Science in Christian Perspective
Christian Philosophy of Science: An Unfinished Business
ARTHUR F. HOLMES
Department of Philosophy
Wheaton College, Wheaton, Illinois 60187
From: JASA 23 (March 1971): 4-6.
What contribution does the Christian philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd1
make to the
philosophy of science? This was the question debated for four days
and four nights
by the group of scientists and philosophers who met at Wheaton
College in December
1969. Their discussions and disagreements clarified in this
observer's mind some
salient features of Dooyeweerd's philosophy and identified the
problems in philosophy
of science to which he speaks. The seminar as a whole provided a
worthwhile preamble
to further inquiry which is needed in this area.
I. THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT
(1) Dooyeweerd insists that all theoretical thought has pretheoretic
roots.' Life
is prior to learning; the
lived-world is both logically and chronologically prior to scientific
abstraction;
the presuppositions by which a man lives will shape his theoretical
work as well
as his naive experience. The presuppositions by which a man lives are basically
religious, in the sense that they embody his ultimate beliefs and values, the
orientation of his heart either toward or away from God. Consciously
or unconsciously,
to some extent be it small or great, be it evident or hidden, be it
consistently
or inconsistently developed, what we are in relation to God shows up in the way
we think. Theoretical thought has pretheoretical, "transcendental,"
religious roots. As Robert Knudsen put it, "One who is occupied
theoretically
can, as it were, look back over his shoulder, to the religious motive which is
driving his activity and which is establishing its orientation."
Dooyeweerd
accordingly insists on a "transcendental method" in both critical and
constructive thought.
(2) In critical thought, this means examining the
"transcendental" presuppositions
of a thinker. Calvin Seerveld illustrated it by pointing out the
effect of naturalistic
assumptions on the aesthetic theories of people like John Dewey and
Susanne Langer,
and by comparing a series of classic paintings by Christian and
nonChristian artists
of a similar subject. His point was that both in aesthetic theory and
in artistic
practice, a man reveals the religious orientation of his life.
However, this was
not illustrated as specifically in regard to the criticism of either theory or
practice in the natural sciences.
The presuppositions by which a man lives are basically religious, in the sense that they embody his ultimate beliefs and values, the orientation of his heart either toward or away from God.
(3) In constructive thought, the transcendental method gives careful
and explicit
attention to Christian presuppositions. The Christian believes the Creator to
be a Sovereign Law-Giver, the structure of whose law is evident in creation and
is both objective and universally binding. Aesthetics, logic,
psychology, physics
and every other science should therefore conform. Dooyewcerd, it
should he noted,
extends the term "science" to any theoretical discipline
concerned with
a distinct aspect of human experience. There are at least 15 such sciences, for
human experience discovers at least 15 distinct aspects of
experience, each subject
to the law of Cod. In each case, as Van Riessen pointed out with
regards to physical
science, the scientist needs a carefully defined concept of the
aspect of experience
with which his discipline is concerned, and a careful understanding
of what makes
possible a scientific statement in his particular science, if he is
to work effectively
in his particular "law sphere". Each science is somewhat different in
these regards, different in its subject matter and different in its
methodology.
Each is therefore sovereign within its own sphere, free from the reductionism
that would annex one science to another regardless of differences in
the objective
law structure on which the sciences depend.
(4) Finally, Dooyeweerd insists that each science, while distinct, is related
to the others in a coherent whole, for all creation bears witness and points to
one Law-Giver. But it bears witness in the hearts of men [see (1) above] where
we either grasp or reject that unity of meaning through the orientation of the
heart towards God. A wrong religious orientation misconceives the
unity of meaning,
and can therefore distort the relationships of the sciences and
deceive us about
the concept and methods of a particular science. [See (3) above.]
This has happened
historically, and this is why transcendental criticism is needed.
[See (2) above.]
There, in overly brief form, are four salient features of
Dooyeweerd's philosophy.
In sum, theoretical thought is both subjectively and objectively dependent. In
neither case is it autonomous: objectively, it depends on the
law-structure created
by a Sovereign God; subjectively, it depends on the pretheoretieal, religious roots from which
both life and thought issue.
II. PROBLEMS IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
To what problems in the philosophy of science does the foregoing speak, and how
directly? I shall comment on four problems that were identified in
the discussions.
1. The foundations of science. Ever since David flume exposed the
limits of empiricism
by opening up the logical problems connected with causation and
induction, philosophers
of science have been probing this matter. Some have retained an
empirical approach
by resorting to a purely operational or instrumentalist view of science. Others
have reverted to intuitionism or formalism. The problem affects the foundations
of mathematics and logic (which Dooyeweerd regards as sciences) as well as the
more experimental sciences, and it has concerned phenomenologists like Flusserl
and analysts like Russell as well as metaphysicians like Whitehead.
Dooyeweerd too is concerned about it. His transcendental criticism scores other
approaches for assuming the autonomy of theoretic thought, as if the
foundations
of science are somehow immanent within science itself. This, he
declares apostate;
it ignores both the transcendental (subjective) roots and the
Godgiven (objective)
law-structure of science.
Is this sufficient, however? Granted that other approaches are non-Christian,
just what Christian alternative is proposed? Does it have to altogether bypass
intuitionism and formalism and all kinds of empiricism as if the problem they
addressed is a pseudo-problem, horn in apostate minds? Perhaps the
problem needs
restating (just how it would be restated is not altogether explicit), but is it
completely and utterly inconsistent for the Christian to be an empiricist of
sorts,
or an intuitionist? Why? What we need is a careful Christian
appraisal of intuitionism
(et al), its roots and its fruits, in mathematics and other sciences. This is
unfinished business.
(2) Reductionism. Especially since Auguste Comte attempted his classification
of the sciences, we have witnessed attempts of various sorts to
reduce the methods
and concepts of one science to those of another, or of all sciences to those of
just one. This is characteristic of positivism past and present, of
historicism,
psychologism, etc. It is resisted, however successfully, by
phenomenologists like
Flusserl and analysts like Wittgenstein, and it is resisted by Dooyeweerd.
His vehicle is the theory of law-spheres, each a sovereign state independent of
the others, and each concerned with a distinct aspect of experience.
If his theory
properly represents the objective law-structure of creation, such that the law
of God is inevitably fragmented into at least 15 different modes when
it intrudes
into temporal existence, then he certainly offers a powerful
alternative to reductionism.
But it was the irreducibility of law-spheres which provoked most dissent at the
conference. (a) Dooyeweerd's thesis supposes a kind of gulf between
time and eternity
that is not necessarily Biblical. (b) The fixity of law-spheres is too like the
old fixity of species to make the scientist happy. It appears to be an imposed
dogma rather than an evident structure. Instances were cited where
purported law-spheres
appear to merge; and the case for fixity is not helped by
accommodating the law-spheres
to such phenomena.
(c) The relationship betwen man-made classifications (whether of sciences or of
pre-scientific experience) and Divinely created structures remains
unclear. Within
each science, it seems the scientist is responsible for his own
classifications.
But in the overall the philosopher provides an a priori structure for
classifying
the sciences themselves.
Dooyeweerd's alternative to reductionism, then, as well as his view
of the foundations
of science, leaves a great deal of unfinished business.
(3) The status of scientific law and theory. The tendency in science today is
to regard laws as manmade formulations, rather than necessary
structures. It was
not always so. Greek and Medieval science conceived of real forms immanent in
nature, and Renaissance science had its imposed laws of motion: in both cases
the structure of things is both immanent and necessary. Nineteenth
century science,
with its positivist reaction against metaphysics, contented itself
more with descriptive
generalizations, and the present emphasis on models and constructs
and operational
definitions has not departed as far from that tradition as we
sometimes suppose.
Dooyeweerd reminds us that the creation of a sovereign God is through
and through
ordered and purposeful. There are no bare, unrelated facts waiting to
be structured
according to the convenience of men. The law-structure is objectively real, and
the scientist is responsible to it. Scientific theory has objective controls as
well as instrumental values.
Dooyeweerd reminds us that the creation of a sovereign God is through
and through
orderly and purposeful. There are no bare, unrelated facts waiting to
be structured
according to the convenience of men. The law-structure is objectively real, and
the scientist is responsible to it.
It follows that operationahsm, phenomcnalism, instrumentalism, and
related views
of scientific knowledge are insufficient, for science should get at
real structures,
interpretive and fallible though it be. But how does one get at real
law-structures
in his particular science? What are the respective roles of models
and constructs
and experimental procedures? What relation has theory to fact and
fact to theory
in conceptformation and confirmation procedures? Just how do
religious roots affect
different views of scientific explanation?
Specifically how and how far do they
affect the procedures and assumptions of the working scientist? Until
these questions
are carefully answered, Dooyeweerd leaves us with some important
generalizations,
but with an incomplete philosophy of science. This too is unfinished
business.
(4) Subjectivity and objectivity in science. The scientist is a
historical person,
with both individuality and temporal limitations. Writers like J. Bronowski and
T. S. Kuhn and Michael Polanyi have stressed the effect these factors have on
theoretical thought, while Israel Scheffler has recently urged caution in his
Science
and Subjectivity. Dooyewecrd's contribution here is his insistence on
the fundamental
influence of religious subjectivity in and through and above all other aspects
of personal and historical existence, and the demand that we
understand the nature
of scientific objectivity accordingly.
But this has to be worked out more fully in regard to science as a whole and in
regard to each particular science. What does objectivity mean in sociology, and
how does it differ from objectivity in physics or in mathematics? Are
subjective
influences equally evident in all sciences, or are there differences of degree
depending on the proximity of a science to (say) theology and ethics? Why is it
easier to detect the influence of non-Christian presuppositions in
painting than
in mathematics? In order to answer these questions, we must see more precisely
how religious presuppositions relate to the "presupposita"
of each particular
science. This too is unfinished business.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The unfinished nature of the project may be an illusion created by my lack of
understanding. But at present it seems to be also due to the
limitations of Dooyeweerd's
philosophy, including the technicality and obscurity of his language
and the seeming
rigidity of his system, and to the fact that the transcendental method has not
yet been pressed far enough to the kind of questions we have raised.
What difference does it make to the research scientist or the teacher? In the
first place, we have been discussing the philosophy of science, which
is theurretical
thought about science, not the teaching of science or its
experimental procedures.
Whatever difference it makes, therefore, will be indirect rather than
immediate.
In the second place, practical consequences will not become clear until some of
the unfinished theoretical business is taken care of more completely.
The effect
of philosophy of science on science comes via such things as the relationship
between the sciences, the bearing of theory on fact, and the nature
of objectivity.
Just how Dooyeweerd's approach to these subjects affects the laboratory and the
classroom is not yet fully clear.
This much, however, can be said: (1) Science cannot be isolated from religious
and philosophical considerations, for in them it finds its own logical basis,
and gains selfunderstanding. (2) The scientist must be religiously
and "world-viewishly"
awake, alert to the role of religious motives and philosophical presuppositions
in his work. (3) It must be stressed with renewed clarity that the scientific
enterprise is a Divine calling to explore the ways in which the whole creation
reveals the law of God, and so bears witness to its Creator.
FOOTNOTE
1The uninitiated reader is directed to Dooyeweerd's In the
Twilight of Western Thought (Philadelphia: Presbyterian
& Reformed Publishing Co., 1960), and to J. M. Spier,
What is Calvinistic Philosophy? (Grand Rapids: Eerdman's,
1953). Dooyeweerd's magnum opus is his four-volume
New Critique of Theoretical Thought (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1953).