th and 19th eentury-assoeiationist phychologists looked at
physics as their idol, should he well known. The start of
psychophysics with Fechner
was also motivated by the hope that the data of psychology lend themselves to
a systematization exactly similar to the laws of physics.
Feehoer, most of the earl)' associationists, and Locke, were still
dualists. For
them the existence of a soul in a metaphysical sense was a tenet
which they refused
to doubt. The first major modern psychologist who combined
physicalism in psychology
with materialistic monism was Sigmund Freud. As he knew very little physics, he
boldly drew up in 1895 the plan of a "Project for Scientific
Psychology."
By this he meant the total and rigorous reduction of psychology to
physics. Within
a year he gave up working on the plan but not the hope. His system based on the
libido was still a physicalist account of psychology but without
physics and its
terminology. Freudian terminology was in fact so
"unscientific" (opposite
to quantitative and physical) that it served as a chief target of the
behaviorists.
Watson, for one, derided the "demonological terminology of the
Freudians"
while Freud described behaviorism as a theory "naive enough to boast that
it has put the whole problem of psychology out of court.
In this patently bitter conflict you have in a nutshell the rest of
the frustration
of 20th century physicalist psychology. On the one hand, there is the
deep seated
antagonism between psychoanalysts and behaviorists. The former claim
that introspection
and empathy are basic tools of research, but for behaviorists introspection is
an anathema, in the camp of psychoanalysis the clashes are very sharp between
the followers of Jung and Freud. Equally uncompromising is the
opposition in the
behaviorist camp between theWatson-Skinner school and the
Gestaltists. And please
remember, the hone of contention is always physics, or rather the
measure of carrying
physics into psychology. Jung parted with Freud because he saw in
Freud's posiealism
an abdication of human personality, of its strivings and its
goal-directed attitude.
The Gestaltists in turn accused \Vatson and his school of their failure to make
use in psychology of the conceptual wealth developed by modern physics.
However that may he, one thing should he certain for any unbiased
student of 20th-century
psychology: it is not a science in the sense physics is a science. The data and
the subject matter of psychology are as com
plex as ever, and have such strange features that their handling by the methods
and concepts of physics is simply impossible. This is a lesson which a dualist
cannot afford to forget. It is also a lesson of which physiealist
should be constantly
reminded. For if man is truly a servomechanism and nothing else, then why is it
that the great realm of man's psyche just cannot be pigeonholed into the narrow
and simplistic categories of mathematical and physicalist psychology?
There is no indication whatever that a physiological explanation of thinking and consciousness is anywhere near.
Such questions do not cut much ice, I know, with most cultivators and
interpreters
of psychology. The reason for this is their tragic philosophical shallowness.
Gone are the day's when a giant of psychology, like William James, no friend of
dualism, could still have a clear perception about the anguish of monists, and
about their true predicament: "The monists," he wrote, ...writhe like
worms on the hook to escape pluralistic or at ]east a dualistic language, but
they cannot escape it." Gone are the days of plain logic and
straightforward
recognition of such basic truths that no one can make a silk purse
out of a sow's
ear. The most relevant truth about physicalist psychology is still
the statement
made by Priestlcy, one of the founders of associationist psychology:
"I see
clearly and acknowledge readily, that matter and motion however subtly divided,
or reasoned upon, yield nothing more than matter and motion still." Much
of the confusion in today's psychology comes from the fact that
pbysiealists can
be so forgetful of such an elementary truth.
Whether they are forgetful can only be known by inference. All one
knows is that
they do not talk or write about these things. And you know,
pbysicalists are fond
of pointing out that all that man can observe are material, physical
signs. However
that may be, physicalists talk and write profusely and by this very fact they
unwittingly trap themselves. Language and its written symbolism are
the very rebuttal
of physicalism. True, we know about thoughts and concepts only through spoken
or written words, but it is also well known that concepts are not
strictly codified
in words. There is always some overlap, some undefinable margin of uncertainty,
the like of which does not and cannot occur with machine components.
Wittgenstein
learned that through his frustrating failure to find atomistie concepts, from
which the rest of thought could be mechanically built up. His failure
was rather
inexpensive as compared with the failure of those who tried to do
something similar
with languages. What I have in mind is the highly subsidized program of machine
translation. After two decades and after millions of dollars, it has now been
largely shelved. Yet, machine translation is only the most elementary part of
the so-called quantitative systematization of language.
Science of the Quantitative
This reference to "quantitative" should serve as an
opportunity to clear
up one possible misunderstanding. Perhaps I gave the impression that I conceded
to the physicalist whatever was quantitative in human thought and experience.
Far from it. I merely tried
to emphasize that phvsicalists have not even reached first base
unless they have
succeeded ssith the quantitative systematization of brain research,
of psychology
and of conceptual analysis. As far as the record shows they do not seem to have
any chance in this respect. But suppose they do. Should then a dualist throw up
his hands? Not at all. He has not vet used his most effective weapon,
which really
strikes the phvsiealist in his presumed stronghold, the realm of the
quantitative,
and especially the realm of quantitative proofs. These latter rest on
our ability
to count and to do arithmetic in a consistent way. As consistency presupposes
laws, counting too makes sense only if it is done according to some
laws of arithmetic. Depending on the extensiveness of the arithmetic one uses, its laws too form a
more or less extensive set. This set also must have its proof of consistency or
else 2 and 2 will not always and necessarily make 4 and the whole
enterprise will
collapse.
In 1931 Godel proved that no sufficiently broad set of laws of arithmetic can
have its proof of consistency within itself. To have the proof, one must reach
after assumptions lying outside the set and to prove these assumptions the same
step should he repeated again and again. This means that to prove the
consistency
of the science of the quantitative one must rely on considerations
which the prevailing
jargon calls metaquantitative or metamathematical. In older times
when there was
still more courage to call a spade a spade, one would have said not
metamathematical
but metaphysical. Well, I do not wish to argue about words. The explanation of
man by machines completely breaks down if one admits at least the
realm of metamathematieal.
Steps that are metamathematical or metaquantitative, cannot have by definition
quantitative symbolization which as machine parts could he built into
a computer.
Machines Cannot Even Add
My last remark, in this connection, should be a warning about an
often heard interpretation
of Gödel's theorem with reference to the mind-computer problem. The mind,
so goes the typical saying, can therefore do something that the machine camot
do, namely to formulate Godel's theorem and therefore the mind is
still superior
to machines. Implicit here is the admission that machines can do some
or a great
many
One thing should he certain for any unbiased student of 20th-century psychology: it is not a science in the sense physics is a science.
One
things that the mind can do, such as addition, multiplication,
extracting square
roots, performing numerical integration and even proving some
theorems of geometry.
Herein lies the worst fallacy of the whole modern discussion about
computers and
minds. Machines do not add, they do not calculate, they do not
integrate any more
than a gutter does not add or integrate by collecting millions of raindrops. In
an electronic computer not raindrops but electronic impulses are collected and
channelled along strictly predetermined routes. In the process no addition is
performed. It takes a mind, always a mind, to abstract meaning from
each step through which the machine is directed by its specific
man-built mechanism.
The ultimate proof of this has little or nothing to do with expertise
in computer
science. The ultimate proof rests on having a mind sensitive enough
for the enormous
magnitude of such basic human experiences as one's ability to move one's little
finger at will. Among these basic experiences is the uncanny sense of
having proved
something. It need not be an esoteric theorem in integral equations. It may be
as simple as Pythagoras' theorem which in my schoolboy days was
called pons asinoruln,
or the bridge for donkeys or rather dunces. Well, it certainly saved some poor
students as a last resort question, but it also doomed, legend has
it, the Pythagorean,
who discovered it. The Pythagoreans, as you know, were in a sense the
first physicalists.
They claimed that everything was composed of unit lengths. But the hypotenuse
of a right-angled triangle with unit sides is neither two nor one,
but the squareroot
of two, an irrational number.
Human Mind
It is the privilege and marvel of mind to find rhyme and reason even
in what may
appear irrational. It is the privilege of human mind to take for real what are
so aptly called imaginary numbers. Only the human mind can imagine,
that is perceive,
meaning under the layer of disconnected sense data. Only the human
mind can grasp
facts and also respect them. In this attitude of respect, which is definitely
not machine like, is comprised the whole dignity of man. Perception of truth is
only part of the story: man also must respect facts and truths to survive and
to make progress. No one put this more impressively than T. H. Huxley, Darwin's
champion and a sharp antagonist of dualists: "Sit down before
fact as a little
child, follow humbly wherever and whatever abysses nature leads, or you shall
learn nothing." Since this is my favorite quotatint) which I
have been carrying
in my breastpocket for years, I should tell you something about it. It is from
a letter of Huxley to an Episcopalian minister, Kingsley, who in a long letter
tried to comfort Huxley and to raise his eyes to things eternal following the
death of Huxley's seven year old son. Huxley's reply was polite but defiant. He
urged Kingsley to have full respect for the facts of nature, which in Huxley's
view excluded soul, God and eternity.
Well, if facts are only the facts of nature then perhaps Fluxley was right. But
there are also the facts of human experience and the facts of history. Nothing
shows better their paramount importance than the fact that the facts of human
experience and history cannot be repeated. Unlike the facts of nature, they are
unique.
Without respect for these facts, there can he no true respect for facts
of any kind, including the facts of nature.
I wonder if Iluxley ever sat down before one fact in particular, the
fact of the
child from Bethlehem and with the open receptive eyes of a child, with the same
unconditional respect which he advocated for the lifeless facts of
nature. Clearly,
somewhere, there was some bias, some oversight. This is all the more
regrettable
as Kingsley's letter to Huxley made it sufficiently clear, that dualism rests
ultimately' on respect for facts, for all facts without any restriction and on
one's willingness to be led by them even if the journey is hound to
eternity.
OTHER OPTIONS?
Richard H. Bube
Department of Materials Science
Stanford University
Stanford,
California 94305
From: JASA 24 (March 1972): 14-15.
Models of the relationship between body and soul can be classed as belonging to
one of four groups.
Strict Dualism. A strictly independent soul is viewed as living in a strictly
independent body. The soul is the true person, and it manipulates the
body during
life. At death, the body passes away as the vehicle of the soul, and the soul
continues its existence in a disembodied state.
Piano-Player Analogy. The whole human personality is compared to the music produced by the cooperative interaction of the piano
(body) and the piano player (soul). The soul is independent of the
body, but the
functioning of the person requires interaction between body and soul.
The person
can be affected either by interacting with the piano alone (the body)
or by interacting
with the piano player alone (the soul). Although the soul remains upon death of
the body, the person per se does not function wholly until the
resurrection.
Emergent Systems Property. The soul is still presented as a reality,
but a reality
which is produced as an emergent property of the living system of a
human being.
As life is produced as an emergent property of a non-living system by
the appropriate
patterned in
teractioo of the non-living subsystems, so soul is produced as an
emergent property
of non-soul subsystems when they interact according to the appropriate pattern.
At death the identity of the person is retained in the mind of God,
and he himself
passes from death to new life in the resurrection.
Materialistic Exclusionisns. In this model man is describable simply in terms
of the physics and chemistry of the matter of which he is composed. There is no
such a reality as soul, and all apparent experiential evidence to the contrary
is only an illusion. When the body dies, the man dies totally and
permanently.
In his paper, Dr. Jaki speaks as if only the first and last of these
options were
available. Since the model of materialistic exclusionism is strongly non-
Christian, he is forced to the defense of strict dualism. It is quite possible,
however, that the realities he seeks so devoutly to maintain may be
advanced with
even greater fidelity by investigating the possibility and the significance of
the second or third options. It is my own opinion that the third option is by
far the most helpful in tackling problems in which a coherent picture
of the relationship
between body and soul is mandatory.