Science in Christian Perspective
The Concept of the Soul in Psychology and Religion
J. K. HOWARD*
Health Department Liverpool, England
From: JASA 24 (December 1972): 147-154.
The study commences by querying the validity for either psychology or religion of the concept of the soul. Traditional religious concepts have always given a prominent place to man's soul as a distinct entity. It is argued that this idea derives from Platonic philosophy and historical evidence is adduced to support this contention.
The Christian religious viewpoint must be founded upon the biblical data and these do not provide any grounds for the traditional 'dipartite' or 'tripartite' views of man. On the contrary, it is argued, the Bible sees man as a unity, a single! personality. Similarly modern psychology begins with the 'person.' Modern views of the personality are discussed and it is maintained that the overwhelming consensus sees personality as dependent upon bodily integrity, particularly that of the central nervous system.
It is argued that for both religion and psychology the only valid view of man is as a unified and integrated personality. The practical implications of this are very briefly discussed.
The late C.E.M. Joad was renowned for his insistence upon the need for adequate
definition, and it is a commonplace of human experience that much of
the misunderstanding
that may arise between one person and another does so as a result of
imprecision
in language and a lack of mutually accepted definitions of terms. It
might, therefore,
with reason, be argued that a discussion of the concept of the soul
in psychology
and religion should begin with a definition of what we are to
understand by 'soul'.
Such a course of action, however, would be to 'put the cart before the horse'.
It is a manifest impossibility to arrive at a meaningful definition
without possessing
all the relevant data. Furthermore, we must ask ourselves whether the concept
of 'the soul' as a distinct entity possesses either validity or
meaning. In order
to reach a decision it is essential for us to examine the
psychological and religious
views of man's constitution. It should be added at this juncture that, for the
purposes
of the present study, the term 'religion' will be taken to mean 'the Christian
religion'.
From the biological standpoint there is nothing by which we cars quantitatively
distinguish man from the other animals. While there may be
differences in degree, there is no absolute difference in biological terms between man, and say,
the higher apes. On the other hand the Judaeo-Christian tradition affirms that
man stands as distinct from the rest of the animal creation. The
biblical record
states that man was created in 'the image of God'. Does this then
imply that man
has some sort of spiritual 'extra' - a 'soul'? The traditional
religious viewpoint
would almost certainly reply in the affirmative. It is, however, our conviction
that this viewpoint is defective and misleading, and it will be part
of the purpose
of this study to argue that the concept of a 'soul' cannot be
considered as meaningful
for either psychology or religion and should thus be discarded.
Before any misunderstanding
can arise, let it be stated clearly that we affirm man's distinction from the
rest of the animal world. Man alone, as far as we can tell, is
capable of making value-judgments and man alone is the one that the biblical record
presents as being
able to co-operate as a willing agent in the purposes of God. Further, it was
through a Man that God chose to redeem His creation.
Before proceeding further with our argument, however, it is essential that we
look briefly at the traditional religious concept of the soul.
Traditional Statements concerning the Soul
It is surely axiomatic that the Bible is to be considered as the foundation for
the Christian faith. The Christian viewpoint and the formulations of Christian
doctrine should owe their origin to the biblical data, irrespective
of the precise
terminology we may use in our statements. The question we must face
at the outset
is whether the traditional statements of the doctrine of man are derived from
the biblical data or whether they owe their conception to categories of thought
which are essentially unbiblical. It is our conviction that the latter is the
case.
In seeking to establish this contention we shall begin with a
reference to Plato's Phaedo. This is an imaginary report of a discussion Socrates is
supposed to have
held in his condemned cell. In the course of the discussion we have propounded
the essence of the Greek view of the soul. It is conceived as being immortal,
immaterial and like the divine.1 0. Cullmann summarizes the viewpoint
as he writes,
the 'body is only an outer garment which, as long as we live, prevents our soul
from moving freely and from living in conformity to its proper eternal essence
... (Death) looses the chains, since it leads the soul out of the prison of the
body.2 This conception was to be developed later by the Neoplatonists, especially
Plotinus and Proelus, into a more cohesive form. Almost inevitably, Christian
thought was greatly influenced by this viewpoint as it moved further from its
Palestinian roots into the Hellenistic world.3
The systematic formulation of these ideas into Christian doctrine
came with Augustine
of Hippo. His view of the soul was thoroughly Platonic. It was an
immaterial and
indestructible substance which ruled the body. It was to be
considered the mirror
of the divine nature corresponding in its faculties to the Trinity itself.4 Augustine's
writings were to exert a profound influence upon the development of Christian
thought down to, and beyond Thomas Aquinas and the development of
mediaeval Aristotelianism.
Aquinas himself, although renowned for introducing a system which
harmonized Christian
thinking with Aristotle,
was nonetheless also influenced by Neo-platonic concepts. His view of the soul
differed from that of Augustine in many respects, especially in considering the
soul as united with matter to produce the 'form' of the body, yet he
still thinks
of it as occupying an intermediate position between purely material and purely
spiritual. Man's understanding is the demonstration of the soul in his system
and is evidence of its spiritual nature and its immortality.5
The concept of a "soul" cannot be considered as meaningful for either psychology or religion and should thus be discarded.
Not suprisingly the Reformation theologians, in view of their
cultural and intellectual
background, did not move from these basic presuppositions in regard
to the soul.
They formulated their 'doctrine of man' in the traditional categories
of a christianized
Greek philosophy. Calvin, for example, speaks of the soul as 'an immortal, yet
created essence . . . an incorporeal substance.6 Calvin represents a return to
Augustinian thought rather than the Aristotelian concepts of the schoolmen, but
the basic categories remain the same.7 In each case, in fact, it is
apparent that
the understanding of the soul of man was based upon metaphysical
speculation rather
than observed or recorded data. While certain shifts of emphasis
occurred through
the years the governing presuppositions remained unaltered.
What is surprising is to find that these viewpoints are still held by a large
number of modern theologians. Two writers will illustrate this point.
L. Berkhof
develops a theory of 'realistic dualism' to explain the relation between soul
and body and writes, 'body and soul are distinct substances, which do interact,
though their mode of interaction escapes human scrutiny and remains a mystery
to us ... from the continued conscious existence and activity of the soul after
death it appears that it can also work without the body.8 It is important to
note the assumptions that are made here. In the first place the
'soul' is a distinct
substance, capable of being separated from the body and of surviving
death. This
is but a restatement of Platonism. Furthermore, he refuses to admit
that the nature
of the 'soul' and its relationship to the body are matters for
investigation.
The second example is a writer well known in evangelical circles of Christian
thought. Erich Sauer considers man to be 'a trinity in unity, and his invisible
inner being consists of two substances to be clearly distinguished'. These two
substances are 'soul' and 'spirit' and he goes on, 'the soul is the connecting
link . . . a "body" for the spirit, even as it is itself enclosed by
the body as its own material frame.9 Once again we are confronted by
the Platonic
conception of 'soul' as a distinct substance, but Sauer adds the
further thought
that the body is the 'frame' for the soul. This is little removed from the idea
of the body as a prison from which the soul is released at death.
Space precludes
mention of other modern writers who adopt the position we have
outlined and which
may be considered as the traditional conception of the soul.10
It is true that many theologians today have abandoned these
traditional formulations
and categories of thought, recognising the unbiblical origin; they
are, nonetheless,
deeply rooted in religious thought. Furthermore, it is this
metaphysical approach
which is generally viewed as the Christian understanding of man. It
is an essentially
speculative concept, and, while it may be considered a religious view of man,
we contend that it is not the Christian view of man. It is this
traditional concept
which is, rightly we judge, viewed as highly suspect by physiological
psychologists
and is one of the factors leading them to voice their strong
criticisms of 'religion'
for indulging in metaphysical speculation which bears no relation to observed
realities.
In this discussion we purpose to demonstrate that the biblical understanding of
the soul is far from these ideas derived from Greek philosophy.
Further, we also
hope to show that the view derived from the biblical data is in
essential agreement
with the findings of modern physiological psychology. The Bible is
concerned with
the wholeness of man and its basic concepts and assumptions are those of Hebrew
thought which stands in marked contrast to that of the Greeks."
The Biblical Concept of the Soul
If the traditional formulations concerning the nature of the soul are
judged inadequate
and misleading from the standpoint of the Christian religion, it is imperative
that an alternative view be propounded. Such a view, as we have
already indicated,
must be derived from the biblical data. We shall therefore commence our study
of the biblical concept of the soul by investigating the data
provided respectively
by the Old and New Testaments. In a study of this nature it will be impossible
to do more than indicate the essentials of our argument and it will
not be possible
to give any treatment of the possible objections to our thesis.
Before proceeding
further we should note two features of biblical syntax. The first is the use of
synecdoche, a figure of speech in which the part stands for the
whole. Secondly,
we should also be aware of the use of poetic parallelism, in which two or more
phrases standing side by side utilize different words to express the
same meaning.
These usages will become apparent as the study progresses.
The view derived from the biblical data is in essential agreement with the findings of modern physiological psychology.
Two words are of especial relevance to our study in the Old
Testament. These are
napes and rdah, usually translated by 'soul' and 'spirit' respectively in the
AV. Napes is etymologically related to the Akkadian napistu meaning 'throat',
'gullet', or 'neck'.12 It is used in this physical sense in a number of places
in the Old Testament. At Psa. cv. 18, for example, we have, 'His feet were hurt
with fetters; his neck (napes) was laid in iron'. Again, at Psa lix.
if. we read,
'Save me, 0 God, for the waters have come up to my neck (napes); I sink in the
deep mire, where there is no standing, I am come into deep waters,
where the floods
overflow me'. A further usage which is again essentially physical
is seen in the relationship expressed between napes
and blood, as at Gen. ix. 4; Lev. xvii. 11; Dent. xii. 33, etc. In this respect
the suggestion has been made that this is the way we are to understand napes at
Gen. xxxv. 18-as her napes was departing ... she (Rachel) called his
name Benoni.
Death from post-partum haemorrhage was tragically common before the
days of blood
transfusion.
At this juncture we should take note of the fact that an essential feature of
Hebrew thought is the idea of movement.13 The Hebrew conceived his
world in dynamic
terms and this was naturally applied to the concept of living beings. The basic
distinction between the living animal and the dead one was that the living were
active, involved in constant movement. The man who was alive showed
this by doing
things, he worked, when necessary he fought, he ate and drank, he
fathered children
and so forth. This essential feature of all living things was
captured by an extension
of the use of napes. It came to represent the vitality of the individual and in
this sense was used of anything that was alive. Thus the animals
share this characteristic
with man and can be called 'living souls' (Gen. i. 20,24; ii. 7, 9;
Lev. xi. 10,
etc.).
A. B. Johnson14 has conveniently summarized this usage under four headings. The
word may speak of the principle of life as at I Kings iii. 11; Gen. xxxvii. 21.
It may refer to the physical vitality of an indivdual as at Num. xi.
6; Lam. ii.
12, etc. Then again it may be used to express affect, a man's
emotional vitality
as at Psa. xlii, 6; Job. iii. 16. Finally, it may speak of the
volitional vitality
of the individual, expressive of will and purpose. as at Gen. xxiii.
8; Num. xxi,
5; Dent. xxi. 14; II Kings ix. 15. The intrusion of death into
individual existence
brings about a cessation of all activity, whether physical, emotional
or volitional.
The coming of death thus means the loss of vitality, the loss of
napes. Accordingly,
we find such expressions as all the days that he separates himself to the Lord
he shall come at no dead body (napes)' (Num. vi. 6, see also vi, 11; Lev. xxi.
1; Hag. ii. 13). A dead man is a dead napes.
When the biblical creation narrative states that, 'the Lord God breathed into
his nostrils the breath (rs2ah) of life; and man became a living soul (napes)'
(Gen. ii. 7,) we may conclude from what we have seen of Old Testament
usage that
there is no thought here of some metaphysical essence. Writes G. A. F. Knight,
'the result of God's action was not a soul within a body, one that could later
be extracted from that body and which would then continue to exist apart from
that body, when the body finally crumbled into dust. Man is not an amalgam of
two separate entities, dust and the breath of life. He is one entity". The
napes thus becomes the totality of conscious being, or, as we may put it, the
personality expressed in the wholeness of vitality at every level of existence.
It is for this reason that we find napes standing in place of the
personal pronoun,
a fact that will be seen from an examination of the references
already provided.
In the Old Testament 'soul' is 'not meant as a tert inns quid between
spirit and
body, but denotes the totality." Man's 'soul' is the man himself.
Two other words require brief mention in order to complete our picture of the
Old Testament view of man's personality. Closely related to nepes is the word
ruah, a word which contains the basic idea of air
In terms of biblical psychology, man does not have a "soul," he is one. He is a living and vital whole .... From the biblical point of view the concept of "the soul" is meaningless and has no validity.
in motion. In a high proportion of cases the word is used in this
original sense
of wind-'He commands and raises the stormy winds' (Psa. cvii. 25).
The word, however,
became related to man's being and was used of the power and vitality of human
life. The creation of man, as we have already noted, commenced with the 'breath
(n2ah) of life' being breathed into him. Air, by virtue of its oxygen content,
is essential for the life of all but the more primitive forms of
animals and plants.
Throughout his life man is dependent upon the air lie breathes, but
the movement
of air in terms of wind and tempest suggests power and energy. Thus,
by metonymy,
that which man requires for the continuance of his vitality, becomes
the vitality
of being itself.
Any unusual manifestations of power or energy could be described as having or
showing more 'spirit'. This was often used in relation to Cod-given
vitality for
some special purpose (e.g. Gen. xli. 38, 39, judges xv. 14, etc.).
What is important
to note is that in every instance to be filled with 'spirit' implied
action. Indeed,
one could go so far as to say that to be filled with 'spirit' and not engaged
in some activity, not performing some action, is a contradiction in terms .17
It is also important that we do not personalize this manifestation of God-given
vitality-the concept of the Holy Spirit as a mode of God's being related to the
life of the Church belongs to the post-Easter theology of the New
Testament.
In much of Old Testament usage there is little to distinguish ruah from napes
(note Isa. xlii. 5, etc.). The word is used to mean 'self' or simply
life. Furthermore,
the whole animal creation shares with man this 'vital breath' (e.g., Gen. vi.
17). Commonly ruah is used to express the vitality of the mind as expressive of
the whole personality (Psa. xxxii. 2, lxxviii. 8, etc.) and it may also be used
to describe a man's inclinations and desires (e.g., II Chron. xxi. 6; Num. v.
14; Hos. iv. 12, etc.). In none of these usages, however, is it
possible to make
any absolute distinction between napes and ruah. Both words denote
the life within
a man and the individual himself in the expressions of his total
personality.
A number of physical expressions are also used to denote the totality
of man reflected
in a particular action, activity or emotion. The word 'flesh' is to
be noted particularly,
especially the fact that it is never used as something over against
nepcs or rdah.
The flesh is simply the outward form or expression of the nepes. It
is the living
form of the personality, or, as Eichrodt has put it, 'the necessary expression
of our own individual existence, in which the meaning of our life
must find expression'."'
As H. Wheeler Robinson has pointed out,'9 however, it is often used
to emphasize
the fact that, in comparison to God, man is frail, dependent and
incapable. Other
words such as 'heart', 'hand', 'foot', 'mouth', and so on are also used, by the
use of
synecdoche, to speak of the whole personality (e.g., job xxiii. 11, etc.).
It is the concept of man that is taken over into the New Testament.
While of necessity
the vocabulary was Greek rather than Hebrew, the underlying ideas that governed
the use of the words was Hebrew rather than Greek. In the writings of Paul, for
example, we look in vain for any evidence of Hellenistic dualism. Indeed, as N.
P. Williams has pointed out, to ascribe such ideas to Paul is a psychological,
ethical and spiritual impossibility.20 No sustained argument is necessary to
justify the assumption that ideas found in the Old Testament are fundamental to
the understanding of much of St. Paul's teaching.21
As in the Old Testament we are faced in the New with an holistic view of man.
The New Testament was written out of a conviction that the coming of Christ had
brought about a remarkable and radical transformation of human existence, but
this change did not alter man's eontitotion. Rather, the coming of
Christ restores
man to the wholeness of being which he had lost as a result of his divorce from
Cod. The action of Cod in Christ brings to man, for the first time
since the Fall,
the possibility of realizing his full potential. In one sense the power of the
divine life adds a new dimension to man's being, but in another it brings about
that inner harmony of being which allows the total development of personality
in relation to God'.22
The key word in the New Testament is psyche which is generally
translated as 'soul'.
In some senses it stands as equivalent to the Hebrew nepes. It may simply mean
a person's life as at Phil. ii. 30, where Epaphroditus is said to have risked
his life (psyche) on Paul's behalf (note also Matt. ii. 20; Mark iii. 4; Acts
xv. 2v 26, xx. 10 etc.). Again the word may be used to describe man's
volitional
activity, his vitality of purpose, as at Acts H. 32, xiv. 12; Phil. i. 27; Heb.
xii. 3, etc. In these instances the use of psyche can hardly be distinguished
from the other Greek words used in the New Testament to express
purpose and will.
Similarly we find psyche used to denote emotional activity (e.g. Mark xiv. 34,)
and there is one example of particular interest involving both volitional and
emotional ideas. At Mark xii. 30 (=Matt. xxii. 37) our Lord outlines
man's proper
response to God. By the relationships of the words in this verse it
is clear that
psyche in this context refers to the totality of man's being and not
to some part
of it.
At other times the word is used in place of the personal pronouns when greater
emphasis is desired (e.g., Luke i. 46, xii. 19; Acts ii. 41, vii. 14;
Rom. xiii.
1, etc.). In many instances, however, man's vitality is expressed by
another word, pneuma, usually translated 'spirit'. Indeed, this seems to be the more common
word in the New Testament and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that
this may have been to avoid the metaphysical overtones of psyche. In
certain contexts
the two words are used with identical meaning (e.g., Luke i. 47).
Moreover, pneuma
may speak of the mind (Acts xix. 21; II Cor. H. 13), and may be expressive of
purpose (Phil. i. 27, where, once again, it is equated with psyche).
In cooperation
with soma (body) it denotes the totality of human personality (I Cor., v. 3-5,
vii. 34).
Both the words we have discussed are many-sided and in each ease it
is the context
that gives the clue to the meaning. In this respect it is essential
to distinguish
when pneuma is used of the human personality in its various expressions and
when of the Spirit of God which we may view as the transforming life and power
of God at work in the human situation and adding, as it were, a
totally new dimension
to human experience. As such it stands in complete contrast to everything that
characterizes this age of sin and death; it is the principle of the life of the
age to come. In this sense pncwoa may stand in contrast to psyche. Paul's words
make this clear, 'the first man Adam was made a living soul (psyche); the last
Adam a lifegiving spirit (pneuina)' (I Cor. xv. 45). By his incorporation into
Christ the personality of man takes on an added dimension, that of
the incorruptible
life of God. This, however, is a somewhat specialized use of the
concept. In normal
usage it is impossible to distinguish between psyche and pneuma as
representative
of man's personality.
Thus, in both Old and New Testaments we are presented with an holistic concept
of man. In terms of biblical psychology, man does not have a 'soul', he is one.
He is a living and vital whole. It is possible to distinguish between
his activities,
but we cannot distinguish between the parts, for they have no
independent existence.
'Man is an entity, quite indivisible into his various elements, even
though aspects
of his personality, such as his appetites, his affections, his moral purposes,
may be examined and handled one by one, just as we can look at each side of a
coin in turn'.23 From the biblicial point of view the concept of 'the soul' is
meaningless and has no validity. The consequences of this approach will occupy
us at a later stage of the discussion. We must now turn to consider
the psychological
concept of the soul.
The Psychological Approach to Personality
In our consideration of the religious concept of the soul it was emphasized that
from the standpoint of Christianity our understanding must be based
on the biblical
data. In this respect we need to remember that the biblical data must
be elucidated
and the conclusions drawn with the same dispassionate care that would be taken
over the analysis of data from any laboratory experiment. In the same way, such
care is also demanded from the psychologist in the assessment of his
data. Some,
especially the representatives of the psychoanalytic schools, have
been as prone
to speculation as the theologians they so readily criticize. The
genuine scientist
must, as far as possible, maintain an objective and disciplined outlook, even
when the results he obtains and the conclusions he is forced to draw from them
appear to he in conflict with previously held theories. For this
reason we intend
to concentrate upon the views of those psychologists who are most consciously
endeavouring to follow the scientific method and base their
conclusions upon the
empirical data of experiment.
Little attention will be paid to the psychoanalytic schools of Freud and Jung
and their followers. Those who follow this approach have allowed a free rein to
their speculations, indeed, at times their imaginations! H. J. Eysenek remarked
some years ago that psychoanalysis 'is essentially non-scientific and is to he
judged in terms of faith and belief, rather than in terms of proof
and verification'.21
Our assessment is not intended as a value judgment; on the other hand
it is essential
for us to be aware of the subjectivity and intuition upon which psychoanalysis
is based. Deliberately and con
sciously the psychoanalysts have not based their work
The integrity of the personality is to be considered dependent upon the proper functioning of the central nervous system at all levels.
upon scientific
methodology,
and whatever value their approach may have, a matter in dispute, it is not to
be considered a scientific discipline. Thus it will be given no place
in the present
discussion.
It must be admitted, however, that even where there has been a conscious effort
to follow genuinely scientific principles much psychological theory tends to be
the outcome of inductive rather than deductive thinking. In this
respect we need
to take into consideration the timely warning sounded by G. S. Klein
and his colleagues,
that 'the study of personality continues to he a many-faceted field,
with diverse
conceptions of its subject, and certainly not agreed upon demarcation
of the phenomena
that should be its proper concern as a distinctive speciality within psychology.25
In spite of the divergences of approach it is apparent that most psychologists
are prepared to begin with the 'person'. There is little of that old division
into 'mind' and 'body' which bedeviled early psychological theory as much as
the closely related concepts of 'soul' and 'body' still bedevil
theological thinking.
Irrespective of one's psychological outlook, it is generally agreed
that a study
of personality must arise out of a consideration of the whole human organism.
This is the case whether we are concerned with establishing the
sources of individual
differences or with the integrative functions that go to produce a
coherent organism.
H. Helson is concerned with the relevant variables that make up individuality
and he writes, 'personality is the person in the situation'.26 In the same way
those more concerned with intra-individual integration, that is to
say with those
processes which make for personal integration demonstrable through
specific functions,
again take the 'person' as their point of departure and the prime
object of analysis,
rather than some particular form of behavior or physiological process
in isolation.27
Thus the psychologist in his study of personality is concerned with
what G. Murphy
has called 'the interdependence of a large number of qualitatively
distinct attributes
in some sort of coherent whole'.28 Personality may thus be viewed as
an interlocking
of functions and traits, an architectural unity involving the whole
person. Moreover
this coherent interaction fulfills the function of maintaining identity across
a wide range of environmental conditions, thus making the organism to
some extent
independent of its enviroment. It should be made clear, however, that in saying
this we do not advocate that 'organismal' approach beloved of the
psychoanalysts.
We simply wish to make it clear that from the beginning the organism is a whole
and that this wholeness may he considered as the total personality.
The separate
parts, such as cognition, memory, affect, may he viewed one by one,
but the personality
itself cannot be considered in isolation as a 'system' of the body.
It should he noted that this approach involves us in two basic assumptions. In
the first instance we assume that man is an 'open-system'. That is to say lie
is capable of entering into transactions with surrounding
energy resources. Secondly it is assumed that man, in common with other living
systems, will always tend to preserve his identity, both in spite of
and because
of these energy transactions. In other words the 'person' as a coherent whole
possesses two distinct attributes. He has the ability to relate in a variety of
ways to his environment and at the same time relate to himself,
preserving himself
as an independent unit separate from the environment. These
tendencies will tend
to produce tension and, partially at least, we may see their outworking in the
phenomena of 'socialization' on the one hand, and 'individuation',
the 'self-concept',
on the other.29
It is thus assumed that the human organism possesses a genuine degree
of self-regulation,
and further, this is considered explicable, ultimately, in psychological terms.
The integrative functions of the organism are to be described in
terms of inborn
behavioural tendencies, imprinted genetic patterns and the response patterns of
the central nervous system. It might well be asked whether these
somewhat mechanistic
terms are adequate to describe such a complex picture as human
personality. Some
psychologists have preferred to see personality in terms of value concepts and
describe behaviour as that which endows human action with meaning.
Such concepts
however, are matters of belief not verification. They may he true but
they cannot
be proved. C. W. Allport states the heart of the problem succinctly
as he writes,
the 'theoretical issue is not the truth or falsity of any particular
formulation
for some particular occasion. The question is rather where do the
primary dynamics
of human life lie? Shall we say that our patient suffers from a
biochemical intolerance,
or from an intolerable loss of self-respect? Both statements may be true; but to
science it seems more objective, less animistic and mystical, to
attack the problem
at the biochemical level where cause and effect are easier to perceive'.30 The
problem with all value-orientated judgments and categories is quite simply that
they are unable to provide us with any experimentally testable hypothesis.
Clearly much of our approach will be conditioned by individual preference, but
in this respect it needs to be remembered that if psychology is to be
considered
as a science then it must be prepared to be governed by the same
objectivity and
discipline that mark the more exact sciences. The scientist must be governed by
the results of experiment and observation; his conclusions must he
based on these
alone. He is concerned with the answer to the question 'how?' and not that of
the ultimate 'why?' of existence. On this basis the problem of personality is
to be answered in terms of psychology and biochemistry and not in the realms of
metaphysical speculation. Reverting to Allport's example, biochemical
intolerance
can be measured and, in principle at least, corrected. On the other hand a loss
of self-respect, while a genuine entity in terms of intra-and
inter-personal relationships,
is merely a descriptive term to describe the outward effects of the underlying
physiological abnormality. The theologian or philosopher is entitled to use the
categories of value-judgments, the scientist is not.
The psychologist thus has to interpret personality in terms of the
physiological
mechanisms of the body. Recent work in a number of fields, much of it popular
knowledge, has made it apparent that the expression of personality is
intimately
connected with the central
nervous system. The behavioural changes which the manipulations of neurosurgery
can induce, the increasing knowledge of the pharmacology of such substances as
the mono-amine oxidase inhibitors, lysergic acid derivatives, the amphetamines,
and tryptamine derivatives, all of which are capable of producing
changes in personality
and behaviour, make it abundantly clear that in personality we are dealing with
something which is biochemical in its origin. Further, the
personality breakdowns
which occur in such conditions as schizophrenia are due,
fundamentally, to biochemical
abnormalities and disturbances of neuro-cellular metabolism. This is seen again
in other pathological conditions where the primary fault may lie in genetically
determined enzyme deficienees, disjunction of the nuclear genetic
material, vitamin
deficiencies or toxic substances acting on the brain, but where the result is
seen in personality disturbances.
It is not a case of "mind" and "body", but rather of a unified, integrated, functioning person, the architectural unity of a single personality.
The widening frontiers of neurophysiology have revealed the complex
system organization
which relates the cortical and autonomic arousal systems and the
interrelationships
of cortical and sub-cortical units. Not that these functions cannot
be considered
in isolation; each system is dependent upon the integrity of the body
as a whole
and the correct inter-working of all its functions. The personality
may be unequivocally
related to this interworking. The integrity of the personality is to
be considered
dependent upon the proper functioning of the central nervous system
at all levels.
Viewing the available evidence N. Sanford writes, 'it is only to the activities
of the brain, the conserver of experience and the integrator of processes, that
we may ascribe the organization that is the most essential feature of
the personality'.31
H. J. Eyseoek is even more explicit. His conception of the
personality is explicitly
linked to the overall functioning of the central nervous system and
its processing
of information.32 Starting at neural levels he
postulates a genetically determined cortical and autonomic response to stimuli
out of which the structure of the total response of the organism develops, in
terms of conditioned behavior. The concept of conditioned responses is of vital
importance to our understanding of the development of human behaviour and the
structure of person ality.33 The practical importance will occupy us at a later
stage of the discussion.
From the standpoint of scientific psychology it is possible to say
that the coherent
whole which we term personality is dependent upon the integrity and
proper functioning
of the central nervous system. This in itself cannot be considered an isolated
entity for it is bound up with all parts of the organism's
functioning-the body's
systems do not work in isolation. Personality and bodily identity are
thus inseparable.
It is not a case of 'mind' and 'body', but rather of a unified,
integrated, functioning
person, the architectural unity of a single personality.34 Once again we would
assert that the concept of 'the soul' as something distinct within man can have
no meaning. From the psychological point of view, as from
the Christian, man is a unity.
Some Conclusions
If our argument thus far has carried any weight it will be apparent
that the concept
of 'soul' as some immaterial and immortal part of man should be abandoned. The
data provided by psychology on the one hand and religion on the other, although
approaching the problem from widely differing standpoints, both point
to the inescapable
conclusion that man is an indivisible entity. For this reason it may
well be that
we should abandon the use of the word 'soul' altogether since it will
be impossible
at this stage to rid it of the Platonic overtones it has carried for so long.
Our study leads us to affirm that the concept of 'the soul' has no
place in religion
or psychology. Psychologists would be unanimous in discarding the word since it
belongs to the realm of metaphysics and not to the realm of
observable phenomena
and scientific investegation. Equally, from the standpoint of the
Christian religion,
the idea of the 'sour as a distinctive entity must be rejected as
unbiblical and
belonging to the speculative world of Greek philosophy. We would emphasize with
0. Cullmann that 'the teaching of the great philosophers Socrates and Plato can
in no way be brought into consonance with the New Testament.35
In place of these fragmentary concepts we put forward the view of man
as a living
being, a vital organism, expressing this vitality of his existence through his
personality. The personality thus becomes the expression of his
being. It is the
observed and observable phenomena of the total life displayed through
inter-personal relationships.36 Such a view of personality leads us to a further
important concept,
that personality can only be developed in terms of community, in
terms of 'I-thou'
relationships. From the religious point of view this will mean not
only the adequate
development of horizontal, inter-personal relationships, but, and
primarily, the
development of a correct vertical relationship between man and God. Much of our
psychiatric practice is concerned with the breakdown of personality
under conditions
of stress. Such breakdowns interfere with the development of those
normal relationships
which belong to the proper outworking of personality and are essential for the
maintenance of its integrity.
The fact that man's redemption is a bodily event bears with it a corollary that any future state must be peopled by real beings and not incorporeal spirits
It is at this point that there is a close contact between religion
and psychology.
The biblical emphasis is consistently upon the wholeness of being which belongs
to the fully integrated person. This wholeness is commonly expressed
in the word
'peace' which to the Hebrew mind meant far more than merely the
absence of strife.
In Greek thought, as in modern Western, peace was viewed as a state,
but in biblical
thought peace denotes 'well being' in every department of life. The essential
feature of the Christian gospel is that the coming of Christ has brought peace
to man in its fullest aspect. The reality of this peace denotes the
present fact
of the new creation and the restoration of the whole man; it is God's
salvation.
The biblical emphasis is upon the fact that man astray from God can never know
true harmony of being-there is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked' (Isa. lvii.
21). On the other hand God's healing is extended to the humble and
contrite, restoring
the fullness of their being (Isa. lvii. 15-19). This God-given
wholeness of personality
is evidenced in the 'fruit of the Spirit' (Gal. v. 22f.), traits
which every competent
psychologist would recognize as belonging to genuine maturity in the
development
of personality.
The Christian would maintain that such wholeness and maturity belong
only to the
one whose life has been invaded by the power of the risen Christ. The
Lord Himself
said that He had come 'that they might have life, and that they might have it
more abundantly' (John x. 10). This is the fulness of life that comes
from a personality
correctly orientated at all levels. On this view it will be seen that
'redemption
must be accomplished as a bodily event'.37 Just as the intolerable
burden of guilt
affects every part of life, so the reality of liberation through Christ affects
the totality of the personality. Psychiatric methods by themselves do
not remove
the deep seated sickness of man, what D. M. Baillie has called the
'moral-failure
complex'.38 The liberation of man's total being belongs to the realm of divine
action.
The fact that man's redemption is a bodily event bears with it the corollary that any future state must be peopled by real beings and not incorporeal spirits.
From
the psychological point of view the personality is dependent upon the
full function
of the total organism; it has no existence in its own right as an
immaterial substance.
The same holds true from the biblical point of view, but to this is
added an additional
fact. 'The hope of the new corporeality is grounded in the bodily resurrection
of Jesus'39, a fact that the New Testament makes abundantly clear (Rom. viii.
11; I Cor. xv. 20-22, etc.). Christ has conquered death and has introduced into
life the new dimension of incorruptibility (II Tim. i. 10). This is already at
work in the being of him who is 'in Christ' and the process will be brought to
fruition at the Day of His Coming. There is not space to develop this
and in particular
how the personality can exist after death. The clue may well lie in
Paul's expression,
'them also which sleep through (dia=by the agency of) Jesus' (I Thess, iv. 14).
By the agency of Christ the transfer of being from one plane of
existence to another
is accomplished. The exact nature of this intermediate state must he a matter
of speculation and thus unverifiable. Without prolonging the
discussion we would
suggest that in some way it involves the preservation of personality within the
corporate personality of the body of Christ.40
Finally, we must touch upon the subject of conditioning. If our psychological
viewpoint is correct, the development of conditioned responses is of
prime importance
in the formation of the total personality.4' In one sense this is seen in the
development of conscience. This regulatory mechanism is dependent for
its origin
upon the initiation of conditioned responses to certain 'value-situations' and
in particular those developed in childhood. For this reason an
uninformed conscience
is an unreliable guide, in spite of the advice of Jimmy Cricket. The biblical
writers were well aware of the value of conditioning, as one writer
puts it, 'Train
up a child in the way he should go; and when he is old he
will not depart from it' (Prov. xxii. 6). Total freedom of choice is
an impossibility,
there are too many factors impinging upon us. The anarchists' dream would lead
to the destruction of genuine personality. The Christian responsibility, both
from religious and psychological standpoints, is to ensure the
correct conditioning
of their children which will lead to the full maturity of personality
in relation
to Christ. Inevitably much has been omitted from our discus
sion and lack of space has necessitated dogmatism without proof. Nonetheless,
if our approach has been valid it will produce a more realistic
awareness of the
truth and the hope that underlies our credal affirmation, 'I believe . . . in
the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting. Amen.'
REFERENCES
1See especially Phaedo 78E ff. Note also Republic 10. 608C ff.,
Timaues 90A ft.
For Aristotle the soul was not so much a separate entity as the formal cause of
the living body. See further C. S. W. Taylor, 'Forms as Causes in the Phaedo',
Mind (t969), LXXVIII. pp. 309 ff.
20. Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the
Dead (London, 1958), pp. 19 f.
3See further, C. Bigg, The Christian Platonists of Alexandria
(Oxford, 1968).
4This is especially developed in De qualitate auiosae. A good
introduction to the period is G. Leff, Medieval Thought;
St. Augustine to Ockham (London, 1958).
5Sumna Theol. I. 75. 6. For further details of Aquinas and his thought see, F.
C. Copleston, Aquinas (London, 1955).
6Institutes, I. 15.
7John Marsh The Fulness of Time (London, 1952), is probably right in asserting
that 'it would seem to be as characteristic for the reformed
theologian to follow
Plato as for the catholic to be Aristotelian.' p. 17.
8L, Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, 1941), pp. 191 ff.
9E. Saner, The Dawn of World Redemption (ET, London, 1953), pp. 39 ft.
100ther recent works which continue to propound the traditional concept of the
soul include J. M. Shaw, Christian Doctrine (London, 1953), E. L.
Mascall, The
Importance of Being Human (London, 1958), and T. C. Hammond, In Understanding
be Men (Rev. D. F. Wright, London, 1968). Similar views are stated in the older
but still widely recognized and valued works of A. H. Strong, C.
Hodge, etc.
11
These differences have been carefully worked out by T.
Roman, Hebrew Thought compared with Greek (ET,
London, 1960).
12Basie lexicographical data have been derived from L. Kohler
and W. Baomgartner, Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti
Libros (Leidea, 1953), for the Old Testament and W. F.
Arndt and F. W. Gingerich, A Greek-English Lexicon of
the New Testament (Cambridge, 1957), for the New Testament.
13Note T. Roman, op. cit. pp. 205 f. 'According to Israelite
conception everything
is in eternal movement; Cod and man, nature and the world . . the
Greeks describe
reality as being, the Hebrews as movement.'
14A. R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel
(Cardiff, 1949), pp. 9ff.
15G. A. F. Knight, A Christian Theology of the Old Testament
(London, 1959), p. 34.
16W. Eiehrodt, The Theology of the Old Testament (ET, London, 1967),
p. 137. See
also E. C. Rust, Nature and Man in Biblical Thought (London, 1953), pp. 101 ff.
It is surprising to find a scholar of the calibre of L. Kohler, writing that,
'soul is therefore the (individualized) spirit, delimited by its connexion with
a body.' Old Testament Theology (ET, London, 1957), p. 145.
17This conception is carried over into the New Testament. While here
the. Spirit
of God is personalized and related to Christ's life within the Church there is
still the implication that activity follows the 'filling of the
Spirit' (cf. Acts
2:4, 4:31, 13:9 fl, etc.).
18W. Eiclsrodt, op. cit. p. 149.
19H. Wheeler Robinson, The Christian Doctrine of Man (Edinburgh,
1911), p. 25.
20N. P. 'Williams, The ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin (London, 1927), p.
149.
21R. P. Shedd, Man in Community (London, 1958), p. 3. Note also J.
Klausner,
'there is nothing in all the teaching of Paul - . . which is not
grounded in the
Old Testament, or the Apocryphal-Pseudepigraphical and Tannaitie literature of
the time' From Jesus to Paul (New York, 1944), p. 482.
22This explains the New Testament emphasis on 'peace' as one of the
primary results
of the divine forgiveness, for peace denotes the wholeness and health
of a man.
23
A. F. Knight, op. cit. p. 37.
24. J. Eyseneck, The Uses and Abuses of Psychology (London, 1953), p. 226. It
is surprising how Freudian psychoanalysis seems to dominate religions thinking
on psychology. For example R. L. Shinn, Man: The New Humanism (London, 1968),
in the series 'New Directions in Theology Today', seems unaware of
any other form
of psychological thinking and E. White, "A Preface to Biblical
Psychology",
Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria Institute (1951), LXXXIII, pp. 51ff.
utilizes exclusively these categories of thought.
25
S. Klein. H. L. Barr and D. L. Welitzky, 'Personality', in Annual
Review of Psychology
(Palo Alto, 1967), 18, p. 467.
26
Nelson, Adaptation-Level Theory; An Experimental and
Systematic Approach to Behavior (New York, 1964), p. 541.
27See for example J. Loeringer, 'Person and Population as
Psychometric Concepts,'
in Psychol. Review (1965), 72, pp. 143-155.
28
Murphy, quoted in C. S. Klein, et al., op cit. p. 469.
29See further C. R. Rogers, 'Towards a Science of the Person', in
Behaviorism and
Phenomenology (ed. T. W. Wann). (Chicago, 1964), pp. 109-140.
30C. W. Allport, 'The Fruits of Eclecticism-Bitter or Sweet?' Acta
Psychol (1964),
23, pp. 2744.
31N. Sanford, 'Personality, Its Place in Psychology', in Psychology: The Study
of a Science (ed. S. Koch). (New
York, 1963), p. 554.
32H. J. Eyseneek, 'The Biological Basis of Personality', in Nature (1963), 199,
pp. 1031-34. See also his earlier work The Structure of Human
Personality (London,
1953).
33See further Ft. J. Eyseneck, 'Conditioning and Personality,' in
Brit J. Psychol.
(1962), 53, pp. 299-305 and, 'Principles and Methods of Personality
Description,
Classification and Diagnosis', in Brit. J. Psychol. (1964), 55, pp.
284-294.
34A philosophical, as distinct from purely psychological, case has
been convincingly
made out for the inseparability of personality and bodily identity by B. A. 0.
Williams, 'Personal Identity and Individuation', in Essays in
Philosophical Psychology
(ad. H. A. Custafson). (London, 1967), pp. 324-345.
350. Cullmann, op. cit. p. 60.
36As a full definition this may be inadequate and we are forced to admit with
IV. L, Carrington, that "there is no simple and yet adequate
definition"
of personality (Psychology, Religion and Human Need (London, 1957), p. 40.
37V. Eiclsrodt, op. cit. p. 149. He goes on to emphasize that the conquest of
death is to he envisaged 'not in the impossible form of the
immortality of a spiritual
portion of man, but only in a new mode of existence for him as a
whole' (p. 156).
38D. M. Baillie, God Was in Christ (London, 1961), p. 164. His whole section on 'The
Need for Divine Forgiveness' (pp. 160-166) is worthy of careful attention.
39W. Knnneth, The Theology of the Resurrection (ET, London, 1951), p. 287.
40W. Kunneth, op. cit. pp. 270-276, rightly emphasizes the theological
importance
of the 'intermediate state.' See further the discussions of 0. Cullmann, op. cit.
pp. 48.57 and E. Stautfer, New Testament Theology (ET, London, 1955),
pp. 210-213.
41The dangers of conditioning are well illustrated by H. J. Eyseneck, 'The Technology of Consent', in
New Scientist (1969, 42,
655, pp. 688-690.
IV. Sargant's Battle for the Mind (London, 1959), is probably still
the best popular
introduction to the subject.
*
Another of the sister organizations of the ASA in Great Britain is the Victoria
Institute. This paper is reprinted from the Autumn 1970 issue of
Faith and Thought,
the Journal of the Victoria Institute, by the kind permission of the Assistant
Secretary, Brian H. T. Weller, and the Editor, Dr. B. F. Clark. The author, Dr.
James Keir Howard, is a graduate in Medicine of the University of Edinburgh and
in Theology of the University of London. He was for some years
engaged in missionary
service in Zambia, Central Africa, and is now resident in Southport
and is Principal
Medical Officer in the Health Department of the City of Liverpool. In addition
to papers on nutritional problems, he has also published some 40 papers and two
books on theology. Besides his concerns in medicine and theology, lie also has
interests in natural history, archaeology, music and the growth of dahlias.